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Abstract 
 
 
In this dissertation I look at various ways in which the relation between gamers 
and games has been discussed in video game culture in recent years. Gamers and 
games are currently being positioned by many scholars and industry experts as 
experiencing a series of major changes. From one perspective, gamers are said to 
be getting more and more access to the means of production of video games. 
Video games, in turn, are frequently analysed in terms of the effects they can have 
on their users. I argue that the discourses surrounding these phenomena have 
the effect of reinforcing the separation between gamers and games, considering 
both terms as separate and distinct entities. Throughout this dissertation I offer a 
series of readings of the relationship between the two, of how this relationship is 
currently being discussed by various actors and of how it could be narrated 
otherwise. I look at the narratives about the historical origins of both gamers and 
games, the conflicts between consumers and publishers, the production of 
independent games and the use of games for doing things. Drawing on 
deconstruction (Derrida 1976, 1980, 1985, 1988) and cultural and media studies 
scholarship, I interrogate the mechanisms behind many of the stories 
surrounding the contaminated and parasitical relations (Serres 1982) between 
gamers and games, whereby both categories are seen as emerging from the 
process of boxing consumers and products into discrete entities. I offer a reading 
of contemporary video game culture through a study that aims to encourage all 
of us who study and play (with) games to raise ethical questions for our own role 
in shaping the objects of research and for our involvement in the discourses we 
produce, as both gamers and scholars. What is ultimately at stake in this project 
is the possibility of outlining an alternative mode of thinking about the medium 
of the video game, one that blurs the distinction between studying, playing, 
making and living with video games through the invention of narratives about the 
unresolved relations (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) between gamers and games. 
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Introduction  
 
 
 
 
In recent years the discourses produced by scholars, journalists and industry 
experts surrounding the medium of the video game have often insisted on 
proclaiming a series of allegedly revolutionary changes when it comes to the 
relationship between gamers and games. These changes supposedly involve 
things that gamers do with games, such as modifications of existing games, forms 
of participatory co-creation of content or of entirely new games, and even 
hacking of games consoles and hardware. Conversely, transformations are also 
said to be happening in the understanding of what games can do to gamers, such 
as soliciting participation in processes of social change through political 
messages, and working as tools for self-improvement and socialisation. For 
instance, Ian Bogost has proposed in How to do Things with Videogames (2011c) 
that video games could be used for a variety of purposes such as improvement of 
a work environment, for promotional and political purposes, or even to create 
artworks. Moreover, according to several authors the allegedly new possibilities 
offered by the medium are apparently being progressively democratised as 
access to the means of production, promotion and distribution is widening. Anna 
Anthropy, in her text Rise of the Videogame Zinesters (2012), strongly argues that 
a new age for digital gaming is approaching, one where everyone will have access 
to the tools and skills required to make and release a video game. This, she says, 
will eventually lead to more diversity and to various minorities being 
represented better in video games. 
Similar claims supporting these visions of the future of the medium have 
been replicated by industry experts and game consumers alike, often through 
specialised and mainstream press. For instance, Sony Computer Entertainment 
has been promoting Gaming 3.0 as a leading concept for their business in this 
decade.1 According to Sony executives, Gaming 3.0 follows the 1.0 era of the early 
                                                 
1 Radd, D. (2007), ‘Gaming 3.0’, Bloomberg Business Week Innovation and Design, 9 March 2007 
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home consoles and the 2.0 era of online gaming. In the first two ages video game 
products remained unmodified by players after their purchase. Gaming 3.0 
focuses instead on the personalisation of the gaming experience, on continuous 
updates and, more importantly, on the user rather than the developer as a key 
figure in the production of new content within the game. Gaming 3.0 has been 
used by Sony as the leading principle behind its development of software and 
hardware in recent years. This includes products such as the PlayStation 
Network, an online environment where gamers can access a variety of services 
such as online gaming and social networking, now a key tool for Sony’s consoles. 
Also, Sony’s bestselling game series Little Big Planet (2008-ongoing), released for 
both home consoles and handheld devices, is framed in terms of the production 
of objects and levels designed by the players. The game offers, apart from a 
limited single-player experience, a series of tools to shape new parts of the game 
to be shared online with other gamers [See Appendix: images 1 and 2]. 
Probably as a consequence of the trend of involving gamers in the 
production of content, gamers are now much more prone to starting forms of 
mass protest whenever the possibility of being involved is denied to them. 
Ownership of the products, and freedom to manipulate them, are often causes of 
controversy between producers and consumers. As I will discuss in chapter three 
of this dissertation, the very same Sony’s PlayStation Network has been the 
target of what is so far the largest instance of hacking a game system, caused by 
Sony’s decision to alter and remove some of the features of its product without 
consulting the consumers first.2 
Moreover, the medium of the video game has been re-evaluated by many 
commentators as a tool which could potentially be used for social change and 
artistic expression. The availability of the means of production is seen as partly 
responsible for this re-evaluation. Easily accessible development tools (such as 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-03-09/gaming-3-dot-0businessweek-business-
news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; Krotoski, A. (2008), ‘Little Big Planet signals the start of 
‘Game3.0’’, The Guardian, 6 November 2008 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/nov/06/little-big-planet-lbp-indiegames-games 
[Last accessed 7/11/2014]. 
2 Quinn, B. and Arthur, C. (2011), ‘Playstation Network hackers access data of 77 million users’, 
The Guardian, 26 April 2011 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/apr/26/playstation-network-hackers-data [Last 
accessed 7/11/2014]. 
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Unity, Twine, the RPG Game Maker series or Microsoft’s now dismissed XNA) and 
forms of financing such as crowdsourcing have in fact allowed for more diverse 
people to be involved in making games. Such games are not necessarily presented 
as being made with the intention of selling enough to repay the initial 
investment, and instead propose experimental forms of game design that would 
not receive support from more established publishers because of their 
experimental or politically controversial content.3 Players are now seen, in the 
reports and talks about the state of the industry, as capable of making and 
publishing their own independent games, reaching wide markets through online 
distribution.4  
Drawing on this trend in which video games are seen as widely accessible 
tools and potentially useful for the creation of social and political awareness, the 
last few years have also seen the rise of gamification, a phenomenon discussed in 
more detail in the final chapter of this dissertation. Gamification has been 
presented in the marketing and business sectors as a technique for applying 
game design in a non-game environment in order to increase the affiliation of 
customers. On top of its commercial purposes, gamification has also been 
claimed as the technique that will revolutionise the active participation of 
citizens in the public sphere. Game design is here seen as a technique to inspire 
the resolution of real-life problems, such as the improvement of physical health 
or raising public awareness of environmental issues, by assigning clear goals and 
rewards to the players/citizens. 
Indeed, similar stories have already appeared in the context of different 
media. Web 2.0 has been similarly centred on user engagement for the 
production of content on websites. The concept of the prosumer, a contraction of 
producer and consumer, has been circulating since its first official use by Alvin 
Toffler in his text The Third Wave (1980). For instance, the ideal player of Little 
Big Planet could be described as a prosumer, although in the context of a video 
                                                 
3 Examples of this trend are games such as Braid (Blow 2008), Cart Life (Hofmeier 2011), Papers, 
Please (Pope 2013) and the games by Molleindustria http://molleindustria.org [Last accessed 
7/11/2014]. These and many other examples of independent games will be extensively discussed 
in chapter four of this dissertation. 
4 The work of Anna Anthropy is particularly significant in this context. Anthropy is a game 
designer and author who has been narrating the events of her own personal life through video 
games: http://www.auntiepixelante.com/games/ [Last accessed 7/11/2014]. 
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game, as the act of playing involves a process of constructing the game itself by 
modelling and sharing new levels, characters’ costumes and other kinds of 
content. Also, attempts to re-imagine the gamers-games relationship have had 
several notorious predecessors in the last two decades of the history of digital 
gaming. In 1997, long before claiming the advent of a 3.0 era for digital gaming, 
Sony released Net Yaroze (in Japanese “yaroze” means “let’s work together” or 
“let’s do it”), a PlayStation development kit for the computer programming 
hobbyist [See Appendix: images 3 and 4]. The kit contained a Net Yaroze console 
and manuals to introduce users to game development techniques. In 1998 the 
Game Developer UK competition hosted the best games produced on Net Yaroze, 
and some of them were released in the last issue of Official PlayStation Magazine 
UK in March 2004. Although this was not the first time an official kit for 
producing games on a console had been released,5 Net Yaroze was the first 
technology released explicitly for game producer hobbyists that featured an 
official contest for the best home-made video game. A significant effort was made 
by the producer to sponsor and distribute the games. In 1998, the same year, the 
first edition of the Independent Games Festival took place in San Francisco, 
California. The event hosted games produced with an ‘indie spirit’, as the 
submission form put it (and still does, as seen in the documentation for the 2014 
event). The phenomenon of modifying and hacking video games has attracted the 
attention of video game magazines since the early 2000s. Some of these 
modifications were unofficial “patches” to the original software, that is, unofficial 
improvements and updates. Others were large-scale modifications of video game 
software, released unofficially on the Internet. The most notorious, Counter-
Strike, was a modification of Valve’s popular game Half Life. The duo who 
designed Counter-Strike unofficially modified the original single-player 
experience of Valve’s title into a multi-player game. The modification was later 
                                                 
5 Other official development kits for game consoles include: Develo (for NEC's PC Engine, 1987); 
WonderWitch (for Bandai's WonderSwan handheld console, 1999); GP32 (a handheld console 
developed by Korean manufacturer GamePark in 2001, which later became a tool for producing, 
sharing and hosting home-made video games). Early cases include: Bally's Astrocade, released in 
1977, which had a BASIC programming language cartridge for developing software; Family BASIC, 
1984, a development tool for Nintendo's console Famicom. Home computer Commodore64 had 
two interesting games/design tools: Boulder Dash Construction Kit (First Star Software 1986) and 
Shoot-em-up Construction Kit (Sensible Software 1987). Game construction sets are further 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. 
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acquired by Valve itself and is now part of its intellectual property [See Appendix: 
images 5 and 6]. 
Furthermore, over the same period, the game art scene caught the 
attention of gallery curators and art critics. Usually referred to as the production 
of drawings and animation in an early stage of game development, game art is 
now also used for artistic works inspired by or based on video games.6 Last but 
not least, machinima, short for “machine cinema”, became popular in the late 
1990s. Machinima are animation movies made by recording, editing and dubbing 
scenes from video games.7 This practice, which originally manifested quite an 
unexpected use of a video game, was first confined to what could be described as 
a subculture (Menotti 2014), mostly revolving around the recording sessions of 
players competing against each other. Later on, machinima became less 
dependent on the original texts from which the concept developed, and 
participants began to elaborate new stories made with video game graphics. Both 
the players and the commentators who were involved with the online 
communities devoted to machinima began describing these experiences as an 
example of the creative potential of video game consumers, who were now 
viewed in terms of their ability to reinterpret video game software for new 
purposes. 
As I will discuss in chapter two, these are only the most notorious and 
recent attempts to re-imagine some of the ways in which game consumers can 
engage with games. The emergence of similar design concepts can be seen in 
several products of the last decade. Little Big Planet by Sony has often been 
compared to Second Life by Linden Lab, originally released in 2006. Second Life is 
centred on the players as determining actors in shaping the online world. The 
islands of the online game are in fact empty spaces, to be filled with 3D objects 
                                                 
6 Introducing the book Gamescenes: Art in the Age of Videogames (Bittanti and Quaranta 2006), 
Matteo Bittanti describes game art as ‘any art in which digital games played a significant role in 
the creation, production, and/or display of the artwork. The resulting artwork can exist as a 
game, painting, photograph, sound, animation, video, performance or gallery installation’ (2006: 
9). He also distinguishes these works from ‘art games’, i.e. video games designed with artistic 
purposes and with no explicit relation to the previous titles.  
7 The website http://machinima.com, the most authoritative reference for machinima producers, 
explains what machinima is through a machinima video, now available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pGAt3R5oCY8 [Last accessed 18/09/2014]. In the video, 
the Counter-Strike police character explains that ‘machinima is filmmaking within a real-time 3D 
virtual environment of a video game. It's the use of video game graphics technology to create 
animated films.’ This is just before the terrorist character kicks in to ‘ruin the presentation…’. 
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designed by users. The opportunity to earn money for the exchange of these 
items and to convert the in-game currency into US dollars has made the 
experiment of Second Life particularly successful from a commercial standpoint 
[See Appendix: image 7]. The game Minecraft (2011), designed by the duo 
collectively known as Mojang, originally encouraged players to collaborate by 
offering few or no clues about how to proceed and move forward within the 
game. Minecraft puts the player in a world with no other human characters and 
no instructions on how to survive or what to do. Online communities of gamers 
have, however, created in-depth guides to, and videos about, the possibilities 
offered by the game by gathering the information collected by the dispersed 
players. The experience of playing Minecraft has been imagined since its early 
days design as being completely dependent on the existence of these online user-
generated guides [See Appendix: image 8]. 
In this dissertation, the term “gamers’ games” refers to the many and 
emerging cases in which the relation between gamers and games is presented as 
the outcome of a new framework in which the production and consumption of 
video games, as well their uses and effects, are being radically changed. These 
changes, as I have argued, include different aspects of video gaming, such as the 
democratisation of game production, the use of games for achieving specific 
effects, the appropriation and use of games and game technologies from the side 
of consumers and for unexpected purposes, and so on. However, I also claim that 
the stories surrounding gamers’ games, despite being so abundant in 
revolutionary claims, mostly tend to reinforce what we already knew about both 
terms. I argue, in fact, that these narratives are better understood as conservative 
descriptions of the state of events, as they confirm existing conceptual binaries 
and posited separations such as production and consumption, expected and 
unexpected uses and interpretations, as well as old and new technologies (with 
the newest supposedly having an unprecedented power to affect their users and 
the reality surrounding them). I also believe that the reliance on, and repetition 
of, the already existing conceptual frameworks, although in new guises, is not 
only a problem to be attributed to the marketing and industry parlance, which 
often takes the lead in shaping the discourses surrounding video game culture, 
but is also strongly present in the questions posed by gamers and game scholars 
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themselves. Furthermore, and as I would like to argue throughout this 
dissertation, these narratives have a performative value, as they bring about 
those same realities they describe. It is precisely because of this performative 
potential that, I propose, gamers’ games can prove to be relevant for the study of 
the medium in this contemporary period, as well as for the practices of playing 
with and making video games. Thanks to this capacity to generate and bring 
about the very reality it describes, the study of video games can imagine different 
configurations and modes of thinking about both gamers and games – starting 
from a reconsideration of what it is that separates the two in the first place. I will 
now further inquire into what I believe to be the key problem with gamers’ 
games, and illustrate the potentiality and necessity of a critique of this 
phenomenon. 
 
 
What is the problem with gamers’ games? 
 
I believe one of the main problems with gamers’ games is grounded in the 
obsession with newness that is so often replicated in the discourses surrounding 
them. Significant technological changes have indeed taken place that allow for 
unprecedented forms of collaboration between consumers, for the production 
and sharing of new games and for a wider accessibility to technologies for digital 
gaming. My query is with the ways in which this element of newness causes the 
freezing of the present condition and of the previous ones, confining game 
technologies into “boxes”, often equivalent to the products sold on the market. 
Kember and Zylinska, in Life After New Media (2012), effectively summarise how 
linear narratives of technological progress are entangled with a deterministic 
view of media, one that freezes media into isolated tools. They also argue that 
such a process of isolation has to do with the temporality of a ‘developmental 
narrative’: 
 
The old versus new division […] not only brings together affect and matter but 
also inscribes media into a progressive developmental narrative. In other 
words, it introduces the question of time into debates on media while 
simultaneously freezing this question by immediately dividing ‘media time’ into 
a series of discrete spatialized objects, or products that succeed one another. 
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Thus we are said to progress from photography to Flickr, from books to e-
readers. (2012: 3) 
 
The process of the ‘temporal freezing’ of technologies dedicated to digital gaming 
is replicated, for instance, when the alleged democratisation of video game 
development is said to be happening because of Twine, Unity and other licensed 
production tools. Something similar occurs when the involvement of consumers 
in the production of content is said to be happening through and thanks to 
Second Life, Minecraft, Little Big Planet and other game environments identifiable 
as packaged products – environments which are open to users’ modifications but 
which are still branded as cohesive wholes. These and other similar causal 
relations are often present in the discourses produced by industry experts and 
specialised journalism. I argue that these and other similar narratives of newness 
and determinism tend to simplify or completely overshadow the ideological and 
political implications that underlie the emergence of participatory and open 
forms of production and consumption. Moreover, in the academic analyses the 
reassuring idea that openness and access might be good per se and the 
implications of re-evaluating the individual as an agent of change through 
personal entrepreneurship are rarely debated. 
Let me now introduce two examples that are paradigmatic of the issues I 
have just outlined. The first is a series of speeches delivered by US president 
Barack Obama supporting the democratisation and wide accessibility of game 
production and its potential for education. During the Computer Science 
Education Week in December 2013, in what soon became a popular speech 
among gamer communities, Obama invited students to not ‘just play a video 
game’ but also to ‘make one’.8 The speech was part of a longer series of direct 
appeals promoting a wider adoption of computer science in educational 
programmes. Previously, Obama’s administration also promoted the use of video 
games to ‘solve problems’.9 In March 2011 Obama invited the students of the 
Tech Boston Academy to ‘be stuck on a video game that’s teaching you something 
                                                 
8 De Loura M. and Paris R. (2013) ‘Don’t Just Play on Your Phone, Program It’, The White House 
Blog, 9 December 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/12/09/don-t-just-play-
your-phone-program-it [Last accessed 7/11/2014] 
9 Gaydos M. (2012) ‘Using Video Games to Solve Problems’, The White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, 15 April 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/15/using-
video-games-solve-problems [Last accessed 7/11/2014] 
 13 
other than just blowing something up’.10 The second case I want to discuss is an 
advertisement by the international bank HSBC, released in January 2013 as part 
of the In the Future campaign commissioned from the agency JWT Dubai.11 In this 
video we see Emir, a young man from Istanbul, making a video game called Sticky 
Weasel. In the plot of the advertisement, the game suddenly and unexpectedly 
reaches worldwide popularity, with people everywhere in the world playing it on 
their mobile phones. The boy decides to protect the trademark, merchandise the 
game and further expand the brand. Ultimately Sticky Weasel inspires the 
production of a film and Emir goes to Hollywood, where he is interviewed on the 
red carpet of the movie premiere. All this happens thanks to HSBC, which 
guarantees funding of the project and lets it attain popularity in a global market. 
In the final scene, Emir’s mother stops her son from working and reminds him it 
is time for dinner, which should probably remind us that HSBC is a global bank 
that also preserves local values, as is repeated in their slogan [See Appendix: 
images 9 and10]. 
 These examples are not only paradigmatic of the wide popularity reached 
by a new and positive understanding of the medium of the video game also on 
the part of political and financial organisations. They are also examples of the 
contradictions and of the rather repetitive nature of the stories that are usually 
told, by industry experts and commentators, about the things that gamers can 
now do with video games, and that games can do to gamers. The similarities 
between these two examples go beyond the reference to video games. In both 
cases we are presented with a scenario where it is the responsibility of the 
individual to take risks and reap eventual benefits resulting from work – a 
practice that now potentially includes making video games. However, the 
proposed liberating effects of the technological and social evolution that should 
allow this new scenario are moderated by the not-too-subtle confirmation of 
already existing economic and power relations. HSBC remind us that for each 
Emir, or any other self-made, one-person company and independent 
                                                 
10 Lee J. (2011) ‘President Obama Talks Education in Boston: “A Moral and Economic Imperative 
to Give Every Child the Chance to Succeed”’, The White House Blog, 8 March 2011, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/08/president-obama-talks-education-boston-
moral-and-economic-imperative-give-every-chil [Last accessed 7/11/2014] 
11 JWT Dubai (2013) App Tycoon campaign, 
https://www.jwt.com/en/dubai/work/hsbcapptycoon/ [Last accessed 7/11/2014] 
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entrepreneur who accepts President Obama’s suggestion to make games, there 
must be a significant investment that makes that dream possible and guarantees 
a safety net in case of failure. 
In chapter four I will further inquire into the political layer that pervades 
the alleged democratisation of the production of video games. Authors such as 
Julian Ku cklich (2005) and Olli Sotamaa (2009, 2010) have considered the 
political and economic perspectives involved in the processes of video game 
production, particularly in relation to contemporary forms of independent game 
making. Sotamaa suggests that ‘the increased access to the means of media 
production does [...] not necessarily equate to increased freedom’ (2009: 99). 
Ku cklich notices how individualised forms of game production could be defined 
as precarious labour, which ends up being reliant on the already established 
publishers who, in their own turn, can now outsource any risk involved in the 
production process. 
However, the problem I see here is not only concerned with the 
inequalities confirmed or introduced in the video game industry by 
individualised and precarious forms of labour. It has also to do with how 
contemporary changes in video game culture replicate existing ideologies 
already framing the understanding of the individual as an agent of social and 
cultural change. From my perspective the new trends of video game culture 
appear to be mimicking, rather than revolutionising, the oppressive and 
constraining dynamics of over-individualised labour. 
 In both of my examples, actors from a position of power in the political 
and financial world have been replicating common sense claims of innovation 
and a fascination with the newness of technologies, taking for granted the 
deterministic effects that these should have on society as a whole. In both cases it 
is an allegedly linear technological evolution that leads us to the current 
scenario: Emir uses online communication, smartphones and laptops in almost 
every scene of the 30-second advertisement, while Obama reminds us that this 
change he is now seeking follows naturally from the invention of the Internet – 
also presented as an outcome of public investment in science and research.12 
                                                 
12 The full quote of Obama’s words is reported on the White House blog: ‘…and in the same way 
that we invested in the science and research that led to the breakthroughs like the Internet, I’m 
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However, if the skills required in media production and the necessary technology 
are becoming more easily available, as Lister et al. (2009: 33-35) acknowledge 
while discussing computer-based technologies, it is also true that video games, 
being computer-based since their origin, have not followed the same path. 
The progressive evolution towards a wide accessibility of the necessary 
equipment, often claimed by institutionalised voices in statements about gamers' 
games, does not look like an evolution and, even if it is one, is certainly not 
progressive. Low-budget productions in the video game industry were the norm 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, when bedroom coders – that is, one or a few 
programmers who managed a whole game development company – designed the 
majority of video game products. As previously mentioned, teams of a similar 
size now seem to be re-emerging under the label of independent, with the old 
publishers now substituted by new gatekeepers such as Valve and Microsoft. 
These publishers now promote and sell in their online markets, retaining a 
certain percentage of the final price, those independent games they believe can 
generate the largest profits for themselves. In doing so, they also confirm their 
position of power, as their choice of which games to sell often determines the 
economic success of those same games. 
 The argument I propose is not simply a case against newness and 
determinism as incorrect or untrue descriptions of a more complex reality. I am 
much more interested in seeing how these descriptions came about and what 
else could be said about the same phenomena. Newness and determinism are a 
problem, from my perspective, because of their reassuring and comforting 
function of confirming the notions we already have about media and technologies 
– of which video games are here a more specific case. As argued by Caroline 
Bassett (2007), newness and determinism have a strong ideological force, as 
newly introduced information technologies are ‘often perceived to be powerful 
or transformative, able to create new cultural forms and practices, remediate 
others and render others still entirely irrelevant’, and yet they ‘so often 
                                                                                                                                            
calling for investments in educational technology that will help create digital tutors that are as 
effective as personal tutors, and educational software that’s as compelling as the best video 
game. I want you guys to be stuck on a video game that’s teaching you something other than just 
blowing something up.’ (Lee J., 8 March 2011, The White House Blog) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/08/president-obama-talks-education-boston-
moral-and-economic-imperative-give-every-chil , last accessed 18/09/2014). 
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disappoint’ (47). 
In order to evade this force, Bassett offers to put narratives about 
technology back in the centre of our interest. Narrative, as a reaction to the 
discontinuity of information, is also seen by Bassett as capable of bringing 
information into being and producing concepts about information technologies 
(3). She argues: 
  
[I]t is narrative ‘itself ’ that is under discussion here, and I explore it neither as a 
fixed form nor as a contingent content but rather as a formation emerging out 
of the contemporary interchange between information technology, culture and 
society. If narrative is socially symbolic then the materials of which it is made, 
the conditions within which it is read, as well as the forms in which it is written 
or practised and the tales that it gathers up within itself, matter. They are a part 
of what gets symbolized, and how. (6) 
 
The problem I intend to highlight here, through Bassett, Kember and 
Zylinska, is that narratives of gamers’ games tend to stabilise and, at the same 
time, bring about those realities they describe. For instance, the narrative of 
progression from what Sony had named the 1.0 era of gaming to the 2.0 and 
eventually 3.0 era can be seen as also establishing those ages and at the same 
time necessarily freezing the current scenario (Gaming 3.0) in an isolated space 
in the proposed linearity of technological development. Similarly, Alvin Toffler 
imagined the ‘rise of the prosumer’ to be taking place in the contemporary ‘third 
wave’, following the first wave, which corresponded to the agricultural 
revolution, and the second wave of the Industrial Revolution (1980: 265-288). 
These and other similar processes of freezing and isolation are not seen in this 
dissertation as merely descriptive endeavours but also as performative ones. 
Looking again at the example of Sony’s Gaming 3.0, it could be argued that 
the concept frames the ways of reading the possible relations between gamers 
and games in a series of divisions and differences while excluding others. The 
very distinction between gamers (mostly seen by Sony in this narrative as 
consumers) and games (seen, both software and hardware, as marketed 
products) is established by replicating a historical progression of the 
development and marketing of video games. Sony’s concept is particularly 
significant as an example as it is quite clearly a proposal for a historical 
description of the past and present of digital gaming and at the same time an 
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influential concept for the research and development of future video games and 
game technologies. It describes things, but at the same time it does something, as 
it influences the models for the production of video games. 
How is it possible to intervene in these models, concepts and narratives, 
and offer, through theory, some potential alternatives to them? Through the work 
of Derrida, I argue in this dissertation that reading the discourses surrounding 
gamers’ games can be seen at the same time as a process of repetition and 
undoing of the structures that underpin those same discourses. I will consider 
the repetition of those structures as a moment of ‘rupture’, an event that 
displaces and destabilises the centre of the previous discourse (Derrida 1976, 
1980, 1985). In other words, I will propose to question the ground that keeps 
gamers and games alternatively together or separate, depending on the 
circumstances in which they are presented, and see instead how different 
grounds, different centres and structures, could be narrated, and with what 
consequences. 
While introducing a rupture into the stories of gamers’ games, I will 
attempt to outline some alternative narratives and at the same time consider 
these proposals as a way of playing with and studying games themselves. The 
challenge I set myself with this dissertation is to claim the possibility of 
intervening into the study of digital games by developing narratives that can 
question the framings and binaries implied by the contemporary discourses of 
video game culture. My argument therefore involves a reflection on what theory 
can do (and should do), in order to bring forth both more interesting 
technologies and more complex stories about them. 
 In particular, I consider the process of reading the narratives of gamers’ 
games, understood as a deconstructive, performative practice, to be necessarily 
both descriptive and normative: on the one hand, I will look at the structures of 
the discourses of gamers’ games, but on the other my reading will also have to 
say what these structures are, how they are presented and how else they could 
be. Joanna Zylinska, in The Ethics of Cultural Studies (2005), proposes that the 
difference between description and normativity can be rephrased as a distinction 
between saying ‘how things are’ as opposed to ‘how things should be’ (3). 
However, while acknowledging that cultural studies always has a normative 
 18 
aspect, she also argues that descriptions have at the same time a performative 
side (here drawing explicitly on Austin’s notion of performativity). 
What does it mean, then, to think about theory, and cultural studies more 
specifically, as performative as well as normative? I propose, through the work of 
Zylinska, that embracing a normative and performative dimension of theory 
makes the distinction between theory and practice collapse. This is after all also 
how Derrida discusses deconstruction, not as a ‘neutralization’ of oppositions but 
a form of intervention, through the ‘double gesture’ of ‘reversal of the classical 
opposition and a general displacement of the system’ (1980: 21). A similar 
commitment to theory as intervention can also be seen in the work of Judith 
Butler (1990, 1997, 2010), among others: the idea that saying something is 
already a way of doing something, it is a way of not only suggesting but also 
introducing transformations. In this sense I argue that studying gamers’ games 
can be a way of playing with games and making games. It can be a mode of 
thinking as doing, or reading as enacting, alternative structures and modes of 
living with video games (the notion of life will be, more specifically, debated in 
the final chapter of this dissertation). 
 But what is it, ultimately, that makes these alternatives better, and worthy 
of being brought about? The problem we are left with, while considering the 
performativity and normativity of theory, is to understand the ethical problem 
that theory itself entails as an intervention that must be motivated. Crucially in 
the work of Zylinska, the ethical question is entangled with the notion of 
deconstruction, as proposed by Derrida, in a way that I would like to repurpose 
for my own understanding of gamers’ games. To summarise her perspective, 
ethics involves remaining open to alterity (i.e. otherness), while deconstruction 
can be seen as a way of examining the logic that keeps opposites together and 
similarities distant in various structures as well as discourses. As argued by 
Laclau: 
 
Deconstruction consists in discovering the undecidability of things which are 
presented as being either joined or separated. So deconstruction involves two 
kinds of operation. On the one hand, it shows that between two things which 
have been portrayed as being essentially linked there is in fact some kind of 
undecidability which prevents them from being assembled together. On the 
other hand, deconstruction also involves showing that between two things 
which are originally presented as separated there is a certain amount of 
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contamination. (Laclau 2002, quoted in Zylinska 2005: 8) 
 
Gamers’ games is intended in this dissertation as an expression that summarises 
the merging together of two separate entities, while analysing them in terms of 
the differences between them and in terms of the undecidability that holds the 
relationship between the two together. With this deconstructive approach, I also 
aim to consider the contradictory processes of merging and distancing as 
necessarily involving ethical questions. This approach entails that the necessary 
presence of an “other” (which can be a different structure of discourse, an 
alternative narrative of production and consumption, and so on) needs to be 
taken into account without reducing my reading to an ontology of gamers and 
games, i.e. trying to establish their identity once and for all. Zylinska explains this 
problem well, through the work of Levinas, by arguing that: 
 
[Ethics is] situated before ontology. […I]f ontology (i.e. a ‘philosophy of being’) 
is seen as a ‘philosophy of power’ and ‘injustice’ (Levinas 1969: 46) that tries to 
reduce any idea of the other to the terms and categories possessed by the same 
(which amounts to describing to what extent the other is or is not like me), 
ethics should be read as a different mode of thinking, one which ‘precedes’ 
ontology in its relation to knowledge and justice. Instead of attempting to 
thematize and conceptualize the other as always already known, ethics points 
to the radical and absolute alterity of the other which collapses the familiar 
order of Being and calls the self to respond to this alterity. This possibility, as 
well as necessity, of responding to what Levinas defines as an incalculable 
alterity of the other is the source of an ethical sentiment. (Zylinska 2005: 13) 
 
 In the work of Gary Hall (2008) we can see what such a deconstructive 
and yet ethical approach to cultural studies could be like. Hall looks at how the 
supposed merging of the concepts of producer and consumer, which confuses the 
boundaries between the two and their respective roles, can be seen to have both 
a descriptive and a normative function: while on the one hand the emergence of 
the prosumer describes a new scenario in the practices of production and 
consumption, on the other it also delineates a new way of designing and using 
media. Moreover, the notion of the prosumer, while attempting to blur the 
distinction between producers and consumers, also maintains such a distinction: 
‘…production and consumption can be brought together like this in the guise of 
the prosumer only if they are positioned as having somehow been separate and 
distinct in the first place – which they generally are in narratives of this kind’ 
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(2008: 23). 
 The problem Hall identifies in this mode of thinking is that concepts such 
as the prosumer often tend to be rather conservative about existing divisions and 
hierarchies. As I have noted, this also seems to be the problem with gamers’ 
games, as they mostly tend to confirm the social and economic inequalities 
already existing in video game culture. Hall also argues that re-interpretations of 
the practices of production and consumption appear to be based on the same 
binaries that enforce divisions such as the one between theory and practice, a 
separation considered by him to be also influential in the contemporary trends in 
higher education. In these trends, Hall sees a dominance of practice, understood 
as a supposedly tangible and factual form of learning, as opposed to theory, 
which is instead seen as purely based on the linguistic domain and therefore 
always questionable and inaccurate. In this and other similar derivative 
distinctions, Hall argues that there often lies the tendency to confirm what 
industries and markets assert higher education should be like. Therefore, re-
evaluating theory, and its performative capacity to bring about concepts, can 
actually be an ethical gesture that may even end up outlining a new way of doing 
media studies in higher education. Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter have similarly 
critiqued the concept of the prosumer by noticing how ‘Web 2.0 makes loud 
noises about the false synthesis of the so-called “prosumer”, but this does not get 
us very far other than reiterating the logic of individualisation’, and this is why 
‘we need a creative subject who is neither a citizen nor a consumer’ (2007: 13-
14). Hall, in turn, issues an ethical call to scholars in the humanities precisely by 
questioning the ground that separates theory and practice, as well as the notions 
of producer and consumer. His attempt is relevant in the context of this 
dissertation because it shows what could be at stake in reading the discourses 
surrounding a certain phenomenon while also acknowledging the performativity 
of the acts of reading and proposing alternative narratives. 
I believe it is possible to argue, broadening Hall’s appeal, that the study of 
video games and video game culture equally needs some ethical decisions, and 
that it needs to step outside the binaries that frame the existing discourses. 
There are several reasons for doing this. First, it is a way of countering the 
dominance of the discourses, mostly originated from the industry, in which video 
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games are assimilated with products, and gamers with consumers. As I have 
argued earlier on, this kind of logic mostly feeds a fascination with newness and 
a tendency towards determinism in the accounts of video game culture (while 
often making these accounts sound repetitive and hence rather disappointing). 
Second, these narratives, so often replicated by industry experts, 
journalists and scholars alike, overshadow the existing economic inequalities and 
geographical specificities. HSBC’s advertising forgets to mention that none of the 
emerging independent video games represented at the most famous festivals and 
exhibitions in the last decade actually originate from Turkey. In fact, it is rare to 
see any independent video game being produced anywhere outside those 
countries where the industry is already strong (the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries). This should be a surprising 
fact, considering that we have been told that video game production is now 
allegedly available to everyone. Likewise, Obama’s address has been welcomed as 
emblematic of the current positive evaluation of the medium of the video game. 
However, making games, rather than just playing them, still requires access to a 
high level of education and expertise, and the availability of economic resources 
that often run the risk of not being converted back into revenue if an existing 
publisher does not pick up the product and promote it. 
Finally, I believe a study of gamers’ games could be a way to experiment 
with alternative and less conservative narratives about technology in general and 
gaming in particular. It can also be a way of embracing the performative and 
ethical dimensions of theory, rarely accounted for in the study of digital games 
and their players. The study I propose, delineated in detail in the following pages, 
brings a certain amount of anxiety with it (not least for its author), as it offers to 
abandon the comfortable presence of the existing categories and of the 
possibilities that resulted from them for theoretical discourse. Yet Derrida (1980) 
argues that anxiety is probably a necessary consequence of deconstruction but 
also a sign of being really (or we might say, ethically) involved in the ‘game’: 
 
The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a freeplay based on a 
fundamental ground, a freeplay which is constituted upon a fundamental 
immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of the 
freeplay. With this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the 
result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the 
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game, of being as it were from the very beginning at stake in the game. (248) 
 
It is this sort of anxiety that I am aiming at foregrounding and making manifest in 
the present work, and that I would like to see displayed more often in the overall 
study of video games.13 
 
 
Research questions and chapters outline 
 
To recapitulate, in this project I aim to understand what is at stake with gamers’ 
games. This leading research objective will require several sub-questions. I will, 
throughout the present work, try to understand what a gamer’s game is, and how 
dualities such as producer-consumer, new-old, accessible-closed become 
problematised in a study of gamers’ games. The reading I offer will look at how 
these dualities come about, through discourse, and what their consequences are. 
Furthermore, I will discuss the ideological perspectives that emerge through the 
discourses produced with regard to gamers' games and the implications of these 
ideologies. Finally, my aim will be to inquire into the possibility of formulating 
some other narratives about gamers’ games and to debate what seeking such 
alternatives entails. This proposal will be underpinned by an ethical question 
about the necessity and duties of a scholarly intervention. I will now outline the 
chapters of this dissertation, through which I will attempt to offer my answers to 
the problems discussed above. 
 In chapter one (Literature review and methodology: a study of 
                                                 
13 In this dissertation I rarely look at the notion of play, and never in relation to pleasure, or fun, 
as it often happens in the studies on games and video game culture. As noted by Roger Caillois 
(1961), play can be ‘a source of joy and amusement’ (6) but it is also ‘an occasion of pure waste: 
waste of time, energy, ingenuity, skill, and often of money […]. (5-6). Notions of play can be 
understood as further narratives of our engagement with games, or as ‘rhetorics’, as argued by 
Brian Sutton-Smith (1997). In his work, Sutton-Smith looks at the ambiguity of the notion of play 
and how this ambiguity has been resolved in our culture through discursive practices. These 
practices share a rhetorical aspect, that is, they attempt to persuade others of their validity, and 
are presented as objective explanations of what play is. Sutton-Smith finds similarities between 
the variability of the rhetorics of play and the variability required to living beings as discussed in 
the theory of evolution by the biologist Stephen Jay Gould (1996, Full House: The Spread of 
Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York: Harmony Books). In the present work I do not 
concentrate as much on how the ambiguity of play could be explained, but I investigate the 
possibility of finding other forms of play – probably as ambiguous and ‘rhetorical’ as those 
analysed in the work of Sutton-Smith – within the cultural study of games. 
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contaminated relations) I introduce and debate the literature that frames the 
majority of the research questions of my dissertation. I look at how the concepts 
of gamers and games have been put into place as separate from each other in 
several academic contributions. In these texts, gamers and games are defined and 
understood while considering both as strictly separate entities. However, as 
Dovey and Kennedy (2006) argue, the discourses surrounding the medium of the 
video game tend to organise themselves around ‘dominant technicities’: 
imaginaries about technologies and their users that are replicated in the industry 
and academic sectors. 
I propose to expand on Dovey and Kennedy’s view by looking at the 
discourses on gamers’ games as narratives: stories that shape how games are 
made and played, and how gamers are approached as a category of consumers. 
The separation between gamers and games can also be seen as one of the results 
of a dominant technicity, one that originates within the game industry, that is 
replicated in the academic discourse and that takes into account products and 
consumers as two separate categories. I look at procedurality (Murray 1997, 
Bogost 2006) as a method for the development and criticism of games, and as 
essentially limited by the consideration that gamers and games are separated by 
a supposed boundary between them. I aim to intervene precisely with and 
through scholarly and industry conventions, and look, with Derrida’s help (1976, 
1980, 1985), into the binaries that are so often replicated in the discourses 
around the medium. 
In the rest of the chapter I look at how discourse theory (Laclau and 
Mouffe) and performativity (Austin, Butler, Foucault) can be seen as methods for 
reading discursive formations while intervening and being implicated in those 
very same discourses. I turn to the notion of the ‘parasite’ (Serres 1982) to 
propose a non-linear approach to the examination of existing dualisms, such as 
gamers and games, producer and consumer, product and user. The parasite, 
rather than being an external element of disturbance, is understood by Serres as 
necessarily entangled within the system that it exploits and opens to further 
contamination. The parasite will be taken as a metaphor for a performative 
reading of discourses, a reading that is always and necessarily implicated in, and 
constitutive of, the narratives it brings about. I also draw on Serres to propose a 
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study of gamers’ games as a study of ongoing relations and transformations, 
rather than separate objects or technological boxes. 
In the final part of this chapter I discuss the ethical implications of being 
involved in a study of the relations between gamers and games. A discourse that 
attempts to be contaminated by the categories it otherwise critiques eschews 
analysis, ontology and observation in favour of participation. A participative 
theory, in its own turn, involves the responsibility of having to make choices and 
posing questions that are going to be part of the discursive formation in which 
the researcher intervenes. The ethical question that I intend to pose, and not 
necessarily resolve, throughout the rest of the dissertation concerns precisely the 
position of the researcher in the process of forming knowledge: what are the 
implications of avoiding essentialist and hegemonic approaches, and of 
attempting instead to multiply particularisms and differences through the 
invention of alternative narratives? 
 In chapter two (A history of boxes: archaeologies of gamers’ games) I 
debate the possibilities of intervening in the processes of “boxing” video game 
technologies, a trend that I identify as replicated mostly in the historical analyses 
of the medium and in the predictions about the future of the games industry. I 
critique the concepts of media archaeology and game archaeology for their use of 
the notion of materiality, as a mere rhetorical strategy aimed to give a form of 
authority to historical reconstructions. Materiality, in fact, is often brought into 
archaeological analyses as supposed proof or evidence that seeks to confirm 
contemporary notions about games and gamers, often seen as the result of the 
development and marketing of an entertainment industry. Historical 
reconstructions, such as those offered by Erkki Huthamo and Jussi Parikka 
(2011) and Raiford Guins (2014), rely on the presence of tangible evidence to 
confirm the trustworthiness of the historical narrative they propose. 
I critique similar narratives for the stabilising effect these have on the 
categories and notions of the present. By tracing back the origins of the 
contemporary games industry, archaeological endeavours solidify the present 
and construct it as a firm standpoint from which to look at the past. However, it is 
precisely the present that constitutes the problem of archaeology, as it was 
originally offered in the project of the ‘archaeology of the present’ by Michel 
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Foucault (1972). Following Foucault’s proposal (and as further developed in his 
project of a ‘genealogy’ of ideas), in this chapter I delineate a study of the present 
and contemporary ways of saying the truth about the past of the medium of the 
video game.  
From this perspective I look at several stories about the origins of digital 
gaming as they have been narrated in recent years. I bring forth two stories in 
particular as significant examples. I look at the story of Spacewar (circa 1962), 
allegedly the first video game ever. Spacewar was the name given by researchers 
and scholars in computer science research centres in the United States to a 
never-finished series of playful experiments, started in the 1960s, with the PDP-1 
mainframe. Spacewar became, in the historical reconstructions of the last two 
decades, an attested video game, even if a consistent unity of this game could not 
possibly be found. Texts on the history of the medium of the video game traced 
back the origins of Spacewar, including in its analysis experiments that could not 
be seen by their authors as finished products. Spacewar came to be narrated as 
an experiment whose authors failed to realise its economic potential, despite the 
absence of the technological conditions for commercialising the game as a video 
game, for identifying the authors of the game and even for naming it. The second 
story I look at involves the re-discovery of the dumped cartridges of E.T. the 
Extra-Terrestrial, a commercial failure of the company Atari in the 1970s that 
allegedly resulted in the company trashing the unsold copies of the game in the 
desert of New Mexico. The story had circulated as a legend in the histories of the 
video game industry. As a response to this legend, a group of self-professed video 
game archaeologists decided to prove the trustworthiness of the story by 
organising an expedition into the area. I conceive of this event as tautological 
research into the material evidence (the dumped cartridges) of something that 
was already known to be there (the co-ordinates of the location where the 
cartridges had been buried in New Mexico provided the reason for the search to 
be carried out in that specific location). Most importantly, I see the expedition as 
a process that confirms the established notions of the present, an approach to 
historical reconstructions that reinforces the knowledge we already have. The 
myths that kept circulating after the controversial (non-)discovery of one or 
several cartridges of E.T. vaporised the supposed materiality of the video game 
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and gave birth to a new series of conspiracy narratives about the reasons behind 
the expedition. The non-event brought back present and past to very unstable 
territories. The stories about the video game E.T., before and after the expedition, 
made the evidence of game history relevant and valuable for gamers and game 
historians but they also deprived the historical research of any confidence about 
the reliability of material proof. It is precisely the performative potential of 
narratives, I conclude, that needs to be investigated and seen in its capacity to 
reinforce the categories of contemporary discourses as given unities, or to 
destabilise those same unities. 
In chapter three (Narratives of conflict: the hacking of PlayStation as a 
Network) I look precisely at one such story of destabilisation. The hacking of 
Sony’s PlayStation3 and its online service PlayStation Network, as it occurred 
between 2010 and 2011, has been extensively reported in mainstream as well as 
specialised media. It is the most popular case of conflict between producers and 
consumers in the history of the video game industry. It is also, I argue, an 
important case of unboxing a video game console, as it allowed people to revisit 
the definitions, limits and uses of PlayStation3. 
I propose that hacking into the PlayStation Network can be better 
understood as the hacking of PlayStation as a network, with network here 
understood as the multitude of cultural and material nodes that constitute the 
very definition of the object PlayStation3. More than a clash between producers 
and consumers, the PlayStation3 hacking case can be read as an ontological 
dispute over what PlayStation3 is, over what the distinction between its 
hardware and its software is, and over the extent to which it should be opened up 
to the intervention of multiple actors. 
I initially look at the statements produced by the actors involved in the 
events surrounding the PS3 hack. I observe that the dispute is not only about the 
rights claimed by both sides in their favour (which are, in any case, noteworthy 
and valuable for legislative reasons). The clash mostly revolves around the very 
definition of the boundaries of PlayStation3 and the actors involved in the 
production and consumption of this technology. I then argue that the number of 
definitions, actors and voices involved in the hacking of PlayStation3 brings into 
being an unlimited number of different interpretations of who the consumers 
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and producers of PlayStation3 are and, ultimately, what PlayStation3 is.  
In fact, the contexts from which discourses have been produced are 
varied, and include not only reports in mainstream and specialised newspapers 
but also the legal trials that occurred in the California state court between Sony 
and the hacker George Hotz, and between Sony and the consumers association. 
These contexts produced and defined who was in charge of saying what 
PlayStation3 is, in relation to its material and immaterial boundaries, and to its 
ownership and control over a limited time and space. In light of the multiplicity 
of actors involved, I propose to read the institutionalised discourses as being 
produced by a restricted number of voices. I also look in this chapter at the 
possibilities offered by the many unofficial voices, and at the alternative 
narratives of conflict that these have been delineating. What other forms of 
hacking have become possible, and what can be learnt from these? 
In order to evaluate and make sense of the multiple actors who have 
introduced different modes to rethink PlayStation3, I offer to reconsider the 
figure of the hacker as a mediator. Drawing on Bruno Latour’s actor-network 
theory (1999, 2005), I argue that hackers can be seen as actors who introduce a 
modification within a network. However, the hackers of the stories I present here 
are themselves involved in the modifications they introduce. By proposing 
alternative definitions of PlayStation3, they also define themselves in relation to 
the technology they define. Presenting an alternative vision of how the video 
game console could be used and modified, they position themselves in relation to 
the same technology they intend to use and modify. Thus they become hybrid 
mediators, the ‘upshot of ongoing configurations of heterogeneous associations’ 
(Michael 2000: 22), who discursively produce their own definition and position 
within an unstable network.  
Ultimately, I raise the question of how to evaluate the mediations these 
hybrid actors introduce. If the hackers featured in the official stories on the 
hacking of PlayStation3 appear to replicate a masculine and aggressive freedom 
to own the technological products once these are bought, other forms of hacking 
could be imagined where more inclusive and participated networks are framed. 
 Questions of hospitality and relation with the other are also the centre of 
chapter four (Narratives of independence: taking care of one’s own game), 
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where I look more specifically at the narratives of independence that surround 
contemporary video game culture. Independent video game productions are an 
emerging phenomenon in the game industry. In the context of video game 
culture, independence usually refers to the possibility of producing and releasing 
a video game outside the control and constraints of a major publishing company, 
which might impose limitations on the content in order to appeal to a broader 
audience. However, independence has also been critiqued by many gamers and 
game journalists for re-introducing the same relations of power it originally 
attempted to surpass. As independent games become easier to produce, new 
forms of competition arise between designers who struggle to gain sufficient 
attention from their potential audience, thus requiring the same or new 
publishers to promote their games on mainstream channels of distribution in 
exchange for part of the revenue. However, independence can also mean different 
things. It can be presented, as it is in the work of game designers Molleindustria 
and Anna Anthropy, among others, as a political proposal aimed towards 
inclusion and participation in the production of video games -- and not 
necessarily oriented to commercial distribution. 
I claim in this chapter that independence can be seen, through the work of 
Laclau (1990) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985), as a floating signifier: a word that 
acquires a specific meaning only when associated with other signifiers but that 
does not, by itself, refer to anything that is conceptually delimited. However, it is 
precisely the difficulty or impossibility of defining independence that forces the 
actors involved to constantly produce self-definitions and explanations of how 
they relate their work to other independents, or to the video game industry. I 
look at the institutionalised contexts (game magazines, movies, websites and 
festivals about independent games) where these self-definitions are solicited and 
produced. Like a ‘thorn in flesh’ (Foucault 2005), independence is at the same 
time a repressive and productive power that limits individuals through specific 
practices of self-production (including incubators and workshops where game 
designers are taught how to become independent through a series of specific 
instructions). 
While looking at the multiple contexts in which contradictory definitions 
of independence are formulated and at the different individuals that are 
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produced through the notions of independence, I also propose that the concept is 
valuable in contemporary video game culture precisely due to its unstable, 
floating condition. In fact, what I find particularly interesting is the unresolved 
question of how a game designer relates to other independent designers or to the 
non-independent video game industry, to the other independent-which-is-not-
me and the universal outside the independent territory. These continuous 
processes of tracing unstable boundaries between oneself and a form of alterity 
that is not part of one not only contribute to constructing both the individual and 
its outside but also force one to take into account one’s other, the differently 
independent or non-independent. I ultimately look at the emergence of 
independent gaming as the source of an ethical question that is opened up (even 
if not articulated directly) in the culture of video game development. The way in 
which this question is resolved (again, often indirectly) by various designers 
creates the difference between independence as a narcissistic condition or a 
purely solipsistic and destructive self-reclusion. Such question also opens up to 
the possible formulation of new forms of hospitality towards the other, as 
opposed to aggressive claims of self-fulfilment in opposition to an allegedly 
repressive video game industry. 
 In chapter five (Narratives of engagement: gamification and the 
performativity of video games) I focus on another series of contemporary 
narratives about the mutating relations between gamers and games. The 
“evangelists” (mostly designers, marketing consultants and social entrepreneurs) 
of gamification have been proposing in recent years that video games can be used 
not only for entertainment purposes but also to affect players in specific ways. 
Engaging with players through video games can result, in these contexts, in new 
forms of political or activist propaganda where players are moved to action 
through the messages conveyed in a video game, or to new business solutions 
that attract customers via game-like environments.  
 I suggest that this perspective on games and gamers conceives of both as 
static and separated, and as one potentially affecting the other in predictable and 
often quantifiable ways. Moreover, this view reduces games to objects with 
identifiable properties and gamers to subjects that can be affected and controlled 
in their behaviour. I therefore recommend to consider some alternative 
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narratives of engagement, where games and gamers are seen as being in 
movement rather than remaining static. 
 To accomplish this, I turn to the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold (2010, 
2011) and his reading of Martin Heidegger (1971a) and Henri Bergson (1914, 
2001). In the work of Ingold, objects are considered in their vitalism, in the 
constant movement and mutation that occur within an environment populated 
by ‘things’ (Heidegger 1971a), as well as by ourselves. Following on from Ingold’s 
theory, I look at video games not as abstractly influencing gamers from a 
supposedly separated position but as participating and living in the same 
environment. What is more, theory itself, including theories of gamification and 
approaches to the use of video games, can be said to be participating in the same 
reality they describe and bring about. 
 From the theory of participation and ‘dwelling’ (Heidegger 1971b), I then 
develop an alternative narrative of engagement, one that involves the study of 
games and gamers more broadly. In the conclusions I propose a method for doing 
game studies as a form of involvement and participation, one that takes into 
account the life of theory, of gamers and games. Drawing on Bergson’s (2001, 
1914) notion of creativity, I intend to call this approach creative game studies: a 
participated, critical and anti-authoritarian project for telling narratives about 
gamers and games while playing with both. Creative game studies will be 
outlined as a process of ethical invention, as a mode of ‘cutting’ (Kember and 
Zylinska 2012) across the multiple forms of participation with gamers and 
games, and as a way of reintroducing the humanities and cultural studies 
approaches into the research on video game culture. 
 In the conclusions (Why we need creativity now - the end of gamers, 
the end of games) I further propose how to look at recent developments in 
video game culture through the perspective outlined in the dissertation. I discuss 
how the recent (at the time of writing) case of GamerGate, quickly polarised by 
many commentators as an attack by misogynist gamers on the inclusion of 
women in the production of video games, might hide more intricacies than are 
apparent at first glance. The individual perspectives that have revolved around 
the GamerGate case reveal a large number of conflicting views on the role that 
gamers and games should play in our society. I present this case as a final and 
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contemporary comment on the need for a creative study of gamers’ games, one 
that questions the given categories and dualisms and that asks, in a post-
structuralist fashion, what it is that keeps similar things separate, and what 
keeps opposing categories together.  
 I would like to present this work as the result of a long process that 
started well before the beginning of a PhD programme. As a gamer and game 
journalist, I had been confronted by many different stories about video games 
and their players. What provoked me to begin this research project was an 
undefined feeling of dissatisfaction with the repetitive nature of those stories, 
and the apparent difficulty of finding new questions and voices within video 
game culture. In the final analysis, I believe that this dissertation serves as an 
attempt at re-evaluating the possibility of saying something about video games 
and their players without denying a certain involvement in the things we say. 
Indeed, I have defined myself as a gamer for a long time, but my game is not the 
same as that of the hard-core consumers, the game artists, the independent 
developers, the console hackers or the misogynist aggressors I present in this 
work. Understanding the similarities and differences between these different 
types of gamers and myself remains an open question. The dissertation I am here 
offering is my personal game, a game that has kept me busy on a daily basis for 
many years (as intensely as a more conventional gamer might feel playing a video 
game). My final appeal for creative game studies is also a possible beginning of a 
new project, one that does not rest on the assumption that there should be much 
difference between studying, playing and living with video games. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature review and methodology: a study of 
contaminated relations 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the methodology of my research project and the 
relevant theoretical literature that has contributed to it. I will also set out a 
number of theoretical issues this dissertation intends to address. I will attempt to 
understand how to study games and gamers through the multiple relations that 
occur between the two while looking at both gamers and games as unstable 
categories, open to many different configurations. Gamers and games, as outlined 
in the introduction, appear to be defined through many discursive performances, 
often focusing on the newness of technologies and their unprecedented, 
liberating effects. But these narratives of newness and determinism can also be 
opened up to new and unexpected questions. This first chapter intends to 
examine what sort of questions these could be, how we could approach them and 
why we should. 
This chapter also aims to set the study of gamers’ games as focused on the 
discursive formations that emerge in this context. As a narrative, the relation 
between gamers and games will be examined by focusing on several discursive 
performances, pronounced by a variety of actors. I will look at how video game 
studies have rarely been influenced by the post-structuralist tradition, 
particularly in the ways it has been debated in cultural studies – which, in my 
view, is a regrettable omission. Authors such as Michel Serres, Jacques Derrida, 
Ernesto Laclau, Michel Foucault and Judith Butler will be approached in this 
chapter in my attempt to understand discourse in its descriptive and 
performative capacities. 
Performativity, in particular, will bring me to a discussion of the problem 
of the involvement of theoretical discourse in the objects it looks at, blurring the 
distinction between the practices of observation and participation. This 
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participated, contaminated and parasitic approach to theory will be discussed for 
its novelty in respect of the current trends in game studies. It will also be seen as 
a method for deconstructing, in the post-structuralist, or, more specifically, 
Derridean sense, the existing binaries and fixities, such as the separation 
between gamers and games, but also that between production and consumption. 
Drawing on discourse theory, post-structuralism and performativity, I will 
aim to outline in this chapter what can be defined as a cultural study of gamers’ 
games. The difference I ultimately intend to introduce through this approach, in 
respect of the previous accounts of the medium and its users, is the 
abandonment of essentialist, ontological questions about never-resolved 
definitions of gamers and games. These are the sorts of questions that have 
tended to reinforce the dualities and boundaries that I aim to dissolve. Instead, I 
propose to adopt an ethical and participative involvement in the gamers’ games 
relation. Rather than questioning what gamers and games are, how they work 
and what effects they should allegedly produce, I want to interrogate how these 
very questions – so often asked in game studies – came about, how we are 
involved in them and how we could answer them while keeping ourselves 
involved through the invention of some new and alternative narratives. 
 
 
Studies of gamers and games 
 
In the opening part of this chapter I will discuss how the field of game studies has 
so far approached the analysis of both gamers and games. Studies around this 
topic have mostly aimed at nuancing the debates on the practices of production 
and consumption in video game culture, drawing initially on the categories and 
clusters developed by the industry. The notions of gamers and games have been 
mostly associated with a study of consumers and the products of their 
consumption, often reinforcing categories (product types, audience sectors, etc.) 
conceived in the market research departments of video game publishers. I will 
start by overviewing and discussing some of the most notorious and relevant 
studies of video game culture, trying to understand the limitations of the 
perspectives proposed so far and their performative potential in reinforcing and 
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bringing about notions about the production and consumption of video games.  
 Joystick Nation: How Videogames Ate Our Quarters, Won Our Hearts and 
Rewired Our Minds by J. C. Herz (1997) was one of the first popular books about 
video game culture. In it, Herz is mostly concerned with understanding the 
emergence of the category of gamers, seen as a new group of consumers with 
varied habits and styles. As an early attempt to understand the video game 
industry and the culture surrounding its products, the book provides an 
overview for the inerudites and introduces each term carefully, while explaining 
its origins. Herz comments on the origins of the video game genres, on the 
different kinds of audiences and on the styles of game fans. The issue at stake, 
according to Herz, is how games culture is redefining itself in the emergence of a 
new, mainstream market. In 1997, in fact, the video game market was changing 
significantly by opening itself up to embrace some new, unexpected market 
sectors (such as consumers in their late thirties). At the same time, Herz shows 
us a world of previously underestimated entrepreneurs now growing their 
companies and becoming part of a multi-billion-dollar market. She also describes 
a world of teenagers and fans who are mostly concerned with maintaining a 
conservative stance against the major changes of the video game market. 
 Joystick Nation is an elaboration of the narratives that were used to 
describe and make sense of video game culture in the late 1990s. It is interesting 
to see how this first attempt maintains a view of video game culture as, mostly, a 
kind of counterculture, while at the same time showing a certain fascination with 
the ways in which the game industry creates a mainstream international market. 
Such a view keeps together the goals of an expanding industry that is attempting 
to involve new categories of consumers, with more conservative approaches and 
styles of consumption of those who really made the video game industry and the 
hard-core, true gamers. Herz focuses quite explicitly on individual actors and on 
technologies as determining agents of change. Such change is therefore social, 
economic and technological. The story of the video game Doom and the 
production company id Software is emblematic of it. In the chapter ‘Why Doom 
Rules’, Herz combines the myth of the lonely genius (the two nerds, John Carmack 
and John Romero, who founded id Software) with the possibilities offered by new 
technologies (mostly Apple II and the advent of the Internet). The author shows 
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how the new video game industry is ‘rewiring our minds’, as the title of the book 
suggests, thanks to the conjunction of both human and technological elements, 
and how it is shaping a new culture that is at the same time mainstream and 
‘counter-’ (Herz 1997: 83-90).  
A similar view is maintained by Steven Poole in another popular text, 
Trigger Happy: The Inner Life of Videogames (2000). Here Poole observes how an 
industry that started almost accidentally in an academic laboratory became a 
cultural phenomenon that would shape the minds of a generation. In a similar 
fashion to Herz, Poole is fascinated by what appears to be a new emerging 
phenomenon, which starts as an underrated form of entertainment for teenagers 
and now outperforms the cinema industry in terms of economic growth. 
 Many of the early accounts of the emergence of the video game industry 
and video game culture tend to treat both producers and consumers of game 
products enthusiastically. Only much later does a more critical or moderate 
approach start to appear in the literature on the medium. Aphra Kerr, in her book 
The Business and Culture of Digital Games (2006), still considers that it is of key 
importance, as both Herz and Poole do, to debate the relevance of the hard-core 
sector in the design and publishing of a video game. She argues that market 
research has not always been considered essential by game publishers. The 
consequence of this is that most video games designed and released on the 
market are influenced by a perception of the typical game consumer as a hard-
core gamer, a male teenager, who is believed to form the bulk of the demand for 
new games. Kerr notices, for example, that simple puzzle and trivia games with a 
fast learning curve of the game mechanics are not included in most studies of 
game consumers. She concludes that the game market would look quite different 
were more attention paid to this sort of game (2006: 113). The situation 
nowadays is quite different from the one Kerr described in 2006, and the last few 
years have seen a large number of releases of free puzzle and trivia games for 
online playing or as mobile apps. These games usually require skills of speed, 
intelligence and management of resources, and are addressed to general, 
mainstream audiences. Publishers seemed to have accepted what Kerr noticed in 
her work, as some of the results of their audience research were being affected 
by an outdated assumption regarding the demographics of game consumers. 
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Kerr’s text is important not only for its predictive qualities. Her work 
offers one of the first extended accounts of how economic as well as social factors 
contribute to the shaping of the video game industry and to the perception of the 
stereotypical consumer of video game products. The most significant aspect, I 
believe, is Kerr’s critique of the idea that the progression of, and current 
developments in, the game industry are driven by purely rational behaviour. She 
shows instead how the development of both software and hardware is also 
largely influenced by a certain image of, and expectations about, the potential 
consumers of those products. Kerr also argues that, in their own turn, game 
consumers tend to describe themselves in terms of the image proposed by the 
mainstream products and specialised press. In the past this resulted, for instance, 
in the marginalisation of the female and casual audiences. Kerr notices that the 
image of an emerging female sector, as often claimed by industry experts, 
depends largely on the introduction of market research specifically oriented 
towards that audience: female gamers have always existed, but the industry had 
never looked for them until recently. Kerr’s discussion of the role played by hard-
core gamers in creating the image of the typical game consumer resulted from 
her exploration of ‘the entire production cycle from producer to distributor to 
final user and the linkages and relationships between these stages’ (6). While 
reviewing the models used to describe the relationship between media 
producers and media consumers, she maintains that ‘one must always be careful 
to acknowledge that such models may act to simplify complex social processes 
and divert attention from other factors, peculiar to certain places and times’ (7). 
 Jesper Juul, in A Casual Revolution: Reinventing Video Games and Their 
Players (2009), also investigates the relation between the development and 
marketing of video game products and their expected consumers. Juul shows 
how the video game industry and the culture of digital gaming are being 
reshaped by the trend for designing games for a casual audience, that is, for 
consumers who are no longer spending large periods of time committing to a 
specific game but are instead demanding a quick and easy gaming experience. 
Juul, confirming Kerr’s findings, acknowledges that the ‘casual revolution’ 
happened because those working in game publishing had stopped assuming that 
the majority of gamers were ‘obsessed’ young male teenagers (1-23). Kerr 
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already acknowledged that ‘publishers seem to lack the tools and information to 
enable them to understand non-traditional (i.e. non-hard-core) consumers both 
in established and in newly emerging markets globally’ (2006: 76). Both Kerr and 
Juul show how the nature and products of the video game industry have been 
determined by a belief in a particular sort of consumer. The expectations of those 
working in marketing, as well as the game designers and executives, were shaped 
by this perception. The video game industry has been and still is predicated on 
certain narratives of production and consumption. 
Moreover, scholars in video game culture have also frequently started 
their research with a certain ready-made idea of what to expect from their 
inquiry. For example, T.L. Taylor (2006) became puzzled while visiting an 
EverQuest14 convention as an ethnographic researcher. She writes: ‘I wonder, as I 
have in the past, why that singular image of the male teenage isolate hanging out 
and gaming online holds so strong in the face of real players. The demographic 
truth is much more mundane’ (4). Taylor looks at online game players in offline 
environments, such as conventions and public events. Her key insight is that a 
distinction between online worlds and real worlds is misleading as the two are 
intermingled and help to define each other. Taylor’s study reveals the extent to 
which common prejudices shaped her expectations of the demographic of online 
video game consumers. Her work is motivated by a desire to confront this 
expectation with the demographic truth. 
Taylor (2006) is concerned with the productive potential of the 
consumers of online video games. She looks at how gamers interact with the 
game world in a way that resembles a form of labour. Gamers, according to 
Taylor, contribute to the online game world in a way that makes them more than 
just passive users of software. She writes: 
 
The word ‘participatory’ might raise red flags for some designers. The idea that 
players can act as meaningful agents within the overarching game structure is 
generally seen as naive. But let me reframe this: players already are core actors 
in the maintenance and life of the game. There is no culture, there is no game, 
without the labor of the players. Whether designers want to acknowledge it 
                                                 
14 EverQuest is a massive multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) published by Sony 
Online Entertainment in 1999. It is still, thanks to its sequel EverQuest II, one of the most played 
online video games. 
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fully or not, MMOGs15 already are participatory sites (if only partially realized) 
by their very nature as social and cultural spaces. (2006: 159) 
 
Taylor points out that gamers participate in a number of ways, through the: 
…creation of game guides, walk-throughs, answers to frequently asked 
questions (FAQs), maps, object and monster databases, third-party message 
boards and mailing lists, play norms, server guidelines, tweaks to user 
interfaces (UI), macro sharing, fanfic, game movies, counter-narratives, comics 
and fan gatherings. (2006: 155) 
 
When she describes this culture as ‘participatory’, she explicitly refers to Henry 
Jenkins’ book Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture (1992). 
Both Taylor and Jenkins’ concern is to illustrate how consumers engage with 
products. This involves not only interpreting and/or decoding a text differently 
but also producing new texts, such as those listed by Taylor. Games, suggest both 
authors, are not just played but also continuously redefined. This process 
happens as much inside the game simulation and eventually in its online 
communities as it does outside it, in other texts that are not part of the game 
itself. This is what Taylor calls a ‘play between worlds’: gamers actually connect 
the online world of the game with activities in the offline real world of their daily 
lives. 
 What is particularly noteworthy in the way Taylor reads the participatory 
aspects of consumer culture in relation to the medium of the video game is how 
existing distinctions between consumers and producers, in-game environments 
and outside real world, and ultimately gamers and game products are used as the 
starting assumption to be nuanced and understood. On the one hand, Taylor’s 
perspective can be seen as being based on those existing distinctions, which she 
then tries to unpack and confront with her own personal engagement with the 
communities of video game players. On the other hand, this approach 
discursively reinforces those distinctions by acknowledging the existence of 
different sorts of hierarchies between industry products and their buyers, real 
and simulated worlds, and gamers and games.  
 In this dissertation I will question what generates these distinctions in the 
first place, how they are replicated and how they could be thought otherwise. 
                                                 
15 MMOG: Massive multiplayer online game. An MMOG is a game played online by a large number 
of people connected at the same time to the same server, eventually in a persistent world (an 
online environment that is constantly available for playing). 
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How could these hierarchies and differentiations be understood and 
reformulated differently? And what are the consequences of proposing a 
different perspective on these issues? Why is it needed and what would the 
implications of a different approach be? In the following section I will look at 
how other authors have tried to address these questions. Mostly, I will see how 
dominant narratives, originated in the industry and in the mainstream and 
specialist press, have been challenged and countered by game scholars and with 
what consequences. 
 
 
Challenging imaginaries and dominant technicities 
 
In Game Cultures: Computer Games as New Media (2006) Dovey and Kennedy 
acknowledge how a limited number of models dominate the debate on video 
game culture. The authors start by analysing how video games can be placed 
within the broader category of new media because of their tendency towards 
interactivity, participation, immersion and co-creation of content. These trends 
complicate the division between producer and consumer of digital media, and of 
video games as part of that category. According to the authors, video games and 
new media make it easier to ‘access, alter and disseminate symbolic texts’ (2006: 
15). Nonetheless, Dovey and Kennedy argue that this tendency overshadows, and 
at times is in conflict with, some other aspects of the emergence of video games. 
They suggest that the overarching conditions that shape video games and new 
media generally are to a large extent determined by an optimistic narrative of 
openness, even as other areas of video game development are hindered by this 
tendency.  
Dovey and Kennedy draw attention to the way that specific events in the 
history of the medium are turned into histories and images, highlighting the 
extent to which these texts contribute to a mythology of the game designer and 
game culture more generally. For instance, their analysis of the biographical 
accounts of early game designers supports this view: 
 
[… R]ather than view these accounts as primary historical evidence, we have to 
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understand that they are themselves part of the discourse of the hacker 
mythos, the lone individual genius, breaking into hi-tech equipment and 
repurposing it for pleasure and fun. Similarly, cyborg discourse informs these 
accounts in the notions of early designers with machine-like minds and 
inhuman propensities. (2006: 69) 
 
These discourses are elsewhere called ‘dominant technicities’ by Dovey and 
Kennedy. The presence of these notions, as the two authors argue, can lead to a 
misunderstanding of what is at stake in gamers’ practices. The view of the 
phenomenon of independent gaming, for example, which will be further 
discussed in chapter four of this dissertation, is distorted by being viewed 
through the lens of other media: 
 
As we have seen in the film and music industries, the ‘indy’ tag may not signify 
much more than ‘wannabe’. In other words, the power of already established 
publishers may in fact be strengthened by the creation of an industrial diaspora 
of hopeful independents looking for commercial sustainability by copying game 
formats that already exist. If the concept of independence is really to change the 
nature of existing game cultures it might have to incorporate some 
understandings of the cultural forces that have shaped what we already have. 
(2006: 141) 
 
Giddings and Kennedy (‘Digital Games as New Media’ 2006) further argue that 
digital games are part of what they call a technological imaginary. In this shared 
imaginary, video games co-exist with cyberpunk dreams of interconnected 
minds, hackers, spaceships and cyborgs. It is the same imaginary that frames 
movies such as Tron (1982) or The Matrix series (1999-2003), cited by the 
authors, where computer-generated worlds are represented and that 
consistently resemble video games in their aesthetics. On the one hand, video 
games seem to bring about this imaginary of a hi-tech future; on the other, the 
evolution of video games is shaped and determined by the very same imaginary. 
Lister et al. (2009) also argue that the technological imaginary shapes our 
collective understanding of the progression from old to new media while also 
framing the development of technologies (66-73). In this double influence there 
are some core elements that justify the adoption of such a term. Giddings and 
Kennedy acknowledge that digital games are a ‘paradigmatic new medium in that 
they offer experiences and pleasures based in the interactive and immersive 
possibilities of computer technologies’ (2006: 129). They acknowledge that the 
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technological imaginary is linked to this notion of newness, although they 
maintain that this should not lead to ‘over-simplistic versions of technological 
determinism’ (131). The technological imaginary, while playing an essential role 
in establishing what the key issues around game culture are, can also be seen as 
hiding certain practices and other social or economic factors. 
The study of game culture should, according to Dovey and Kennedy 
(2006), develop a practice of critical play, where the very same rules of the game 
(in the broad sense of digital texts and the cultural discourses and practices 
about them) are critiqued (143). For example, Dovey and Kennedy suggest that 
game art is a form of rebellion against the dominant technicities, or a way to ‘play 
critically’. In game art the role of the artist is problematised in terms of its 
relation to gamer culture; a game artist is no longer a mere player, he or she is 
neither a fanatic nor a hacker. This sort of problematic relation is seen by the 
authors as outlining a potentially new approach to the study of game culture, 
which originates from a non-complacent view of the political, economic, 
technological and social issues involved. 
 The hypothesis that can be drawn from here is that the relation between 
gamers and games comes to be described by industry experts, specialist press, 
gamers and game scholars as part of a dominant technicity or imaginary. This 
results in the production of symbolic texts, as Dovey and Kennedy would put it, 
which might alter, in their own turn, existing economic and technological 
conditions. The descriptions of what gamers do with games can bring about new 
models and paradigms for understanding the relation between the two, and in 
some cases even alter the strategies of game publishers, as in the ‘casual 
revolution’ analysed by Juul (2009).  
At the same time, however, counter-narratives can equally emerge and 
propose to reconsider the economic and political implications of the new trends 
of participatory consumption and the openness or democratisation of game 
development. Sotamaa (2009) and Ku cklich (2005) provide pertinent 
perspectives in this regard when they discuss the implications of the recent 
trends in favouring players’ productions. Both are concerned with the political 
implication of players’ labour as a form of unpaid exploitation, which should 
raise awareness among game designers, gamers and scholars in game studies. 
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This perspective is partly discussed by Taylor (2006) but it is further developed 
in these two studies. Ku cklich (2005), in particular, defines the emergence of 
content produced by players as a form of ‘playbour’, where playing and labour 
mix together. Ku cklich writes: ‘While the commercialisation of leisure is hardly a 
new phenomenon [...] it seems a radical departure from the established business 
models of the leisure industries that the games industry not only sells 
entertainment products, but also capitalises on the products of the leisure 
derived from them’ (2005: online). Ku cklich looks at the issue of players’ 
production from a political economic perspective while describing modding, 
which is the trend of modifying video game software in order to make new 
games. 
Sotamaa (2009) discusses similar concerns while debating the same 
phenomenon. They both acknowledge that modding, just one among a large 
variety of activities performed by video game consumers, is shaped by specific 
industrial operations and needs. Sotamaa writes: 
 
During the past decade the combination of players’ increased skills and 
developers’ supportive strategies have taken player production from the 
shadow of cultural economy to the spotlight. The increased access to the means 
of media production does, however, not necessarily equate to increased 
freedom. In one sense facilitating players with productive tools has only 
underlined the centrality of distribution that is traditionally strictly controlled 
by the industry bodies. (2009: 99) 
 
 In a similar vein to the literature discussed earlier, both Ku cklich and 
Sotamaa take a position in judging the characters of this story. The modding 
community emerges ‘from the shadow of cultural economy to the spotlight’, as 
Sotamaa argues, assuming the development of a collective character in a time 
period (‘the past decade’). Ku cklich sympathises with the modders because an 
opposing figure (the ‘leisure industries’) is capitalising on their work. 
Nonetheless, both Sotamaa and Ku cklich have to acknowledge that the 
phenomenon they are describing is extremely variegated and displays the most 
diverse interests on the players’ side. The majority of modders might not care 
about this exploitation, which is regulated quite clearly in the end-user licence 
agreement (EULA) the player has to accept before playing the game. Sotamaa, 
just before making the aforementioned statement, acknowledges that: 
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[w]hile many players are happy to hand over the productive control to the 
industry, some are keen to follow their productive inclinations that result in 
bending and transforming the products of the game industry into potentially 
new directions. Some players choose to adjust the challenges, create completely 
new self-defined side games and test the limits of the game world. In other 
words, they move from playing the game to playing with the game. (Sotamaa 
2009: 99) 
 
Sotamaa reiterates this view in ‘Play, Create, Share? Console Gaming, Player 
Production and Agency’ (2010). Here Sotamaa describes the evolution of game 
mods (modifications) for console gaming, a phenomenon usually limited by strict 
production licences and now progressively more open to user customisation and 
production of content (as exemplified by Sony Computer Entertainment’s game 
series Little Big Planet, 2008). Recreation and sharing of content are seen as 
entirely new phenomena in the console market – although similar activities 
occurred before, they were not encouraged by developers. Two excerpts from 
Microsoft and Nintendo press releases from the same period help clarify this 
narrative. The first cited by Sotamaa is taken from a press release dated 13 
August 2006 entitled ‘Microsoft Invites the World to Create Its Own XBox360 
Console Games for the First Time’.16 In this context Microsoft was presenting the 
XNA Game Studio, a set of tools to facilitate game production, later released in 
December 2007 and whose development ceased in January 2013. 
 
In the 30 years of video game development, the art of making console games has 
been reserved for those with big projects, big budgets and the backing of big game 
labels. […] XNA Game Studio Express will democratize game development by 
delivering the necessary tools to hobbyists, students, indie developers and studios 
alike to help them bring their creative game ideas to life while nurturing game 
development talent, collaboration and sharing that will benefit the entire industry. 
(2006: online) 
 
Sotamaa shows the similarities with Nintendo's press release (12 May 2008) 
entitled ‘Nintendo Launches WiiWare: An Open Playground for Creativity’: ‘by 
reducing the barriers that make console game development prohibitively 
expensive, WiiWare showcases original ideas in the most democratic 
                                                 
16 Microsoft (2006) ‘Microsoft Invites the World to Create Its Own Xbox 360 Console Games for the 
First Time’, Microsoft News Center, 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/aug06/08-13XNAGameStudioPR.mspx [Last 
accessed 7/11/2014] 
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environment in industry history, connecting the people who make games more 
directly with the people who play them’ (cited in Sotamaa 2010: online). 
Sotamaa is concerned with the historical evolution of the process of 
openness, and with how this influences the availability of the means of 
production. My main interest in this dissertation is less in the real or supposed 
availability of new technologies and more in the discursive processes that use 
this same notion of availability, as well as the notion of openness and of the 
democratisation of the means of production. However, I share with Sotamaa a 
focus on the performative aspects of such discourses, and on how the relation 
between the development of new and allegedly open technologies entangles with 
the descriptions, justifications and analyses of those tools. I will soon debate how 
the study of the medium of the video game has often insisted on finding a sort of 
specificity of the medium itself, outlining a technical configuration that should be 
responsible for the specific ways in which video games are made, played and 
interpreted. These theoretical views, I claim, share a similar determinism with 
the discourses that propose a supposedly unprecedented emergence of 
participative forms of production in video game culture. As argued in the 
introduction, it is the notion of newness that permeates these perspectives and 
creates the idea that video games need to be studied in their uniqueness and 
essential irreducibility to other forms of expression. 
 
 
Procedurality and algorithmic culture: game ontologies and their 
implications  
 
Many of the accounts of the culture and production of video games tend to treat 
technology as a potential carrier of specific meanings. In this perspective video 
games are seen as constituted by a unique kind of technology that has inner 
properties and qualities that are responsible for the ways in which games are 
made, played and interpreted by players. I will argue in this section that in this 
perspective there is a tendency to produce ontologies of games by explaining 
what they are, how they are made and linking these descriptions of their 
properties to an analysis of what digital games should make possible. I argue that 
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this view implies a supposed distance from the object of analysis. Such distance 
and non-involvement is also present, as I will debate, in the critiques to these 
approaches that have been trying to focus instead on the practices of play as the 
source of different and unpredicted uses and definitions of the medium of the 
video game. 
The most relevant and influential approach that has been trying to analyse 
games in their uniqueness is known as procedurality, a term originally conceived 
by Janet Murray (1997) in relation to digital technologies and now adopted by 
several game scholars and game designers. The concept of procedurality can, I 
believe, be looked at as an attempt to find a unique and specific way to interpret 
software and digital games. The most notorious proponent of procedurality, in 
the context of the study of video games, is Ian Bogost, who has been elaborating 
this method to understand, critique and make digital games. In his book Unit 
Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (2006) Bogost introduces the 
notion of ‘unit operations’, a ‘general conceptual frame for discrete, compressed 
elements of fungible meaning’ (xiii). Bogost argues that ‘unit operations strive to 
articulate both the members of a particular situation and the specific functional 
relationship between them’ (14). He draws on Janet Murray’s Hamlet on the 
Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace (1997), which proposed four 
essential properties for digital ‘environments’: these are procedurality, 
participation, spatiality and encyclopaedic capacity.17 Procedurality, considered 
by Bogost to be the most important of the four, is the computer’s ‘defining ability 
to execute a series of rules’ (Murray 1997: 71) or the ‘practice of encapsulating 
specific real-world behaviors into programmatic representations’ (Bogost 2006: 
13). 
Units, and unit operations, are a crucial element of Bogost’s theory and of 
the idea of procedurality. His attempt is to provide a form of criticism that could 
eliminate deterministic boundaries and connect the humanities with computer 
science, or even potentially inspire ‘a unit-operational university […]: a series of 
constantly changing relations between highly disparate groups, ideas and 
                                                 
17 These properties are defined by Murray as such: being composed of executable rules 
(procedurality), inviting manipulation and human actions (participation), being able to organise 
spatial environment where information is made usable (spatiality) and finally the possibility of 
storing high volumes of information in various formats (encyclopaedic). 
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resources’ in which ‘intellectual projects would structure themselves more like 
software: units of encapsulated production with structured ties to multiple 
potential applications’ (2006: 173-174). Bogost stresses that ‘unit operations 
give us a lever for understanding any form of human production as potentially 
procedural’ and ‘unit analysis can help the critic uncover the discrete meaning-
making in texts of all kinds’ (15). Bogost shows how the analysis of units could 
work in reading the movie The Terminal by Steven Spielberg (2005). Critics have 
negatively received the movie, Bogost acknowledges, mostly because of its 
incoherent plot. However, Bogost argues that a unit analysis of the movie 
uncovers a series of ‘discrete components of meanings’ organised around the 
theme of ‘uncorroborated waiting’, as many characters in the movie are  involved 
in more or less stressful forms of waiting (sometimes self-inflicted). If unit 
operations might be seen as crossing different media, Bogost concludes, we could 
look at the movie as a piece of software and unveil the ‘units of meaning’ and a 
‘framework of general figures of waiting’ (15-19). Towards the end of his text, 
Bogost also looks at the video game series Grand Theft Auto (1997-2014). In this 
series of games, the non-playing characters the player interacts with caught the 
attention of many critics for their over-simplistic representation of human 
behaviour. These are in fact very predictable and reduced to a few figures that 
lack any traits of humanity (they do not speak and they react in a limited number 
of ways to the player’s moves). It is this dehumanisation that many critics have 
argued causes the game to incite violence, as the player faces no visual 
consequences for beating or abusing the non-playing characters. Bogost affirms 
that this design choice can be seen as an ‘implicit declaration of the game’s 
endorsement of sociopathic behavior’ or as ‘the game’s primary strategy for 
alienating the player from productive social interactions, a unit operation for 
sociopathy’ (168).  
Bogost’s method for looking at and creating video games is further 
elaborated in Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (2007). In 
this text he argues that games, also in their non-digital form, allow a specific kind 
of rhetoric different from other forms of literature or visual representation. Video 
games, Bogost notices, are executed by computers that are essentially rule-based. 
Therefore representations and interactions in video games are rule-based, and 
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this brings a new and rather unique form of rhetoric, which he calls again 
procedural. It should be through and thanks to procedural rhetoric that video 
games can become persuasive and be used for political propaganda, social 
change or artistic expression. However, Bogost argues that, as long as video 
games are studied and made as if they were part of literature or cinema, that is, 
as long as their procedural properties are forgotten, the effects of their message 
will be undermined. 
Studies on procedurality appear to focus on these alleged unique 
properties that games have, and on the effects of these on players. However, this 
process of affecting players happens in an abstract and separated context, from 
where the act of telling and discussing these effects is not itself affected. From 
this privileged position it becomes possible to ‘find meanings’, as proposed in two 
collective papers by Mike Treanor, Bobby Schweizer, Ian Bogost and Micheal 
Mateas (‘Proceduralist Readings: How To Find Meanings in Games with graphical 
logics’, 2011, and ‘The Micro-Rhetorics of Game-O-Matic’, 2012) that further 
articulate the concepts of procedurality and unit operations. The concepts are 
here understood as tools for video game criticism as well as for their design. The 
first paper states in its abstract: 
 
Newsgames and artgames, two genres in which designers wish to communicate 
messages to players, often deploy procedural representation. Understanding 
these proceduralist games requires special attention to a game’s processes as 
well as how these interact with its theme and aesthetics. In this paper we 
present a method for proceduralist readings of arcade-like 2D games so that 
players can determine their range of intended and unintended meanings, critics 
can assess the strengths and weaknesses of the presented arguments, and so 
that designers can identify ways to refine their rhetorical strategies. (Treanor et 
al. 2011: 1) 
 
The second paper similarly offers a method for designing simple games to 
‘express ideas’ through ‘representational units of meanings’ (Treanor et al. 
2012).  
The notion of procedurality has been welcomed by many, particularly in 
the field of game design, as a novel method for understanding and making games. 
However, it has also received severe criticism. Miguel Sicart, in ‘Against 
procedurality’ (2011), argues that: 
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The proceduralists take their starting point in Murray’s statement that digital 
games are unique, among other things, because of their procedural nature (Murray 
1998), that is, because they are processes that operate in a way that is akin to how 
computers operate. The argument, of course, did not stop there: procedurality is 
understood not just as an ontological marker of computer games, but as 
the specific way in which computer games build discourses of ethical, political, 
social and aesthetic value. (Sicart 2011: online) 
 
Bogost has in fact countered the accusation of producing ontology of games by 
differentiating his work with Espen Aarseth’s Cybertexts (1997), seen instead as 
an example of a work mostly concerned with establishing ontologies. According 
to Bogost, Aarseth’s idea of the cybertext,18 which could otherwise appear similar 
to Bogost’s unit operation, aims at an ‘ontological domain that includes and 
excludes certain works by virtue of their overall function’ (2006: 14). Bogost 
instead is proposing a critical tool, and unit operations are an instrument to be 
used for understanding ‘any artefact, or any portion of any artefact, rather 
arbitrarily’ (14). However, Sicart can rightly argue that procedurality can be 
easily critiqued of reducing the act of playing as an “activation” of the meanings 
of the game. This is particularly evident in the papers earlier introduced, where 
the notion is presented as a useful tool for game design, and assumes that 
operations within a video game can trigger exact meanings. Sicart argues against 
this view of the design of games and in favour of the practice of play as the source 
of unpredictable events: 
 
Play is the unknown and the uncontrollable, and by building an ontology based 
on designer-centric reason, the proceduralists eliminate the myth and the ritual 
from play, and encourage an instrumental approach to games that is exclusively 
guided by the rules, norms and processes embedded in the game system.  
[…] Play is the experience of a game by a player, and play is a creative, 
appropriative process of understanding and engaging in a dialectic relationship 
with the game system and with other players (DeKoven 2002). Play is 
appropriation, creation, expression, and to a certain extent submission to the 
rules of a game. Play is everything about a player engaged in a game, and less 
about the rules of such game. (Sicart 2011: online) 
  
                                                 
18 In Aarseth’s words, ‘[c]ybertext […] is the wide range (or perspective) of possible textualities 
seen as a typology of machines, as various kinds of literary communication systems where the 
functional differences among the mechanical parts play a defining role in determining the 
aesthetic process. […] As a theoretical perspective, cybertext shifts the focus from the traditional 
threesome of author/sender, text/message, and reader/receiver to the cybernetic intercourse 
between the various part(icipant)s in the textual machine’ (Aarseth 1997: 22). 
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Mark J. Nelson (2012) has attempted to summarise the debate and also 
argue in defence of procedurality (and directly against ‘Against Procedurality’ by 
Sicart). Nelson sums up Sicart’s position noticing an opposition, implied in his 
work, between ‘rhetoric, propaganda, encoding an opinion [and on the other 
hand] intervention, […] setting up situations, with meaning not conveyed, but 
jointly produced from the design and the players’ interaction with the design’ 
(Nelson 2012: online). Nelson then proposes a ‘possible solution’: 
 
[‘M]eaningful games’ should not be modeled on rhetorical theory but on 
performance-art theory. Rather than attempting to convey meaning or 
persuade via representation of arguments in processes, one ought rather to 
design games aimed at setting up meaningful situations or effecting 
interventions. (2012: online) 
 
 The debate on procedurality, from Bogost to Sicart and including Nelson’s 
response to Sicart, is problematic as it keeps reiterating the separation between 
gamers and games as a given and as a founding principle for the possibility of 
talking about the video game as a medium. In the positions taken so far by 
different game scholars, the debate has been circulating around the idea that the 
meanings of digital games can somehow be located. The location can supposedly 
be found in the units and unit operations Bogost argues about, or in the act of 
playing defended by Sicart. Nelson’s summary is particularly evident of the 
problem at stake here, as his conclusion is that games can be designed in a way 
that affects players’ interventions. In other words, Nelson summarises Bogost 
and Sicart’s perspectives by confirming them both in their rather unquestioning 
acceptance that games and gamers are separated from each other and 
“activating” each other. Procedurality, as a form of criticism that comprehends all 
texts that are composed of executable rules, takes for granted a separation 
between, on the one hand, the subject or instance that interprets unit operations 
and, on the other, the object of analysis. It is an analytic and positivist method 
and it has the limits of such an approach, being a theory which offers to unpack 
the processes of procedural systems from a distant and uninvolved perspective. 
 However, Bogost is not alone in his endeavour as similar methodologies 
have been discussed in the study of video games on many other occasions. In 
what I believe is a similar fashion, Alexander Galloway (2006) has investigated 
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the properties of video games, which in his view largely depend on the 
algorithmic organisation of both games and of the culture that surrounds them. 
In Galloway’s view, games ‘are actions’ that ‘exist when enacted’ by their players 
and when ‘software is executed’ (2). Galloway proposes to distinguish between 
the actions of the operator and those of the machine, and then again between 
diegetic and non-diegetic actions (expressions permuted from film studies that 
generally refer to what belongs to or is external to the narrative environment 
represented in the game). Galloway seems to be following in the footsteps of 
early scholars such as Espen Aarseth (1997), already discussed as an important 
reference for Bogost. Aarseth included video games in the category of ergodic 
literature, which he defined as the kind of literature that requires the reader to 
actually perform an action and to risk being rejected by the text. In a video game, 
a typical example would be the phrase “game over”, where the text rejects the 
player when he or she is unable to perform an action. In this way, video games 
are a part of ergodic literature, according to both Aarseth and Galloway. 
What ties Aarseth, Bogost and Galloway together, I believe, is more than 
just a focus on the actions required to enact a cybertext or ergodic piece of 
literature, or on the operations that frame the meanings of a text. There is in fact 
a common ground in the sort of questions these authors pose. They are all 
equally interested in understanding what video games, or possibly all texts 
elaborated around an algorithmic culture, are and how we should read them. 
This is particularly evident when Galloway debates, in the concluding chapter of 
his book, the concept of countergaming. 
Countergaming includes practices of modding, game art and modifications 
of game software for political purposes. According to Galloway, a video game can 
be modified at the level of its visual design, its rules and its software technology. 
He describes how the modifications have often been encouraged by the game 
industries, and how the countergaming movement is similar to the avant-garde 
cinema of the 60s in terms of its experimentation with the language of art. His 
conclusions are that, despite a lively artistic scene, countergaming does not 
interrogate the qualities that make video games different from other media. As a 
result, it ‘serves to hinder gameplay, not advance it. It eclipses the game as a 
game and rewrites it as a sort of primitive animation lacking any of the virtues of 
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game design’ (Galloway 2006: 125). Countergaming is seen by Galloway as being 
outside, or on the margin of, video gaming, as the absence of interaction classifies 
it as an experiment but not as gaming. 
According to Galloway one of the ‘virtues of game design’ is the 
opportunities it affords players to take part in the construction of the text. 
Nonetheless, I would like to argue that countergaming, as it is presented by 
Galloway, seems to be a comment on video game culture as a whole, and as such 
it also significantly contributes to its shaping. Countergaming changes video 
games. It adds lines to a bigger and longer narrative and thus changes the issues 
at stake in video game culture. As such, even if countergaming takes the form of 
something that is not clearly definable as a video game, it contributes to the 
shaping of video games as cultural objects. From this perspective, when Galloway 
asks for ‘new grammars of action, not simply new grammars of visuality’ (2006: 
125), he clearly points to a lack of interest on the part of artists in critiquing the 
conventional rules of video gaming, something that movie director Jean-Luc 
Godard did in the 1960s with cinema conventions (which is one of the examples 
Galloway uses as a comparison). Nonetheless, Galloway criticises countergaming 
for something it never aimed to do. 
For example, the artist duo JODI (Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans) is 
considered by Galloway to be apolitical because it does not focus on the rules of 
game design. In its work, JODI brings part of the game’s software to the 
foreground, altering it and modifying it until it becomes something completely 
different. In the work SOD (1999), JODI modifies the video game Wolfenstein 3D 
(id Software 1992) until it becomes impossible to play. The result is a disturbing 
series of black and white images that only marginally resemble the original game. 
JODI's untitled game (1996-2001) almost completely covers over any figurative 
image in favour of pure lines of data. JET SET WILLY @ 1984, a modification of the 
popular 80s video game Jet Set Willy, is similar in its strategies [See Appendix: 
images 12 and 13]. In a text accompanying an art exhibition, curator Tilman 
Baumga rtel describes JET SET WILLY @ 1984 as follows: 
 
‘Jet set willy’ consists of (10) ten variations on the computer game ‘Jet Set Willy’ 
that was launched in the eighties for one of the first home computers, the 
Sinclair ZX Spectrum. The code has been modified in such a way that although 
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the basic functions of the game are the same, the on-screen graphics are 
redesigned. The work is written in BASIC, a programming language now in 
danger of becoming extinct. ‘Jet Set Willy’ is also JODI’s homage to the culture of 
hobby game programmers in the eighties, when it was mainly teenagers 
developing games, including all the music and graphics, single-handedly on the 
first home computers, a development that is one of the best examples of the 
libertarian do-it-yourself ethic of the early computer subculture, a mainstay of 
JODI’s work. (Baumga rtel 2003) 
 
JODI intervenes in the narrative of game culture, investigating the core elements 
of the aesthetic of video games and the main issues involved in defining a video 
game. In subverting the graphics of a video game, JODI aims to critique the 
aesthetics of a video game, hence also what a player expects to find in a video 
game. The excerpt from the interview about JET SET WILLY @ 1984 shows that, 
according to its authors, at the centre of their intervention are the narratives of 
hobby game programming, DIY and the early computer subculture rather than 
the gameplay. While Galloway acknowledges this, he also argues that this kind of 
art intervention is not enough to provide a real critique of video games as a new 
medium. 
 The problem with Galloway’s (and Aarseth’s) perspective is 
representative of the problem with most video game literature produced so far. 
In an attempt to define video games (as Aarseth does), or in adopting a definition 
of video games (as Galloway does), these writers establish limitations on what 
can and cannot be called a video game. Methods for analysing games, such as the 
concept of procedurality as intended by Bogost, are ulterior modes of asking how 
video games should be read, and therefore what they truly are. Before Bogost and 
Galloway, the study of video games was already dominated by the so-called 
ludological model, proposed by Jesper Juul and other authors, which similarly 
asked ‘what a game is’ (Juul 2005).19 In other words, these models are grounded 
in an ontological question, one that assumes video games to be definable through 
a set of limited properties. Definitions also serve, in these theories, an 
instrumental role, as a clear understanding of the limits and possibilities of the 
medium could probably allow better forms of criticism, play and design. 
The reason the mode of thinking exemplified by artist duo JODI is relevant 
                                                 
19 The ludological approach is an example of the theoretical trend of defining the medium of the 
video game as a mode of knowledge of its potentialities and interpretations. See Juul (2005) and 
also Juul's blog The Ludologist http://www.jesperjuul.net/ludologist/ [Last accessed 7/11/2014]. 
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in the context of my dissertation is that it evades the ontological question of what 
games are and explores instead, through temporary and strategic readings, what 
games could be. The artistic interventions by JODI, while testing and contesting 
the narratives that underlie digital gaming, are aimed at investigating the social 
and cultural role of video games. Game artist Miltos Manetas reflects this view 
while elaborating what he means by game art: 
 
A videogame after-artist [sic], should not create anything himself but only extract 
the hidden notions of the game. He should do that, by examining carefully the 
parade of symbols that the game is offering. - An explosion should be captured and 
turned into a Turner-like landscape. - The relationship with a Monster should 
become romantic. - Instead of shooting monsters, we can start taking photos of 
them. A Painter doesn't eat a piece of bread but paints it. An artist after videogames 
doesn’t play a videogame, but relates to it. (Manetas 2004: online, my italics) 
 
The work of the artist, according to Manetas, is to copy and modify what the 
game is offering [See Appendix: images 13 and 14]. Manetas suggests that a 
significant piece of game art should focus on the symbols of video gaming, that is, 
on its cultural and social relevance. In a similar fashion, art critic Alessandro 
Ludovico, in an article entitled ‘Video-Game Art: Changing Software Meanings’ 
(2004), points out that:  
 
More and more artists are hacking into games’ codes in order to deconstruct 
the entertainment paradigm by adding social values, decontextualizing lead 
characters and their actions, and subverting the usual rules of conflict. In this 
way, the meanings are definitively changed and the digital landscape is clearly 
manipulated. (Ludovico 2004: online) 
 
Ludovico is vague in defining what he means by ‘meanings’ and ‘digital 
landscapes’. However, his point is clear as he insists that, particularly in the light 
of the current artistic experimentations with video games, it is extremely difficult 
to map once and for all the value of video games. Game art is then a relevant 
contribution to the understanding of how gamers’ games can be shaped, enforced 
and modified. It suggests, in fact, that the notions discussed around the medium 
of the video game, such as its effects and uses, are essentially linguistic 
performances, and as such participate in the linguistic performances used to 
‘relate to it’, as Manetas puts it. Thus, ‘relating to it’ already entails a less 
positivist and analytic approach than the one proposed by the followers of 
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ludology, procedurality and other similar attempts to fix the medium and its 
study around particular definitions and explanations.  
 However, what is at stake in being inspired by the work of game artists in 
a theoretical understanding of games? Is the countergaming Galloway talks about 
merely a form of unofficial use of digital games for unexpected purposes, as seen 
in other forms of active media reception? Or can it become a way of looking at 
games and at the ways in which we are involved in them? Is game art simply 
confirming Sicart’s notion of ‘play’ as the ‘unknown and uncontrollable’, ‘a 
creative appropriative process’ (Sicart 2011: online)? Or can this notion be 
extended to the study of digital games? In the following section I will debate how 
a perspective on video games could be delineated from the contributions 
provided by game art, and not necessarily simply as a re-evaluation of the power 
of players to define the objects of their consumption. In other words, re-
evaluating the work of game artists as a non-ontological inquiry into the medium 
of the video game is not just another way of saying that we should look less at 
what games are and more at the activities of gamers. It can become instead, as I 
will argue, a method for deconstructing the separation between gamers and 
games as well as the supposedly linear processes of production and consumption 
that are too often put at the centre of the study of video games. 
 
 
From prosumers to parasites: intervention as interruption 
 
Video games, particularly in the last decade, have progressively introduced and 
encouraged forms of prosumption, both in the design of the games and in their 
advertising. Thus, it could be argued that game art is probably less significant 
and radically different nowadays, when the original producers officially support 
the involvement of consumers. For example, in games such as The Sims 2 (2004), 
Dovey and Kennedy see ‘the ideal subject of Western technocapitalism at the 
start of the twenty-first century’ (2006: 142). They come to this conclusion via 
the slogan used to advertise the game: ‘How do you play?’ In this slogan the 
consumer is summoned as a character that constructs itself through his or her 
own practice of consumption. 
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Many scholars have looked at the practices of production and 
consumption in their nuanced relation with each other, often with the purpose of 
trying to understand how an apparently top-down form of communication could 
also be seen as a bottom-up approach, where readers have the power to interpret 
and manipulate texts. Many of the studies of players’ productions and video game 
culture draw from Michel De Certeau’s seminal work The Practice of Everyday 
Life (1984). De Certeau acknowledges that each society has, by definition, some 
dominant practices that organise and shape its normative institutions, while 
other practices remain secondary to the dominant ones. These secondary 
practices include those of consumption. If production is rationalised, 
consumption instead has no clear, tangible products that can define it. 
Consumption is defined through a plurality of often contradictory practices. De 
Certeau states that these practices of consumption are molecular, minimal 
actions that conform to a majoritarian, large-scale practice of discipline. But this 
conformity is the solution through which it is possible to explore and imagine 
other practices, such as subversive ones. He introduces a distinction between the 
products, the consumers and the uses that consumers make of the products. This 
distinction assumes that the products are allowing, suggesting or (more often, in 
De Certeau’s terms) forcing us to accept a specific use for them. It also assumes 
that consumers can resist and construct their own practices of use, thus 
personalising the products. 
 How do De Certeau's ideas fare in contemporary media theory? Relatively 
recent experiments, mostly coming from software engineering and web design, 
have included these practices of user resistance within a definition of the product 
itself. Web 2.0 and open-source software are based on the activity of the users, 
who are no longer resisting a forced use of the product but are invited to shape it 
through their contributions. More radical examples of this trend, such as social 
networks, are designed to be entirely based on the content produced and 
uploaded by the users. As already discussed in the introduction, in 1980 Alvin 
Toffler proposed in his text The Third Wave the concept of the prosumer as a key 
figure of the coming information age. The prosumer includes the two figures of 
the producer and the consumer. Media and technologies of the information age, 
according to Toffler, are tailored to the prosumer as the imagined recipient. In 
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such an environment practices of interaction are no longer hidden, illegitimate or 
unforeseen. Instead, they are exposed and define the experience of digital media. 
As a consequence the processes of personalisation and the plurality of practices 
of consumption are no longer necessarily subversive: they are actually 
encouraged, as the product is no longer rationalised and structured in a clearly 
defined way. In this context, De Certeau (1984) still provides inspiration for the 
study of consumers. His approach and underlying assessment of consumers’ 
tactics is important because it has encouraged the ongoing fascination with the 
hacker, the counterculture and the DIY cultures, where consumers redefine the 
received products (and where a clear separation between production and 
consumption is assumed). 
 Critics of the concept of the prosumer have argued against the apparent 
newness of the concept itself and against the alleged democratisation of the 
practices of consumption. Derrida and Stiegler (‘Ecographies of Television’, 
2002), in a conversation about television spectatorship, convincingly 
demonstrate that the relationship between sender and receiver is never going to 
be one between equals. In their discussion they review the development of the 
concepts of receivers and users in a variety of media. While Stiegler claims that 
new technologies may allow the consumers to be writers rather than just 
readers, Derrida notices that reception has never been purely passive. Even if the 
receiver does not know how the technology works, he or she may know how to 
use it (a car driver knows how to use it but may not be familiar with its engine 
and mechanical parts). Nonetheless, Derrida acknowledges that a perfect 
reciprocity or symmetry between producer and receiver is a ‘mirage’ and a 
‘fantasy’ (2002: 58). What Derrida proposes instead is a community of sharers, 
where consumers identify themselves as part of a collective while still 
maintaining their singularities and individual interpretations. 
 Writing and reading are also used as general metaphors for production 
and consumption by Roland Barthes in his text S/Z (1975). Barthes introduces a 
distinction between a ‘readerly’ and a ‘writerly’ interpretation of a text: a 
‘readerly’ text is one where ‘everything holds together’ (156), that is, one where 
the reader takes a passive stance and is supposed to ‘find’ meanings and ‘keep 
them safe’. Barthes suggests that some texts, such as classic literary books, 
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encourage this kind of stance. The ‘writerly’ approach is applied when reading 
becomes ‘a labor of language’ (11). Barthes argues that ‘reading is not a 
parasitical act, the reactive complement of a writing which we endow with all the 
glamour of creation and anteriority. It is a form of work’ (10). Barthes’ focus here 
suggests that the activity of the reader is not to be discussed in general terms, as 
a more or less essential condition of the practices of consumption, but as an 
activity that is grounded in the interpretative strategies suggested by the text 
itself. 
 However, the way in which Barthes discusses this topic is still mostly 
based on a dichotomy between passivity and activity. For instance, he notes how 
reading is not ‘parasitical’, meaning that it does not equate to passively receiving 
information. But on a different note, Michel Serres in The Parasite (1982) argues 
that the figure of the parasite, as well as the hôte (which means, in French, both 
host and guest), has both a social and a biological function that cannot be 
reduced to mere passivity. According to Serres, it is the parasite, an element of 
interruption external to the system but at the same time part of it, that makes 
communication possible. Any system, Serres argues, tends to be corrupted or 
interrupted by external factors. There is no chance that in the long term it can be 
kept closed and preserved as it is. In a communication exchange, it is 
interruption or disturbance that becomes, in the long run, the defining 
characteristic of transmission. This disturbance then breeds further disturbance, 
allowing further waves of noise to again modify the transmission of the message. 
According to Serres, the alleged linearity of the communication process is not 
only inadequate but also subverts the more correct hierarchy where noise and 
parasites are the defining factors of communication. 
 The reason I turn to Serres in this debate about active consumption is that 
I believe his notion of the parasite introduces a novel view on the alleged 
passivity or activity of production and consumption. Through the parasite it is 
possible to think about the practices of production and consumption of video 
games in a non-linear and non-binary perspective. The emergence of active 
consumers has often been discussed either as a reverse process (passive 
consumers becoming active participants) or by looking at how consumption 
could be seen as an inherently productive practice. However, the debate is still 
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organised around a dualism. Serres instead introduces a third element, the 
parasite, which is not merely an addition to the existing duality but is in fact an 
external factor that also makes the system itself possible. In Serres’ theory, the 
parasite is not just an ‘other’ but is that which enables a relation within the 
system. It is a thermal exciter, a disturbance, but also the change in an existing 
relation. Serres explains the role played by the parasite by turning to the image of 
the hôte. The hôte, in French, is at the same time a guest and a host. An hôte 
receives and consumes, ‘gives and receives, offers and accepts, invites and is 
invited, master and passer-by’ (1982: 15). This relation is always going to be 
unsettled by noise, by the arrival of a parasite (whether rats, insects or other 
animals mentioned in Serres’ stories). The parasite is that which introduces 
complexity and expels the hôte, introducing a new relation. The parasitical series 
of ongoing relations is seen by Serres as a chain, an arrow pointing in one 
direction, or a flow that can only temporarily be ordered through the 
establishment of a system. 
 The system then becomes, in Serres’ view, the object of study of ontology. 
The system is a result of the narrowing down of a series of parasitic relations, 
and of the momentary freezing of an existing condition. It can be seen here how 
Serres’ contribution directly addresses the issues raised in the introduction 
about the narratives of technological development and the deterministic views 
on the newness of technological products. Serres talks explicitly about the ‘black 
box’ as the intellectual gesture that denies transformation, thus hindering 
knowledge: 
 
When we do not understand, when we defer our knowledge to a later date, 
when the thing is too complex for the means at hand, when we put everything 
in a temporary black box, we prejudge the existence of a system. When we can 
finally open the box, we see that it works like a space of transformation. The 
only systems, instances, and substances come from our lack of knowledge. The 
system is nonknoweldge [sic]. The other side of nonknowledge. One side of 
nonknowledge is chaos; the other, system. Knowledge forms a bridge between 
the two banks. Knowledge as such is a space for transformation. (Serres 1982: 
73) 
 
What sorts of transformations could we then achieve through this different 
notion of knowledge? Serres proposes that it is the observer itself that should be 
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called into question when looking at the supposed linearity of communication. 
He shows how knowledge implies transformation and the unboxing of the 
relations we tend to establish. He also debates how disturbance and interruption 
persist in those relations, including the relation between the subject and the 
object of knowledge. For these reasons, I believe, Serres’ conclusive proposal is to 
reconsider the performative side of theory, its essential participation in the 
relations it describes and thus constitutes. This is the transformation that theory 
introduces in its activity. As if it were a host/guest, theory can prepare the table 
and also consume, serve and exploit the existing dualities in a system (of which 
the producer-consumer binary could be an example). But theory can also 
participate at the meal and become a parasite and thermal exciter, or the noise 
that disturbs the duality. In other words, theory can introduce and account for 
performative narratives. 
Becoming parasites probably means thinking of theory less as a meta-
language, and more as a further narrative that parasites the existing ones. I see 
this project offered by Serres as much more similar to the work of game artists 
such as Miltos Manetas and JODI, and distant from the constitution of ontologies, 
such as those delineated by Aarseth, Juul, Galloway and many others, or the study 
of units and their functional operations outlined by Bogost. I will, in the following 
section, explain the notions of performativity and the role narratives can play in 
the understanding of gamers’ games. I will also discuss how theory can 
participate in and be responsible for the relations it describes. 
 
 
Narratives of gamers’ games 
 
Caroline Bassett, in The Arc and the Machine (2007), proposes that we consider 
narrative as productive of information technology and of the concepts relating to 
digital media. Bassett argues that there was a denigration of the concept of 
narrative during the 80s, which culminated in the emergence of postmodernism. 
The splitting of perspectives and the eclipse of meaning, which distinguish the 
postmodern age, eliminate critical distance, fracturing distinctions, texts and 
truth. In such a scenario, narratives disappear or lose their crucial role helping to 
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make sense of reality (2007: 7). Bassett argues that narratives are a form of 
resistance against the discontinuity of information. In fact, we make sense of our 
experiences through narrative, particularly within the multi-layered and complex 
systems of information (databases, archives, algorithms and so on) we nowadays 
inhabit. 
In this work I would like to further articulate Bassett’s contribution. As I 
have already outlined, the example of the prosumer shows how a certain 
‘narrative’, as Hall also puts it (2008), can be extremely effective in bringing 
about what it describes, despite the contradictions it may hide. The ‘third wave’ 
proposed by Toffler (1980) similarly shows the power of historical narratives. 
However, the idea of a third wave can still be seen as a form of resistance against 
the discontinuity caused by the emergence of complex forms of production and 
consumption, and also as quite effective in inspiring the development of 
technologies. 
 Bassett explicitly writes that narrative can ‘bring information into being 
as a material cultural form. Or, if we switch this around, we can say that 
narratives can produce information’s and information technology’s concept’ 
(2007: 3). She argues that we use ‘narrative to produce digital media’s concept’ 
(47). Narrative works to solve contradictions and shape the real – it influences 
us. As such, it should not ‘be explored in terms of representation but in terms of 
how it performs, acts upon us, or materially produces an effect’ (23). She 
suggests we look back at structuralist approaches as they inspired later theories 
about narratives and still work well in describing some of the ways we make 
sense of and establish oppositions, contradictions and their resolutions. In this 
context, Bassett draws on Roland Barthes, who argued that the narrative code is 
the final level attainable in an analysis – something we cannot ‘step outside’ (14). 
 Barthes, in his essay ‘Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative’ 
(1966), argues that narratives, thanks to their structure, can be translated and 
summarised while still preserving the individuality of the message. The 
translatable part can be looked at in terms of its structures and these should also 
finally allow us to move the same narrative from literature to cinema, for 
example, or from comics to television programmes (291-292). The deep, 
essential level Barthes finds in his ‘structural’ analysis can be seen again to be 
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presented as a narrative. The movement towards the depth level of meaning 
looks more like a continuous production of further narratives, whose meanings 
(plural and uncountable) will be made and unmade in the process of reading. 
 Such focus on the plurality of meanings might recall Lyotard's argument in 
favour of micro-narratives as the defining element of postmodernism, also a 
major reference in the work of Bassett. In his text The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge (1984), Lyotard argues that the age of grand political 
narratives such as Marxism and the Enlightenment, capable of involving the 
entirety of humanity towards a unique goal, is now in decline. These worked as 
meta-narratives, which offered to define and interpret any practice and event 
through a political framework. According to Lyotard, an emerging feeling of 
incredulity towards meta-narratives, which, among other reasons, results from 
the success of non-traditional studies in science (such as chaos and catastrophe 
theory), as well as from the changing relations of individual political subjects to 
the global political milieu, has favoured the emergence of micro-narratives. These 
are based on visions of reality that are partial and do not aim to prescribe all 
possible outcomes. The revolution in knowledge claimed by Lyotard involves the 
humanities as well as the social sciences. This change is based on a renewed 
interest in paradoxes and anomalies, stories that do not represent a grand 
narrative but are instead singular cases and examples of a fragmented vision of 
the world.20 
 Barthes acknowledges that texts are always liable to a plurality of 
interpretations, and Lyotard argues that the acceptance of this has led to a 
cultural shift in postmodern society. I would like to maintain these two views and 
articulate both in light of the notion of performativity. Narratives, even if the 
result of a plurality of interpretations and even if aware of their partiality, are still 
a powerful tool in framing discourses. 
As Katherine Hayles has argued while debating the role played by 
                                                 
20 In this work I do not explore much further the writings of Lyotard, although his reading of 
Wittgenstein’s language games, in relation to micro-narratives and the performativity of 
language, could play a more important role in my dissertation. The statements produced in the 
discourses surrounding gamers’ games could be seen as moves within language games, as forms 
of play within micro-narratives. However, in the rest of this work I will mostly focus on 
performativity through other authors such as Foucault, Butler, Laclau and Mouffe who, I believe, 
are more useful in the context of my research project when looking at the political, ethical and 
cultural implications of the notion of performativity. 
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narratives in framing research into artificial life (‘Narratives of Artificial Life’ 
1996), analogies between computer code and biology do more than merely help 
in the constitution of metaphors to make sense of research practices. These 
metaphors are also in their turn generative of further practices and discourses: 
 
[Narrative] works to encode premises, authenticate inquiry, and interpolate 
scientific research programmes with larger cultural narratives. My argument is 
aimed specifically against those who maintain that scientific inquiry transcends 
culture, that it does not matter where or by whom it is carried out or in what 
cultural contexts it is embedded. Even positing this view of transcendent 
science requires that one tells a story about how science tells truth and about 
how truth is the same no matter who says it. (Hayles 1996: 162) 
 
 The problem we would be left with, at this stage, is how to make sense of 
narratives, and how this can help us to understand what is at stake with gamers’ 
games. I propose that a possible answer to these questions is to look at how 
narratives emerge through discourse. How are they enacted and performed by 
the statements produced within video game culture? How can we look at these 
statements, and how can we argue for the social and political implications of 
their appearance?  
 
 
Circling the semiotic square: narratives, structuralism and post-
structuralism 
 
In order to discuss the emerging narratives surrounding gamers’ games, I will 
draw on and, at the same time, critique the perspectives of studies in narrative, 
semiotics and discourse theory. I will discuss the methodological implications of 
what I believe is the role played by narratives in the processes of understanding 
gamers’ games. According to a typically structuralist perspective, narratives can 
be understood as being organised around structures and levels of depth of 
meaning. However, these same structures leave themselves open to being 
deconstructed, as suggested by Derrida. Moreover, narratives of gamers’ games 
are not explicitly written in a linear form. They are mostly pronounced and 
enacted in partial forms by a variety of actors, including specialised journalists, 
industry experts and game consumers. I propose we consider discourse theory, 
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mostly as theorised by Laclau and Mouffe among many others, as a useful 
methodological tool for understanding how the statements produced by the 
actors involved in video game culture replicate specific narratives. In doing so, 
the same actors replicate and constitute ideas around the social and political 
perspectives on the uses and interpretations of digital technologies. While 
reinforcing the existing narratives, each discursive performance can also be seen 
for what it relates to or excludes from a certain idea of gamers and games. 
Discourses can be seen in their structuring but also in their constant and 
necessary failure. 
 How can we make sense of narratives, and in what sense can they 
contribute to the understanding of social phenomena? Andrew Bennett and 
Nicholas Royle point out, in An Introduction to Literature, Criticism and Theory 
(2009), that: 
 
1. Stories are everywhere. 2. Not only do we tell stories, but stories tell us: if 
stories are everywhere, we are also in stories. 3. The telling of a story is always 
bound up with power, with questions of authority, property and domination. 4. 
Stories are multiple: there is always more than one story. 5. Stories always have 
something to tell us about stories themselves: they always involve self-reflexive 
and metafictional dimensions. (Bennett and Royle 2009: 54) 
 
Bennett and Royle do not distinguish between stories and narratives. The two 
terms are used interchangeably to name a representation of a series of events 
temporally ordered and involving a status of equilibrium and a disturbance of its 
stability (which ends in a new equilibrium). Bennett and Royle also claim that 
‘academic, “objective” or “scientific” discourses are constructed as stories’ (55). 
Although always present, stories are not always the same. As such, an analysis of 
stories can say something significant about an object of study, as the way they are 
structured (and un-structure themselves at every reading) can suggest different 
interpretations. If there is such a thing as a structure of stories and narratives, 
how is it possible to say something about it?  
 Greimas has proposed a series of methodological tools to understand the 
underlying structures of narratives, the most famous of which is the notorious 
concept of the semiotic square. Greimas, and particularly Greimas and Courtes 
(1982), acknowledges that narratives are part of the ‘generative trajectory’ of 
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sense-making. Greimas, in his writings on generative trajectory, argues that 
narratives play a role in structuring meanings and processes of understanding. 
He argues that there are deep levels and superficial levels in the foundation of 
meanings. At the deepest level, basic semantic oppositions are delineated. Closer 
to the surface, general characters and scripts are evoked, values are attributed 
and, on the very last level, space, time and human (or anthropomorphic) 
characters are delineated. Indeed, this very schematic process is meant to serve 
as a model for understanding the way we make sense of the world and is not 
proposed as a step-by-step guide for the invention of stories. In actuality, the 
most superficial level in Greimas’ process of meaning production is the first one 
to appear and the one we immediately come into contact with. The deeper 
structures come into play in a further moment of interpretation. These structures 
can be represented, according to this perspective, through basic oppositions and 
contradictions, such as those articulated by Greimas and Courtes on the semiotic 
square (309). 
 Greimas and Courtes define the semiotic square as ‘the visual 
representation of the logical articulation of any semantic category’ (308). A 
common criticism of this model is that it explains a way of thinking but does not 
really describe its logical implications.21 The semiotic square tries to apply logical 
implications to semantic oppositions that are not logically regulated. It thus also 
reveals rather visibly the shortcomings of a structuralist approach. The main flaw 
of such an approach is the assumption that structures have a centre, an origin or 
an essential part. Indeed, we can make sense of narratives by understanding the 
underlying meanings articulated on a discursive level, but this would be just one 
of innumerable possible readings and, more importantly, it would not contribute 
to understanding the role played by the interpreter in shaping and closing the 
structure. Also, as I will show through the work of Foucault, a purely structuralist 
approach cannot tell us how a specific episteme, a unifying principle, emerges 
through a more extended discursive formation. I will now discuss how 
                                                 
21 Umberto Eco (1985) critiques thoroughly this methodological weakness while outlining the 
genealogy of the Porphyry's tree in his essay ‘L'Antiporfirio’. Although he doesn’t mention 
Greimas’ adaptation of the square of oppositions, he critiques its logical assumptions through a 
historical perspective. The same argument is developed by Terence Parsons (1997) who 
discusses thoroughly the pitfalls of the logic of assumption from its origins in Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione.  
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contributions from post-structuralism and discourse theory can aid us in moving 
around these obstacles. 
 Derrida made his position on structuralism clear in a well-known lecture 
given at Johns Hopkins University in 1966 and later published as an essay 
entitled ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’ 
(1980). According to Derrida, a structure implies a centre, a source, an origin or a 
subject. But in the history of the concept of structure an event or ‘rupture’ 
occurred. When the ‘structurality of structure’ began to be thought of, the centre 
of the structure appeared to be vacant. This allowed a form of free play, which is 
what distinguishes Levi-Strauss’ methodology. In Levi-Strauss' work, as 
interpreted by Derrida, the analysis of myths does not lead to the discovery of an 
original source. Instead, it denies the existence of a final truth to be unveiled or a 
possible completion of the process of knowledge. Levi-Strauss is well aware that 
there is no centre in the structures he is describing. Moreover, he claims that 
signifiers far exceed the signified. This abundance makes the dream of a total 
description useless, and he does not even pretend to achieve such an impossible 
task. He aims instead to write a new syntax of myths. As such, as Levi-Strauss 
states in The Raw and the Cooked (1964), his work does not pretend to include 
the totality of myths developed within a specific culture. Moreover, he considers 
his own work to be part of the discourse and to be a myth itself. Syntax does not 
need, Levi-Strauss claims, to record any possible utterance of the analysed 
language. It does not need a centre to outline a structure, and is used as it is in its 
constant incompleteness. Levi-Strauss’ seminal work is considered by Derrida to 
be exemplary of the historical rupture that appeared in the concept of structure. 
 Derrida claims further that two approaches are now coexistent in the 
human sciences. On the one hand, there is the approach inspired by Rousseau’s 
nostalgia, which aims to look for an origin or stable point beyond free play. On 
the other hand, Nietzsche affirms the idea of free play and tries to move beyond 
any reassuring foundation. However, grasping some sort of totality of these 
discourses is elusive, although it is possible to provide partial elaborations, which 
are necessarily going to appear as further discourses in the free play generated 
by the vacancy of the original source. For the same reason distinctions 
articulated on a semantic square untie and undo themselves. The oppositions 
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articulated on a semantic square can therefore be seen as partial and temporary 
readings, as they assume the presence of a semantic centre and establish a 
structure within it. Narratives are arranged on a frame that is undermined, at its 
very basis, by its inherent, or foundational, incoherence. The reasons why certain 
values were established instead of others is interesting from the point of view of 
cultural study, although this enquiry might easily fall into the same trap that 
looking for an original, singular source of these values does.  
How can narratives be studied and understood in their structures and in 
the process of their un-structuring, taking into account the ‘ruptures’ that occur 
in the actual study of discourses? I will answer this question by turning to the 
theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), precisely because it questions the possibility 
and modality of this kind intervention within a post-structuralist study of 
discourse. Studying gamers’ games through the narratives that provide an 
account of their own emergence becomes mostly a study of language and of the 
ways in which language is used to describe and frame social and cultural 
phenomena. Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, coupled with Foucault’s notion of 
archaeology and the concept of the performativity of language, can complement a 
reading of the narratives of gamers’ games with methodological perspectives 
grounded in a study of language. 
 
 
Discourse theory: conflict and identity 
 
Caroline Bassett (2007) has argued that a re-evaluation of narratives leads us to 
reconsider the structuralist approach and its focus on narratives as the ultimate 
level of analysis. However, this re-evaluation has itself to be confronted with the 
flaws of the structuralist approach that I have just outlined. Structuralist 
narratives can also be seen to undo themselves, as Derrida would put it. The 
reason I turn to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is precisely because it 
attempts to understand the structures of discourse in their undoing. Both 
authors are interested in the conflicts and processes of antagonism that are 
undertaken through discourse, and in particular through what they name the 
‘floating signifiers’ (Laclau 1990: 28, 1993a: 287). 
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Floating signifiers are not limited to words and utterances but can also be 
non-linguistic. They do not have a specific meaning by themselves but acquire 
meaning once put in a chain of signifiers. Jørgensen and Phillips, in their 
overview of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, bring the examples of ‘the 
West’, ‘democracy’ and ‘man’ to argue that these signifiers are meaningful only 
when inserted into a series of other signifiers. ‘The West’ acquires a specific 
meaning only when seen in connection with other floating signifiers such as 
‘civilisation’, ‘Christian Church’, ‘white people’ and ‘liberal democracy’. It also 
receives meaning in opposition to other signifiers, such as ‘barbarism’ and ‘the 
East’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 24-57). 
The theory Laclau and Mouffe delineate could be seen up until this point 
as being perfectly coherent with a structuralist perspective, one where meaning 
is the result of difference from the other signs within a given structure. However, 
the theory of discourse the authors propose is revealed to be more complex as it 
investigates the areas in which differences and oppositions collapse or overlap 
with each other. For instance, Laclau and Mouffe focus their attention on the 
moments in which barbarism or the East are said to also belong within the West, 
when the other appears to be merged with us. Discourse theory is mostly a 
theory of the linguistic and non-linguistic borders created through discourse, and 
their constant negotiation. As Jørgensen and Phillips put it: 
 
Generally speaking Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical point that discourses are 
never completely stable and uncontested can be turned into methodological 
guidelines concerning the location of the lines of conflict in one’s empirical 
material. What different understandings of reality are at stake, where are they 
in antagonistic opposition to one another? And what are the social 
consequences if the one or the other wins out and hegemonically pins down the 
meaning of the floating signifier? (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 51) 
 
The theory of floating signifiers allows a study of discourse seen in its becoming 
rather than through its fixities. Moreover, it is a study of how identities are 
created through discourse. The questions of discourse theory are oriented 
towards, first, the political dimension of discourse as a conflicting territory and, 
second, the framing of identities around signifiers that are subject to 
contestation. 
 In chapter four of this dissertation I will further explore Laclau and 
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Mouffe’s theory while looking at the emergence of independent forms of video 
game production. In my reading of this phenomenon, discourse theory allows for 
a shift of focus from an attempt to define what independence means in the 
context of digital games (often the main question of the studies provided so far) 
towards a study of how independence tends to be fixated through discourse, and 
what forms of antagonism this fixation creates. Independence will be seen as a 
floating signifier, one through which individual game designers define 
themselves by shifting the borders of its meaning, by including themselves 
and/or excluding others in this category. In chapter three I will also look at a 
story of conflict, one between Sony and the hackers of the PlayStation Network. 
In this case the debate that followed through disparate contexts will be seen as a 
process of identity formation. The identity of the hackers, who opposed Sony’s 
decision to alter one of the features of the PlayStation3 console, came to be 
negotiated through various discursive performances (a series of trials between 
Sony and the hackers, the suing of Sony by the consumers’ association, several 
articles in the mainstream press, debates in gamers’ online communities, and so 
on). However, it also rapidly became assimilated by a libertarian ideology of 
ownership and freedom, one not too dissimilar from the ideology Sony was 
equally replicating. Seen from the perspective of discourse theory, and the forms 
of conflict the case generated, the story of the hacking of PlayStation Network 
appears to be a rather conservative revolution, one where the claims of freedom 
on the part of Sony, who claimed the power to alter the definition of what 
PlayStation3 is, have been repurposed to extend the same possibility to the 
hackers.  
 Discourse theory as a theory of conflict and identity is already much more 
intriguing, I believe, than a purely descriptive endeavour in which the meanings 
and structures of discourse are allegedly unveiled. In fact, discourse theory opens 
up to at least two perspectives. First, there is the problem of how to take into 
account the performativity of language. If discourse is that around which identity 
is negotiated, then we must take account of its performative capacity and the 
possibilities it has to bring about specific realities. Second, if identity emerges 
through discourse and as a territory of conflict and negotiation within the ‘other’, 
then discourse theory also becomes a theory of ethics. It becomes a way of 
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looking at how that which is excluded can possibly become the object of further 
forms of negotiation. A study of games and gamers, seen through these two 
perspectives, becomes a study of how the two signifiers come to be fixated in 
their meanings through discourse. But it is also, and necessarily, a study of how 
that which is excluded in this process of fixation re-emerges, folds and parasitises 
(as Serres would put it) any interpretation. It is a study of the formation of 
subjectivities and their constant undoing when confronted with that same 
otherness that originally turned them into being.  
 I will discuss in further detail the possibilities offered by discourse theory 
as a means of understanding cultural phenomena. Moreover, I will look at the 
implications of the performativity of language and how this concerns the 
understanding of the practices of production and consumption in video game 
culture. I will do this through the work of Michel Foucault, and in particular the 
concept of archaeology. In fact, it is through the concept of archaeology, as 
delineated by Foucault, that I will take account of the ways in which meanings 
become hegemonic and an idea of truth comes to exclude others in a specific 
period and culture. 
 
 
How can truth be told? The archaeology of knowledge and the 
performativity of language 
 
I have provided a brief outline of discourse theory above in order to understand 
how narratives of production and consumption in video game culture come to be 
constituted and replicated. However, for this understanding to be possible there 
needs to be a principle of coherence in discourses and narratives, one that allows 
us to find regularities within them. How can discourses be seen as organised 
around a coherent whole? How do signifiers receive a fixed meaning, and what is 
it that makes that meaning accepted and shared on a social level?  
I will address these questions through the work of Michel Foucault. In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) Foucault puts the search for a unity of 
discourse at the centre of his argument. He is mainly concerned with developing 
a method for understanding the emergence of scientific and official knowledge. 
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Foucault provides a method for studying culture based on the statements 
produced as part of discursive practices. In my research I will look at video game 
culture from a similar perspective. The presence of recurring narratives will be 
seen as it is replicated by the statements produced by the actors involved in 
video game culture. However, these discursive formations bring to light more 
than one methodological problem: How can we make sense of their emergence? 
How can they be untangled and studied in their unique occurrences? And how 
can they be generative of further practices and discourses? Foucault explains his 
position on these questions by turning to the notion of the unities of discourse: 
 
I shall start from given unities, but I will not place myself inside these dubious 
unities in order to study their contradictions or internal configurations. I will 
ask myself what unities they form. I shall accept the groupings that history 
suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to break them up and 
then to see whether they can be legitimately reformed; or whether other 
groupings should be made. (Foucault 1972: 29) 
 
Such an approach might suggest a structuralist perspective, which attempts to 
replace existing structures with a new one. However, Ernesto Laclau explains 
how Foucault's method is unique and different from most formalist approaches: 
 
While both structuralism and post-structuralism start from the logic of the sign and 
its subversion once the conditions of total closure do not obtain, Foucault's starting 
point is a second-level phenomenology trying to isolate the totalities within which 
any production of meaning takes place. (Laclau 1993b: 434) 
 
Laclau (1993b) further argues that discourse theory, in the most typical 
structuralist approach, is meant to analyse the regularities that govern the 
production of meaning in a specific culture. This approach is based on the idea 
that these regularities can be framed as a complete and self-sufficient 
construction: 
 
Classical phenomenology had focused on the meaning of statements by 
bracketing their reference to any external reality. Foucault proceeds to a second 
bracketing by showing that meaning itself pre-supposes conditions of 
production which are not themselves reducible to meaning. (Laclau 1993b: 
434) 
 
Such a process of bracketing implies the presence of an external figure that closes 
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the structure and therefore determines its existence. As I have discussed in 
relation to Derrida’s comments on Levi-Strauss, reflecting on such an external 
figure provides the foundation for an approach oriented towards the provision of 
multiple readings of a text. This argument is supported by Roland Barthes who, 
claiming the ‘death of the author’ (1977), presented readers as the only sources 
of interpretation. However, the distinction between structuralism and the 
contributions of authors such as Foucault, Derrida and Barthes should not be 
reduced to an opposition between the tendency to frame singular interpretations 
and a fascination with the multiplicity of meaning. Foucault draws on these 
theoretical concerns in order to discuss cultural and social phenomena and the 
conditions of their production, thus addressing the political potential of the 
analysis of the structures of language in their constant undoing and un-
structuring. 
 Laclau argues that Foucault represents a move from the theoretical 
positions of structuralism, particularly from his interest in discourses rather than 
signs. Foucault, as reported in the re-examination of his work provided by Laclau, 
argues that meaning is produced under specific conditions, and these are not to 
be found externally, in a further external structure, but within a specific system of 
phenomena, which he calls discourse.22 Thus, Foucault focuses less on the sign, 
as the key concept in the production of meaning and in the emergence or 
subversion of existing structures, and more on the analysis of discourse. 
 Foucault finds in the statement the smallest unit of discourse. A statement 
is neither an utterance nor a proposition. It creates content and has an effect; a 
statement constrains and facilitates what we can do but it also has an authority, 
as in the words said by a doctor to a patient. Also, a statement might have no 
content as long as it creates effects. Statements can be rephrased in different 
ways (they are not the same as an utterance). They are neither true nor false, as 
propositions would be, instead they are considered for their effects, regardless of 
their conditions of truth. A statement is a speech-act with a certain scientific, 
                                                 
22 There are indeed differences between Foucault and Laclau’s theories of discourse. As outlined 
by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 18-21), Laclau, particularly in the developments of his theory 
elaborated with Chantal Mouffe, considers discourse to be constitutive of social practices. 
Foucault instead allows forms of negotiation where discourse is at the same time constitutive and 
constituted (although power and knowledge, in Foucault’s theory, are necessarily represented 
within discourse).  
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normative, disciplinary validity. Drawing on J.L. Austin (1962), Laclau suggests 
that the statement is, in Foucault's theory, a serious speech-act. The question 
then shifts to the understanding of how a statement receives such a disciplinary 
function and how it can create a certain cultural influence. From an original 
question on the structure of discourse and its coherence, the problem now turns 
towards the performativity of language. 
This question is radically different from the more linguistic and semiotic 
perspectives introduced before in this chapter with regard to the concept of 
discourse. In fact, it involves two key issues: first, the performativity of language 
as it affects the emergence of practices and further discourses in a practical 
manner; and second, that the study of discourse, on the basis of its performative 
potential, acquires a political relevance. The understanding of the ways in which 
specific discursive formations came into being entails the analysis of the forms of 
power that made these formations possible. 
Foucault’s main methodological question, as summarised by McHoul and 
Grace in A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject, is ‘how can truth be 
told?’ (2002: 25). In this question, the stress is on the ‘how’. What are the 
techniques, the regularities and the conditions for saying something that can 
count as the truth? The question involves a study of the relations of power, 
investigated thoroughly by Foucault. In this approach Foucault shifts the focus of 
his study of discourses to their role in shaping the very objects they describe. He 
further questions how it might be possible to provide an account of discourse 
and reach significant conclusions from it. 
 With these questions in mind, he proposes that we look at discourses as a 
means of investigating the episteme of a specific age, as the unifying principle of a 
discursive field and of the scientific and intellectual production of a specific age 
of human history. The study of the episteme is termed the ‘archaeology of 
knowledge’ (1972). According to Foucault, this form of archaeology aims to 
describe practices of language. It looks at discourses in terms of their 
characteristics and does not concern itself with questions of specificity. Instead, it 
tries to describe the rules that govern discourses and explain why they are 
constructed in one way rather than another. Foucault explains: 
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Archaeology describes a level of enunciative homogeneity that has its own 
temporal articulations, and which does not carry with it all the other forms of 
identity and difference that are to be found in language; and at this level, it 
establishes an order, hierarchies, a whole burgeoning that excludes a massive, 
amorphous synchrony, given totally once and for all. (Foucault 1972: 165) 
 
Archaeology will be reconsidered by Foucault in his later work and the focus of 
his research will move from the study of the constant reappearance of concepts 
to the ‘regularity of dispersion’: what is regularly excluded by the structuring 
principle of a specific age. The foundation of this method still lies in the analysis 
of statements as speech-acts that enable and constrain what we can know. Both 
the archaeological method and the later developments – named by Foucault, 
drawing on Nietzsche, the genealogical approach – acknowledge that truth is not 
regular and coherent, and nor is it represented exhaustively in a linear argument. 
However, such a linear order appears to be claimed through discursive 
performances in the serious speech-acts that constitute the field of what is 
legitimate and official knowledge. 
 
 
Infelicitous acts: performativity and the subject of discourse 
 
The claim that knowledge becomes official through and thanks to the 
performative agency of statements can be seen as a form of cultural 
constructionism: if reality is determined by discourses then these should play a 
defining role, and it would not be clear how cultures vary in time rather than 
being merely reflective of changing discursive practices. However, Judith Butler 
(2010) draws on Austin and Derrida to argue that performativity should not be 
understood as the power to bring about certain realities through discourse and 
should instead be seen as inherently based on failure, this being the defining 
characteristic of all speech-acts. She summarises the notion of performativity as 
follows: 
 
[…] it seems possible to conclude first, that performativity seeks to counter a 
certain kind of positivism according to which we might begin with already 
delimited understandings of what gender, the state, and the economy are. 
Secondly, performativity works, when it works, to counter a certain 
metaphysical presumption about culturally constructed categories and to draw 
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our attention to the diverse mechanisms of that construction. Thirdly, 
performativity starts to describe a set of processes that produce ontological 
effects, that is, that work to bring into being certain kinds of realities or, 
fourthly, that lead to certain kinds of socially binding consequences. (Butler 
2010: 147) 
 
Butler then reminds us that Austin distinguished between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary performatives, the latter of which have an effect only if certain 
other conditions are met. Perlocutionary utterances thus imply the possibility of 
failure: ‘if we want to say that the theory tends to produce the phenomenon, but 
that it can sometimes fail to produce what it anticipates, then it seems we have 
opened up the possibility of “misfire” at the basis of performativity itself’ (2010: 
152). In a similar fashion, Derrida (1988) argued that performatives, as 
introduced by Austin, are based on the context where the utterance is produced 
and also on the intentions of the speaker. Derrida claims that these are very 
fragile grounds. If the context becomes the defining element, then the sign loses 
its iterability, that is, the possibility of being repeated or cited while preserving 
its meaning. For example, an order pronounced on the stage by an actor to 
another actor does not have a performative effect on the audience, as already 
argued by Austin. Iterability should be considered an essential characteristic of 
writing, according to Derrida, as it guarantees its understanding in the absence of 
the author. However, this means that performatives rely entirely for their felicity 
on the context within which they are produced and received. Therefore Austin's 
theory of performatives tends to consider performativity as a reflection of the 
speaker’s intentions, which should be unique for that specific utterance and 
related to the context.23 
 This idea of intention, however, is not a consideration in Foucault’s 
                                                 
23 Austin's concept of performative utterances has been re-evaluated by game studies in recent 
times. However, it has been applied to describe so-called serious, political games, which attempt 
to convey a political statement through video games. A text such as How to Do Things with 
Videogames by Ian Bogost (2011) goes in the direction of outlining suggestions for the design of 
games aimed at persuading, or affecting in any way, the players. In my dissertation I draw on 
Austin for different reasons. In fact, in my research project I am more interested, as I hope it is 
clear in this chapter, in looking at the statements produced within game culture, and how they 
shape game culture itself. Such an analysis is not limited to video game texts, and is definitely not 
interested in providing a better model for the design of video games, but is concerned with the 
possibilities we have to pose better questions (more politically relevant, more self-critical) about 
video game culture. For this reason I believe Austin’s theory of performativity needs to be seen in 
relation to the critiques posed by later authors (in particular, Derrida 1980), who have critiqued 
the use of the notion of context in the determination of the felicity of an utterance.  
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argument. Foucault’s statements are not utterances in the Austinian sense, and 
have no relation to authorial intention. In Foucault’s perspective, the relations of 
power are non-subjective and do not involve a conscious and deliberate choice. 
To argue for the individual psychology of the speaker would involve another level 
of discourse. A political analysis of discourse would instead investigate the 
conditions for its very production. According to Foucault, we should not interest 
ourselves in the conditions of the original speaker but rather concern ourselves 
with the ‘subject’ of the statement: 
 
The subject of the statement should not be regarded as identical with the 
author of the formulation – either in substance, or in function. He is not in fact 
the cause, origin, or starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken 
articulation of a sentence; nor is it that meaningful intention which, silently 
anticipating words, orders them like the visible body of this intuition […] It is a 
particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals […] If a 
proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called ‘statement’, it is not 
because, one day, someone happened to speak them or put them into some 
concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the subject can be 
assigned. (Foucault 1972: 107) 
 
Individuals come to occupy the positions of subjects established by the 
statements. The subject therefore appears to be the effect of the statement. 
Laclau’s notion of identity can also be seen as parallel to Foucault’s interest in the 
subject. In Laclau’s theory, the performativity of language also delineates the 
subject of discourse in relation to a form of otherness, implied by the very 
presence of a position for the subject. 
The relation between subject and identity can be further articulated 
through the work of Judith Butler. The generation of subjectivities is investigated 
by Butler, more specifically in relation to gender, in Gender Trouble (1990). In this 
text Butler considers gendered gestures and roles as performative iterations that 
contribute towards the constitution of the identity of the subject. The iterability 
of these performatives is crucial, as it is a regularised repetition that recreates 
normative values and identities. By developing this approach to discourse in her 
work, Butler argues that we can come to understand social practice through the 
analysis of statements. Butler also offers a means of combating hegemonic 
descriptions of gender by proposing the existence of a proliferation of genders 
and identities – which means, from her perspective, a multiplicity of 
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performative acts.  
 As part of my inquiry into gamers’ games I will look at the statements 
arising as part of video game culture, and look at what sorts of subjectivities are 
produced through discourse. For example, the figure of the active video game 
consumer is considered in this research project as enacted by discursive 
practices. Such reading also involves an investigation into the political 
assumptions of the statements produced within contemporary video game 
culture. The framing of subjectivities is in fact a process where specific models 
and visions of the world are enacted. This, in the final analysis, is the concern of 
many of the aforementioned authors, including Butler and Foucault: to attempt 
to say something about the present condition in which we live, and how we might 
intervene, if we can, in the framing of different subjectivities. 
 
 
Conclusions: a cultural study of video games 
 
The political implications that I will consider as part of my research will then 
constitute a further narrative of video game culture. However, the arguments 
brought forward by Butler (2010) against the analysis of the performativity of 
language as a form of social constructivism, but also the impossibility of 
describing the totality of myths as argued by Levi-Strauss (1964), will inform my 
account to the extent that these theories will mitigate against the risk of 
providing essentialist and totalitarian narratives. My reading will neither look at 
all the possible statements produced within video game culture nor assume that 
reality is entirely shaped by these discourses. 
 As noted by Jeremy Gilbert in Anticapitalism and Culture: Radical Theory 
and Popular Politics (2008), cultural studies often has to combat essentialist 
perspectives that assume that the ultimate goal of analysis should be the 
discovery of the fundamental quality of a cultural phenomenon. At the same time, 
discourse theory and post-structuralism should not be viewed simply as a means 
of denying the existence of a single truth or reality. Ernesto Laclau, as noted by 
Gilbert (2008: 148-160), has argued for a study of culture that denies 
essentialism and proposes instead a complication of our understanding of social 
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relations, eschewing the idea of a knowable totality. Gilbert explains that, 
according to Laclau, ‘every form of universality is always contaminated by some 
particularity from which it derives and that the elevation of one particularism 
into a universal is one of the fundamental hegemonic manoeuvres’ (158). 
In providing my own narrative of video game culture I aim to address, 
throughout my dissertation, the implications of this struggle for anti-
essentialism. As fossilisations of discursive formations, narratives might tend to 
present themselves as totalitarian and exclusionary, elevating the particular to 
the level of the universal. Counter-narratives also share the same risk, as will be 
noted in my analysis of the narratives of opposition and emancipation in video 
game culture in the following chapters. Counter-narratives tend to structure 
themselves on the basis of independence from hegemonic narratives but are 
necessarily predicated on the very same opposition they try to dismiss. For this 
reason, my reading of video game culture will attempt to avoid naï ve forms of 
radicalism and will look instead, first, at how such radical postures emerge from 
discourse and, second, at how we might imagine different subjectivities. How can 
we increase the diversity of the subjects of statements produced within 
contemporary video game culture?  
 From this perspective, the study of gamers’ games that I am delineating 
here also demands an ethical take. This is a consequence, I believe, of an 
approach that is anti-essentialist, or anti-ontological as argued at the beginning 
of this chapter, as it avoids determinism, constructivism and other ideological 
perspectives that aim to understand what technologies “really are”. The very 
notion of being is undermined by a post-structuralist perspective, where the 
centre of the structure is being constantly destabilised. Reading, as a process of 
undoing, involves the reader in the (dis)formation of structures. At stake in 
gamers’ games, as delineated in the research questions of my research project, is 
the position of the researcher itself, who needs to question his or her 
involvement in the understanding of phenomena where the boundaries between 
gamers and games blur and fold on each other. This form of involvement is 
precisely the ethical aspect I want to introduce in my project and in the study of 
digital games more generally. 
 The involvement I am proposing is a form of contamination with the other 
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as it questions our identity as scholars, gamers and human beings. I do not see a 
similar tendency towards contamination in the theories on ergodic literature, 
ludology and procedurality that have so far attempted to fix the meaning of what 
video games are and do. I see instead a much more compelling involvement in the 
project of a cultural study of video games, towards which I ultimately turn in my 
dissertation. Cultural studies is different from the aforementioned approaches 
because, as Joanna Zylinska puts it (through Derrida), it ‘renounces the desire to 
know, to close off the dissensus, to erase incalculable alterity, but […] does not at 
the same time sidestep its political commitment’, and therefore it ‘presents itself 
as both an ethical possibility and a responsibility’ (2005: 39). 
 In the next chapter I will attempt to set out how my project for an ethical 
theory could contribute to understanding gamers’ games. In this chapter I have 
outlined the theoretical debates that frame my way of looking at the discourses 
surrounding contemporary video game culture. I have discussed how to 
approach a study of gamers’ games, that is, of the relation between gamers and 
games (rather than of these two objects considered separately). I have argued 
that this relation is often described through narratives where the practices of 
production and consumption are seen as evolving and changing according to a 
coherent project. However, these narratives are seen in my research project not 
only as partial and strategic descriptions of reality but also as being constitutive 
of it. Narratives frame the structures according to which reality is understood 
and debated. As such, they are often conservative with regard to the existing 
notions and dualities that have framed the earlier forms of knowledge. For this 
reason, I have discussed how narratives of gamers’ games have mostly reinforced 
the notions around which both games and gamers have been studied so far. The 
procedurality and anti-procedurality debate is a significant example of this 
impasse. In this case the theoretical understanding of the medium of the video 
game should allegedly be based either on a study of games or of the practices of 
play. In this research project I attempt to destabilise this duality and look instead 
at how a study of gamers and games could become a study of relations rather 
than objects. 
 Thus, I have turned away from the ontological questions, often replicated 
in game studies, where the medium of the video game is analysed for its apparent 
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properties and effects, and have proposed instead a participative theory, one that 
takes account of the performative value of theory in shaping the very properties 
and effects it aims to analyse. A study of gamers’ games that parasitically joins in 
the constitution of relations between the two terms becomes, I suggest, a study 
of discourse, of its capacity to undo existing structures and ultimately pose new 
questions. 
 But what sort of questions should this approach lead us to ask? Why 
should these questions be better than the existing ones, and why should the 
study of games attempt to be contaminated by the discourses it generates and 
reads? I have already proposed, in this chapter, that similar questions could lead 
us to look at game studies as a form of cultural study, where the ethics of 
academic research are put at the centre, as the foundation of any theory (and of 
academia itself, it could be argued). 
 In the following chapter I will investigate how patronising, possessive and 
mostly unethical questions have been posed so far, in many circumstances, 
around the topic of the historical emergence of the figure of the gamer, the game 
product and the active gamer more specifically. Historiographies of the medium 
have been fixating the past around contemporary questions, terminologies and 
concerns. Often, historical overviews have been presented as archaeological 
studies of media technologies and their forms of use. In these projects the aim 
was mostly to discover how gamers and games have allegedly been evolving. I 
will debate how the notion of materiality of game technologies and the alleged 
authority of historical documents have been used as evidences for saying the 
truth about the history of gamers and games. In the following chapter I will argue 
instead, in a way more closely aligned to the archaeology of knowledge originally 
proposed by Foucault, how we could be better archaeologists, that is, how we 
could become responsible for our own participation in the formation of non-
hegemonic truths. 
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Chapter 2 
A history of boxes: archaeologies of gamers’ games 
 
 
 
 
As I have discussed in the introduction, the debates around gamers and games, 
both in academic and mainstream discourses, often involve a teleological 
perspective, one where the contemporary relevance of the medium and its users 
are seen through a continuous historical evolution. The story we are often told 
through the mainstream and specialised press is that video games have evolved 
from their primordial stages and now constitute an industry that plays an 
essential role in the economies of the countries in which it developed. A crucial 
role is also played by the emancipation of gamers as a category of consumers 
who are now allegedly becoming actors in the global creative economy. Moreover, 
the possibility of using games for social and political purposes or for conveying 
artistic content has allegedly contributed to the emancipation of the medium. 
Barack Obama’s speeches, HSBC’s advertisement and Sony’s Gaming 3.0 concept 
could be seen as examples of this trend. In each of these examples the focus on 
the newness and on the potentialities of the medium is seen through a historical 
perspective, or by glorifying the contemporary scenario as it allows allegedly 
unprecedented opportunities. 
In this chapter I will provide a critical overview of the implications of the 
historical perspectives on gamers, games and their mutual relation. I will do this 
by going along with the focus on the history of the medium that so often appears 
in the accounts of the contemporary status of the video game industry. This is 
particularly evident in the work of authors such as Jussi Parikka and Errki 
Huhtamo, who have been trying to apply an archaeological study of media to 
video games. Archaeology in these works refers to Michel Foucault and his 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). However, my history of gamers’ games will 
attempt to revisit these historical approaches, also in light of a different reading 
of the original work of Foucault. My history of gamers’ games will be mostly a 
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history of the present, that is, a reading of the ways in which the historical 
progression that has led us to the current framing of the industry has been 
discussed in the contemporary accounts of the history of the medium, and of how 
it could be told otherwise. The focus, in my reading, will be mostly on the present 
rather than the past, and on the ways in which the past is and could be narrated. 
Foucault will be seen in this reading mostly for his interest in the performativity 
of language, a notion I refer to in order to reflect on the involvement of the 
subject in the production of discourses (including the historical, or 
archaeological, accounts). The involvement of the subject is what brings to the 
fore the question of the present, of the relevance of the historical narrative for 
the teller of that same history. Historiographies on the medium of the video game 
will be seen as the result of a performance, in which the subject who narrates 
history shapes him or herself in relation to the historical narrative. 
 Archaeological discourse is often formulated as a form of truth precisely, I 
believe, because it rarely considers the question of the present and of the 
involvement of the subject in the historical narrative. I find the game 
archaeologies proposed so far to be too often obsessed with the discovery of a 
real, accurate, documented history. The current direction taken by game 
archaeology consists in finding documents and sources from the past and looking 
at allegedly true, or more accurate origins of specific forms of production and 
consumption. The problem I see in this approach, as I will debate, is that it 
assumes a separation between language and materiality, in which the former 
serves to describe the latter. Materiality in these accounts takes a privileged 
position as the proof or documentation of the accuracy of a historical 
reconstruction. Also, as will be seen in many of the accounts that I will discuss in 
this chapter, video game archaeologies tend to look for the same notions and 
concepts surrounding contemporary video game culture and see how these 
emerged by tracing their historical evolution. The impression given by these 
historical accounts is that the present notions always existed but were only less 
evident or appeared in different forms. Examples of this trend are manifold, and I 
will critique some of them throughout this chapter. 
Most notably, the history of the medium has been seen so far, almost 
exclusively, as the history of an industry, its products and consumers. Gamers and 
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games are too often posed as the duality around which to organise a 
reconstruction of the alleged evolution of the medium towards its contemporary 
configuration and cultural relevance. In tracing the historical developments of 
game types, game technologies and forms of consumption, the present is 
implicitly taken as the last known stage of an ongoing evolution. 
Conversely, what if the focus is no longer on the past but on the discourses 
that have been narrating the past? What sorts of questions could be posed if the 
focus is moved towards the discourses that are currently framing the 
historiographies of the medium? Would it be possible to imagine another 
archaeology, which looks at us and at the ways we now look at the technologies, 
consumers, producers or players from the past? 
 I will answer these questions by looking at the literature that has so far 
attempted to make sense of the origins of the video game industry. I will 
particularly focus on the aforementioned authors who have named this look at 
the past “archaeological”. The questions posed in this specific kind of research 
tend to rely, as I will argue, on an intellectual confidence, that is, on the 
reassuring notion that the present is the implicit point of destination of their 
historical narratives. The present appears as a fixed set of objects and practices 
to be explained by tracing their lineages. Indeed, interruptions and dead ends 
might appear in these reconstructions; both failures and successes might 
constitute the history of a technology, a product or a form of consumption or 
production. Nonetheless, what persists is a certain confidence that these stories 
can be told objectively. What might appear as an overtly modernist approach to 
history is overlaid with metaphors from the semantic field of the archaeological 
exploration, which serves to give to the proposed narratives the aura of a 
discovery. 
In this chapter I will particularly focus on the stories surrounding the so-
called first video game ever, and how these stories have been narrated by 
attempting to trace the origins of video game products. The case of Spacewar will 
be taken as a key example: a series of experimentations with the PDP-1, an early 
mainframe used in academic laboratories in the 50s, came to be identified 
decades later as the first video game ever made. However, I will argue that the 
lack of an identifiable unity, a packaged and closed product, has been a 
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problematic notion for the stories surrounding the emergence of Spacewar. In 
other words, the multiple and uncountable forms of Spacewar could not be taken 
into account by a historical endeavour about the origins of the video game as an 
industry, taking the existence of an industry as paramount for the formulation of 
a historical project. 
By framing the history of video games as an industry, retrospective 
studies have tended to look for those unities and products that the industry itself 
was producing. In so doing, the history of video games has often been a history of 
boxes. I use this metaphor to problematise the reassuring visions that game 
histories and game archaeologies have replicated so far. Boxes have been seen, 
and found, even when these could not possibly exist, as in the case of Spacewar. 
In those cases other metaphors have been introduced to account for the 
incomplete and open development of the alleged video game products: toolboxes, 
sandboxes, open engines and other expressions have been used to identify the 
non-box, which could otherwise undo the structure that underpins the historical 
narrative. In the archaeological researches, boxes have been the objects to be 
excavated and found in order to confirm and replicate the contemporary stories 
proposed by the game industry. 
Moreover, excavations and findings of this sort are often supported by 
evoking the notion of materiality. In this view, technologies of the past can be 
explained by looking at tangible documents that explain how these games were 
made and discussed in their time. Materiality also serves to support the apparent 
transparency of the historical narrative, offering a dominance of facts over 
opinions and ideas. Materiality is used in the archaeological discourses to 
provide a safe point of arrival, a tangible presence that can confirm or show how 
the narrative of technological development has been unfolding. Instead, I will 
refer to the materiality of discourse as theorised in the work of Foucault and as a 
destabilising notion, one where discourse is not separated from the real or the 
material, and ‘is not annulled in its reality and put at the disposal of the signifier’ 
(Foucault 1981: 66). 
In the final part of this chapter I will look at the story of E.T. The Extra-
Terrestrial, a video game by Atari published in 1982 and responsible for the 
economic failure of the company. In recent times, the cartridges of the video 
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game have been searched for and found in the desert of New Mexico where, 
according to urban legend, Atari buried them to save on storage costs. The 
history of E.T. will be seen as being narrated quite literally as a history of the 
boxes the video game was made of. Yet the supposed materiality of those 
cartridges, which has been used as testimony for the truthfulness of the urban 
legend surrounding the game, re-evaluates, I believe, the performative capacity of 
narratives in making materiality relevant in the first place as a rhetorical artifice. 
In the conclusions I will debate how a different notion of discourse as material 
can be crucial in a re-evaluation of discourse, seen as a performative mode of 
knowledge that takes responsibility for its own questions (and tentative 
answers), and de-stabilises the present and our ideas about it.  
 
 
The problem with media archaeology 
 
As argued by Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka in Media Archaeology: Approaches, 
Applications and Implications (2011), the field of media archaeology has been 
based on two different readings of Foucault's understanding of the term 
archaeology. On the one hand, one reading has been inspired by Marshall 
McLuhan and has moved in the direction applied by Friedrich Kittler. This 
perspective emphasises the role of technology in the production of knowledge. 
On the other hand, the Anglo-American tradition tends to assume that 
technologies are introduced in a pre-existing discursive context, which frames 
the uses and interpretations of the technology (Huhtamo and Parikka 2011: 8-
15). In many cases, as in those presented in the collection of essays edited by 
Huhtamo and Parikka, it is the interplay between technologies and discourses 
that is put at the centre of the analysis. 
 However, I argue that what consistently appears in those archaeological 
accounts, whichever reading of Foucault is applied, is the possibility of explaining 
how certain phenomena happened, how they transformed themselves, and under 
which rules these changes occurred. Technologies and discourses are seen as 
mutating through a series of conditions that have to be discovered. Media 
archaeology abounds with metaphors that evoke a physical excavation, a process 
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of revelation that is made possible by digging, vertically, deep in the historical 
documents. Erkki Huhtamo, one of the most prolific media archaeologists to also 
look at the medium of the video game, describes this approach towards the past 
in quite explicit terms. In ‘Slots of Fun, Slots of Trouble: An Archaeology of 
Arcade Gaming’ (2005) Huhtamo argues that ‘electronic games did not appear 
out of nowhere; they have a cultural background that needs to be excavated’ (4). 
In the same text, the appearance of early video games in public spaces (arcade 
gaming) is described in relation to similar interfaces where touching and the 
motion of fingers were also used for entertainment purposes. Huhtamo affirms 
that these ‘devices provided the ground for future applications such as electronic 
arcade games’, however, ‘how, why, when and where this happened is a challenge 
for scholars’, therefore ‘what is needed is an “archaeology of gaming”’ (4).  
 However, there is no further argument for the need for such archaeology. I 
propose that the need is mostly motivated by the wish to explain how, why, when 
and where something happened. It is an explanatory endeavour, one that believes 
in observation and analysis as objective approaches (although these are named 
excavations). In the conclusions to the same paper, Huhtamo maintains that 
‘excavating the past makes sense when trying to explain phenomena like arcade 
video gaming with seemingly very short histories’ (15). According to Huhtamo 
the list of technologies to connect in order to explain the current scenario 
includes kinetoscopes and mutoscopes, slot machines and flippers, and all 
machines that require physical actions to be activated and to play with. The 
excavation appears to be a detailed narrative of historical progression, which has 
‘continuity and rupture, similarity and difference, tradition and innovation’ (5) 
but still allows us to trace one evident and single narrative out of the many 
marginal ones. 
 Jussi Parikka and Jaakko Suominen, in ‘Victorian Snakes? Towards a 
Cultural History of Mobile Games and the Experience of Movement’ (2006), 
debate the origins of mobile gaming through a similarly defined archaeological 
approach. The aim of the paper is to draw on media archaeology and history to 
explain the emergence of the use of mobile devices for digital play. The authors 
argue that while historiographies of video games have been looking too closely 
and exclusively at the events surrounding the game industry, their paper 
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attempts instead to broaden the perspective to include documents, events, and 
technologies from other areas that could have contributed to contemporary 
mobile gaming. The history of the forms of entertainment used while travelling 
and commuting, from printed books to Sony’s Walkman, puts mobile gaming next 
to a more varied series of commodities and considers it dependent on changes of 
social habits and work conditions in which frequent use of means of 
transportation is involved. 
 The title of the paper (‘Victorian Snakes’) refers to the main question 
posed by the author. Inspired by the work of Tom Standage who, in The Victorian 
Internet (1999), compares the telegraph to a contemporary Internet of the 
Victorian age, the authors aim to find a Victorian Snake (a hugely popular mobile 
video game by Nokia first introduced in the company’s mobile phones in 1997). 
Parikka and Suominen propose to ‘steer clear of such easily anachronistic 
comparisons between times and technologies’ but still ask ‘in which sense can 
we claim the existence of a Victorian equivalent of Snake or of other mobile 
games? That is, in what sense are mobile games part of a longer duration of 
modern experience and media consumption?’ (2006: 7). 
 In the introduction to this dissertation I referred to the work of Derrida 
and his re-evaluation of the anxiety that results from being ‘implicated in the 
game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were from the very beginning at 
stake in the game’ (1980: 248). What Huhtamo, Parikka and Suominen are 
instead offering appears to be a very confident approach to the study of digital 
games, and media in general. Even if each of them acknowledges the possibility 
of different historical narratives to be narrated and the partiality of their own 
views, they maintain that looking at the past in a linear, teleological progression 
could contribute to the understanding of the present. However, what results from 
these narratives is the exclusion of the present as the moment in which the past 
is looked at, narrated, and in fact constructed. The present, from where the 
authors analyse and excavate the past, appears as a safe point of destination.                                   
 More recently, David Parisi, in ‘Shocking Grasps: An Archaeology of 
Electrotactile Game Mechanics’ (2013), has been excavating the past in search of 
traces of media that rely on tactile sensations, including pain, for entertainment 
purposes. In this study the term archaeology is used mostly in reference to 
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Huhtamo’s work. However, it is not clear in Parisi’s text how archaeology should 
be different from a historiography or a description of a series of more or less 
known game products from the past that resemble those of our contemporary 
period. Parisi considers the sense of touch essential in the evolution of 
technologies for gaming purposes, and his work constructs a persuasive 
narrative of how this sense has been involved in forms of entertainment for 
centuries, sometimes prevailing over vision or other senses. However, the 
explanation of why this research could be relevant for us, as gamers and scholars 
of the present, is not put at the centre of the historical reconstruction. 
Game archaeology shares with media archaeology the confidence, as I 
have defined it earlier on, that results from accepting that the present can be 
explained through the past, even if explanations are to remain temporary and 
provisional. The explanation of the present through the past is also the main and 
only rationale for such archaeological studies. In What is Media Archaeology? 
(2012), Jussi Parikka explains that: 
 
[…] a lot of media-archaeologically tuned research has been in writing counter-
histories to the mainstream media history, and looking for an alternative way to 
understand how we came to the media cultural situation of our current digital 
world. It is for media archaeologists as it was for Foucault: all archaeological 
excavations into the past are meant to elaborate our current situation. (Parikka 
2012: 6) 
 
What the role played by ‘our current situation’ is constitutes the very problem I 
intend to bring into the discussions on media and game archaeology. Rephrasing 
Michel Foucault (1970), Parikka and Suominen propose that ‘(cultural) 
archaeology can be defined as the unconscious level of a culture that enables the 
actual perceived forms of everyday life. The archaeological level enables the 
objects, ideas, thoughts, experiences, etc. of a certain historical situation’ (2006: 
9). 
My critique of game archaeology does not intend to question the accuracy 
of those descriptions but is mostly concerned with the stabilising effect that 
these have on the perception of the contemporary situation. Foucault’s original 
project of archaeology of knowledge was not necessarily intended as an 
elaboration of the present through the past but as an inquiry on the fragility of 
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any system of thought, including our own, when confronted with its genealogy. 
The turn to genealogy in Foucault’s work is quickly dismissed by Parikka in What 
is Media Archaeology?, where he acknowledges that in genealogy ‘the emphasis 
was more on questions of “descent” and critique of origins as found in historical 
analysis of his time’ (2012: 6) and was the foundation for Foucault’s counter-
histories. But genealogy was not, as Foucault puts it, about finding the origins of 
an event in order to restore its apparent unity. Genealogy aims instead to: 
 
[…] maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the 
accidents, the minute deviations-or conversely, the complete reversals-the 
errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those 
things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or 
being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the 
exteriority of accidents. (Foucault 1991: 81) 
 
In Foucault’s History of Sexuality, the main problem is not simply tracing how 
differences and truths were said, in different periods of history, about sexuality. It 
is not about finding out the equivalent of sexuality in the Victorian age, as in 
Standage’s search for a Victorian Internet or Parikka and Suominen’s Victorian 
Snake. Foucault’s question is about the present. It is about how, under which 
conditions, we can nowadays say the truth about sexuality in the Victorian age, or 
any other. That is, what are the conditions for differentiating between truth and 
falsehood in regards to a specific notion (of which sexuality could be an 
example)? And how does truth come to be constructed as such, and could it not 
be otherwise? Foucault does not attempt to colonise the past with the questions 
of the present but to challenge our own notion of the present time by tracing its 
genealogy. 
 In a paper on game designer Roberta Williams, Laine Nooney (2013) 
poses questions similar to those of Foucault and re-enables a more destabilising, 
anxious approach to archaeology. Nooney questions the ‘practice of “adding 
women on”’ (1) to the history of video games: reconstructions of the key figures 
of the industry tend to shape the image of a male-dominated context in which 
women appear only occasionally, as extra characters. Roberta Williams is a 
typical example. Williams was the co-founder, with her husband Ken Williams, of 
Sierra On-Line, and one of the most celebrated game designers of the 80s and 
90s. However, she was neither a programmer nor a gamer. In an interview to 
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Williams, reported by Nooney, the game designer confesses: ‘I don’t program, and 
I’m not technical, and I’m not even a game player. So you know, everybody says, 
“Well what are you doing in this industry?” [Laughter]’ (14). Acknowledging that 
‘history is not in what we talk about, but in how we organize its meaning’ (3), 
Nooney asks the following questions: ‘“why is Roberta Williams [in game history] 
in the ways that she is?” What can Roberta Williams tell us about game history? 
How is it that she became an object of game history?’ (4). 
 Nooney’s focus is on how historiographies of video games have been 
written. Her questions regard the modalities for talking about the history of 
games and gamers. Roberta Williams is presented as a non-gamer in the 
historical reconstructions, a strange character who is, at the same time, 
influential and well known and yet difficult to categorise. Williams defines 
herself as a strange case, recognising the impossibility of fitting herself into the 
typical figure of the male, computer-savvy game designer. However, her 
discomfort (a feeling Nooney describes through documents of different kinds, 
including photos with other famous game designers in which Williams clearly 
stages excitement and appears out of context) does not simply derive from being 
a female character in a male-dominated context. In fact, Williams had been 
included as a female game designer even in the accounts of the game industry of 
her age. Williams fits into game histories only as an extra, a token for women and 
games. Yet Williams apparently did not know how to use a computer, had no 
experience of software tools and worked by herself, from home, while taking care 
of her children. Nooney imagines the kitchen table to be the space where 
Williams designed, with pen and paper, most of the games to be converted into 
digital format later by her assistants. The space of the kitchen is seen by Nooney 
not just as a collection of furniture, objects and allowances. The kitchen is not 
simply a different workstation. It is a gendered space from where Williams used 
to work in a manner that could not be understood by the histories of the video 
game industry. The presumption of these historical reconstructions was that 
game designers have to be gamers, that is, perfectly capable of using computers 
and even pushing the limits of those technologies. However, those discourses 
shaped the figure of the gamer as a subject to which Williams could not conform. 
As Nooney puts it: 
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When we inquire into ‘what counts’ in game history, that question is beyond the 
immediately apparent: it is also about how history arrives. How do spaces, 
bodies and objects entangle to produce a historical subject – and why do we 
presume that this subject is a ‘gamer’? (Nooney 2013: 10) 
 
Understanding how ‘history arrives’ is a way of doing an archaeology of the 
present, as Foucault proposed in his work. This archaeology: 
 
[…] does not try to restore what has been thought, its very identity. 
Archaeology, is nothing more than a rewriting: that is, in the preserved form of 
exteriority, a regulated transformation of what has already been written, it is 
not a return to the innermost secret of the origin; it is the systematic 
description of a discourse-object. (Foucault 1972: 156) 
 
The process of transformation that archaeology operates is essential to 
understand the role played by the archaeologist in shaping, framing and in fact 
constructing the subjects of discourse. A study of this process of shaping is what I 
refer to when I outline, drawing on Foucault, an archaeology of the present. 
The discourses I will look at call into question the historical emergence of 
gamers and games and their definition. I propose to look at how these two 
characters appeared in the histories of the medium, how they have been 
described and how those descriptions contributed to their shaping. Gamers and 
games are not only defined through verbal or written statements. As I will see, 
there is also a large production of games and technologies of different sorts that 
has been presented as oriented towards a new kind of gamer: home development 
kits, game production toolkits, and sandbox games in which the contribution of 
the gamer has been proposed as essential for the functioning of the game. The 
archaeology I intend to offer will be a rewriting of those histories in which 
gamers and games are seen in a new and original relationship with each other. 
 This rewriting is not just for the sake of providing a documentation of the 
history of gamers’ games. My attempt is to lose the confidence of the historical-
archaeological perspectives, as exemplified by Parikka, Huhtamo and others. I 
will look instead at how the stories, the technologies and the documents 
produced in regard to the relation between gamers and games bring about these 
two concepts. How is it, in other words, that gamers and games have been shaped 
in a particular way, so that discourses surrounding their historical emergence 
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could be formulated in one way rather than another? How is it that video games 
became identifiable unities, so that the question could be later formulated of how 
gamers could become part of the games they play? Through what sort of 
discourse did those boundaries between gamers and games come to be defined, 
so that these could also be blurred through the production of further discourses 
in which gamers and games are seen as mutually influencing or doing something 
to each other? 
 
  
How to close a video game in a box 
 
My proposal for a different game archaeology will dig horizontally rather than 
vertically: I will ask how certain truths about the past can be and have been told 
rather than finding confirmations of their validity (or lack thereof) in documents 
of the past. I intend to discuss how the historical emergence of gamers’ games 
can be narrated less as a teleological development and more as a repurposing of 
visions and metaphors inspired by the contemporary scenario. This refashioning 
of the present for the purpose of reconstructing the past has contributed to 
reinforcing the idea that games and gamers are, respectively, products and 
consumers, particularly as the medium of the video game came to be defined and 
discussed, mostly, as an industry. The dispute about the first video game ever, as 
it appears in Levy (1984), Herz (1997), Kent (2000, 2001), Burnham (2001) and 
Poole (2000), is one of the main issues on which historiographies tend to 
disagree. However, these texts all agree that the question of which is the first 
video game ever can be posed and answered by finding specific evidence.  
 But how can any question about the first video game ever or the origins of 
digital gaming be posed? And how can we discuss the origins of the concept of 
gamers and of the ways in which gamers use, manipulate or produce games or 
are affected by games? The existence of the two, gamers and games, as separate 
and distinct, must first be put in place. However, this separation must also allow 
its own contradiction, which makes it possible to have active consumers and 
open games in which interventions, modifications and creation of content by 
users can happen. 
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 In the following part I will take into account how the origins of gamers 
and games have been narrated as oscillating between closure and openness: 
closing a game amounts to limiting its possible uses, usually with the purpose of 
selling it to a wide audience, while opening a game invites forms of intervention. I 
propose to look at the histories of these two gestures through the metaphor of 
the box. Boxes have been used as a metaphor of the process of closing software, 
or an application, into a marketable product. Ralph H. Baer, an inventor known as 
the father of video games, described the concept of the first home console as a 
brown box in documents he wrote in 1966 to sell his idea of a video game as a 
marketable product. The process of boxing was not only metaphorical but literal. 
Baer constructed a brown case in which all processing units of the Odyssey game 
console were stored. The box was not supposed to be opened and it was 
marketable precisely because it was a box, a closed object that could be packaged 
and shipped to the stores, asking its buyers to simply connect it to a television 
device. However the box cannot account, as a metaphor, for all the other forms of 
digital gaming in which such closure does not properly exist. I will see how 
previous forms of video games, equally defined as the first ever in other 
historical reconstructions, came to be defined as open boxes, sandboxes or 
toolboxes. These other metaphors imagine a non-closed environment, an object 
that is supposed to be closed and instead allows forms of manipulation. Open 
boxes, toolboxes and sandboxes are games-as-tools, sets of instruments to play 
with. A similar metaphor could be the engine as a generator of multiple, 
sometimes uncountable, forms of games. A game engine is a metaphor often used 
in discourses surrounding the development of video games; it is an expression 
used to refer to the software that allows a game to function as expected. 
Nowadays, game engines, also known as middleware, are composed of the 
software tools to be used in the process of making a new game. An engine 
typically includes rules for the movement and collision of objects, and their 
animation and response to users’ input. Engines can be very expensive products 
released only through licences. But they can also be more easily accessible and 
allow games to be quickly assembled by an amateur or an independent 
developer. The series Little Big Planet by Sony or the online game Second Life by 
Linden Lab, as previously discussed, incorporate simplified engines for users 
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who want to produce new content for the game (3D characters, levels, 
animations, sound and so on). These examples could also be defined, and have 
been defined by specialised press on numerous occasions, as toolboxes or 
sandboxes in order to identify their dual condition of not-closed products that 
allow new games to be produced while playing. 
 In the reading I want to propose, the metaphor of the box will be seen 
more broadly as an idea around which the very notions of gamers and games 
have been defined. More importantly, I argue that the notion of the box has been 
used to refer to identifiable unities, objects to be named, described and narrated 
in their development and release. The idea of boxing a video game only became 
possible much later than the period when the origins of the medium are usually 
identified. The impossibility was not only technical but mostly attributable to the 
discursive framing surrounding the earliest experiments. That is, it was a 
limitation not only of what could be done with the available technologies of the 
time but also of what could be said about them. Before the emergence of Ralph 
Baer’s brown box the possibilities of closing video game software and hardware 
were not discursively enacted by the actors involved in computer engineering. I 
will analyse this point by introducing a reading of the game Spacewar (circa 
1962) and reinterpret the accounts of the history of this video game provided so 
far [See Appendix: images 15 and 16]. In these stories I will see how Spacewar 
has been defined as a missed opportunity to transform an early video game into 
the first ever video game product, and as an open game that was continuously 
modified by its players. However, the discourses surrounding that experiment at 
the time of its production could not frame the possibility of boxing Spacewar, as 
later proposed by Ralph Baer with his brown box. What is noteworthy in this 
story, I believe, is how unities have been found by the historical reconstructions 
even where they could not possibly be. 
 
 
From Spacewar to Odyssey 
 
Reconstructions of the history of video games generally agree on designating 
1958 as year one of digital gaming, when William Higinbotham, while working at 
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the Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, New York, used an oscilloscope to 
design a game called Tennis for Two with a view to entertaining students who 
were visiting the research centre. A few years later, in 1962, at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), Stephen Russell (also known as Steve ‘Slug’ Russell 
in the hacking community) designed Spacewar. The game required two players 
and was a simulation of a fight between two spaceships. Higinbotham’s Tennis for 
Two was addressed directly to students and visitors, and was not advertised 
anywhere other than the Brookhaven National Laboratory. Spacewar was 
conceived explicitly as software to be shared among researchers with access to 
one of the first computer models, the PDP-1 (Programmed Data Processor-1). 
In ‘The History of Spacewar!: The Best Waste of Time in the History of the 
Universe’, an article published in 2009, Matt Barton and Bill Loguidice argue that, 
‘far from the secretive and highly competitive world of modern software 
development, Russell worked in what is now called an “open source” 
environment, where most code was freely shared and implemented without fear 
of copyright or patent infringement’ (2009: online). Steven Poole acknowledges 
Spacewar to be the first video game ever made (2000: 15), as does John 
Anderson in an article published in Creative Computing Video and Arcade Games 
in spring 1983. J.C. Herz (1997), in one of the first texts to present video game 
culture to a wider audience, ignores Tennis for Two and places the beginning of 
the medium of the video game with the invention of Spacewar. Steven L. Kent 
(2001), while acknowledging Tennis for Two as the first video game, claims that it 
was an isolated case that did not influence either Stephen Russell or Ralph Baer, 
who should be regarded, according to Kent, as the real inventors of digital 
gaming (18).  
 Spacewar was modified by Russell's colleagues at MIT and in other 
research centres across the United States. It could be argued that there was no 
sense of progress towards a final, complete version; rather, the video game’s 
imagined player was an academic researcher who could work at and expand the 
software. The idea that computers could be domestic tools was still remote and 
implausible, with Spacewar intended only for academic colleagues with extensive 
programming skills. Furthermore, the game itself was always open: at any time, it 
was possible to add or change parts of it. Indeed, it could be remarked that the 
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idea of making the code inaccessible would have been inconceivable at the time. 
The technologies used to run Spacewar were available only in a few research 
centres, and the playful use of the PDP-1 was impossible to reproduce as a 
product for a mass market. In a similar vein to Russell, Higinbotham would later 
comment on his own invention by saying that it looked so obvious to him that he 
had never thought about patenting it (Bittanti 1999: 50). For Russell and 
colleagues, as well as for Higinbotham, the playful reinterpretation of the 
technologies they were supposed to work with did not, and probably could not, 
suggest the invention of a marketable product. 
What appeared natural for Higinbotham, Russell and their colleagues 
became less so for commentators and analysts who retrospectively, particularly 
from the late 1990s, attempted to reconstruct the history of the medium. In these 
accounts, Russell and Higinbotham have been seen as the initiators of the 
medium of the video game but also as technicians who were not fully aware of 
the potentialities of their inventions. It is my argument that Spacewar, Tennis for 
Two and their respective authors can be seen like this only as long as the early 
years of the medium are considered as converging towards the boxing of video 
games later initiated by Ralph Baer. In other words, Spacewar and Tennis for Two 
can be narrated in the way they are only as long as a history of video games is 
seen as the history of an industry and its products. 
The obviousness of the processes of video game development and 
distribution, which Russell and Higinbotham allegedly failed to notice, can be 
attributed to a shift in the discourses about video games, with an influx of 
statements and assumptions that had originated in other discursive fields. As 
televisions became a widely distributed domestic technology, external devices 
such as tape recorders began to appear on the market. These were sold as pieces 
of hardware – boxes that could be connected to the TV set. The product on sale 
was the device and not the content, which could be sold separately. 
I want to argue that video games, in the process that was about to be 
initiated by Ralph Baer and his Odyssey game console, occupied a place in a 
structure that had originally been created for other kinds of entertainment 
devices. In 1965, Sony, Ampex and RCA released video tape recorders for 
domestic use, while Philips developed its own video cassette format and a 
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specific recorder in 1970 (the N1500, also known as VCR). Philips’ American 
division (Magnavox) released the game console Odyssey in 1972, by which time, 
as a result of the emergence of the video recorder, the notion that hardware had 
to be connected to the television set was already firmly established. Ralph Baer 
reconsidered the possibilities of television devices and Philips/Magnavox applied 
a model that was already framing their products. The fact that Ralph Baer 
thought about his game console mostly as a device for televisions is confirmed by 
the declaration of intents that introduces his documents for the design of the 
brown box: ‘the purpose of the invention is to provide a large variety of low-cost 
data entry devices which can be used by an operator to communicate with a 
monochrome or color TV set of standard, commercial unmodified type.’24 He 
applied an existing business model to his product, framing it as something 
similar to the existing television peripherals. 
 
 
The name of the game 
 
This historical chain of events has been narrated in several reconstructions of the 
origins of video games. However, from these perspectives the work of Russell and 
Higinbotham retrospectively appears difficult to define, and even to name. Thus, 
the open box or engine metaphors come to substitute the impossibility of closing 
and labelling what these games have been. If not as boxes, early games are 
narrated as tool sets, potentially open to uncountable modifications. 
Spacewar might even become, as Stephen Levy presented it in Hackers: 
Heroes of the Computer Revolution (1984), the result of a form of hacking, with all 
its political connotations of individual freedom. According to Levy, Russell was 
influenced by the hacker culture that developed during the early 60s at MIT and 
in computer laboratories elsewhere, in a narrative that tends to mythologise the 
work of Russell and his colleagues at MIT. The hacking culture is defined as being 
inspired by a hacker ethic, where authorities are not to be trusted and the only 
reigning principles are freedom of access (to the computers) and freedom of use. 
                                                 
24 The declaration of intent for the ‘conceptual, TV and gaming display’ invention is available on 
Ralph Baer’s personal website www.ralphbaer.com [Last accessed 8/11/2014]. 
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Spacewar is described as a concrete example of this ethic, and the non-
commercialisation of the game is explained as an example of the opposition 
between freedom to share and modify software on the one hand and the 
restricted access required for commercial exploitation on the other. According to 
Levy, Russell considered the possibility of commercialising Spacewar only when 
it was already too late: ‘at one point the thought crossed [...] Russell's mind that 
maybe someone should be making money from this, but by then there were 
already dozens of copies circulating’ (1984: 65). In Levy's view, monetising one's 
work is the normal condition, the way it should be. From this perspective 
Russell’s behaviour of not selling the game appears to be a decision motivated by 
a passion for sharing and collaborating on a collective work. 
 The fact that Russell and his colleagues at MIT failed to consider this 
option in a timely manner highlights a difference between their vision and that of 
those who, like Levy, later reconstructed their story. Russell’s decision was in 
accordance with that which underpinned the discourses on computer 
programming at that point in time. In Levy’s later description, it appears as an 
ethical and near-heroic choice. Between Russell and his commentator Levy lies 
the emergence of the video game market, and therefore the appearance of 
producers and consumers in the video game industry. It was only after Baer (and 
Nolan Bushnell, as I will discuss) invented the video game consumer that the 
story of Russell, and Higinbotham before him, could be considered as such and 
re-presented by Levy. It is interesting, for example, to notice how both Russell 
and Higinbotham report having failed to consider their software as a potential 
commercial product. The market had not yet been established and, as such, the 
notion of video game consumers would have been inconceivable. The conditions 
established by the discourses surrounding their own work made it impossible to 
address the production and consumption of a video game. Moreover, video game 
was not an expression used at that time, and Spacewar appears to be the name 
given to a series of playful experiments with the PDP-1 by later commentators. 
 What was Spacewar, then? If not a clearly identifiably entity but a series of 
operations and attempts to play with a PDP-1, how did it come to be defined as 
the first video game ever, or one of the very first? In Jeffrey Fleming's ‘Down the 
Hyper-Spatial Tube: Spacewar and the Birth of Digital Game Culture’ (2007), one 
 98 
of the co-authors of Spacewar, J.G. Graetz, remembers the days when the game 
was in (permanent) development. When asked about his feelings when a similar 
game was released, fifteen years later, as a coin-operated machine by a video 
game company (Space Wars by Larry Rosenthal in 1977), he acknowledges that 
the idea of copyrighting Spacewar crossed their minds, but they did not consider 
the full implications: 
 
There was a very brief discussion, probably less than a minute, about finding 
some way to copyright Spacewar, but there were two things; one, nobody knew 
if it was copyrightable, two, it wouldn’t make any money anyway because the 
game platform was $120,000. [...] We were just having fun. There was no 
inkling that computers would develop the way they would. […] Nobody knew 
what programming was. It was something you did to make a computer do 
things but it had no existence apart from the computer. […] The word ‘software’ 
didn’t come into existence until just about the time that we got Spacewar done. 
In fact, the first use of the word in a DEC catalog spelled it wrong. Even after it 
had a name, nobody knew what it was. (Fleming 2007: 4) 
 
 Such a level of attention towards the commercialisation of the game could 
not appear in a previous article published in Rolling Stone magazine in December 
1972. Writer Stewart Brand describes the first ‘Spacewar Olympics’ – a 
tournament played among the engineers who had access at Stanford’s Artificial 
Intelligence Laboratory in Palo Alto, California. In this article, Spacewar is 
described as a prophetic appearance of the world to come, one where computers 
will be used not just for work but also for entertainment purposes. While 
glorifying the game and its makers, this narrative lacked the historical knowledge 
needed to discuss the possibilities of its commercialisation. Commercialisation 
was still inconceivable; as a result of Brand’s context and circumstance, such 
concerns were external to the frame of possibility. Indeed, the final paragraph of 
the article explains how to ‘make your own Spacewar’, extending the spirit of 
contribution to a never-ending project. In 1972, when the Rolling Stone article 
first appeared, the emphasis was on the liberating effects of computers for the 
masses. The first few lines made this clear: ‘ready or not, computers are coming 
to the people. That's good news, maybe the best since psychedelics’ (1972). 
 Graetz’s comments about the idea of copyrighting Spacewar, as they 
appear in Fleming’s interview of 2007, also suggest that the game was not 
considered separate from its platform. The required hardware was unavailable 
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on a large scale but, more importantly, at that time the separation between 
hardware and software was not a relevant distinction in discourses about digital 
computing – in fact, Graetz underlines how the very word software had not even 
been coined at the point when they were designing the game. The distinction did 
not appear as it was not effectively enacted in practical terms, but also because, 
more simply, software and hardware did not exist as words. 
In fact, the separation between software and hardware came into effect in 
1969 after IBM, in order to address the concerns of the antitrust committee of 
the United States Department of Justice, decided to split off the programming 
section of its company from the development of hardware products, and to sell 
them separately. This event effectively introduced a separation, in practical 
terms, between hardware and software, and therefore also made possible the 
enclosure of software and its marketing as a separate product. If discourses ‘act 
both to constrain and enable what we can know’, as McHoul and Grace (1993: 37) 
write in their discussion of Foucault’s methodology, then the question about the 
boundaries of Spacewar as software could not be posed until the distinction 
between software and hardware came into place both technically and at the level 
of discourse. Spacewar was not boxed as a commercial product because its 
closure could not be formulated. It has never been closed because it was never 
open, as this distinction between openness and closure came into use only later. 
In other words, Spacewar could be given the status of open video game, an author 
and even a name only when histories of the medium were written. 
The same article by Jeffrey Fleming echoes the story of Nolan Bushnell 
and his Computer Space coin-operated video game, a Spacewar clone considered 
to be the first commercial game product ever to be released for public spaces 
such as shopping centres: ‘working out of his home, Bushnell struggled to make 
the game work on a Data General 1600 minicomputer. Unable to get the 
economics into the black, Bushnell realized that reproducing Spacewar in 
hardware, rather than software, was the answer’ (Fleming 2007: 4). Bushnell 
managed to commercialise a video game precisely by introducing the distinction 
between video game software and hardware. From the toolbox, or open game, 
designed by Russell and his colleagues, the video game as a medium had to 
become a box – a piece of hardware – in order to be consumed on a large scale. 
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As also argued by Nathan Ensmenger in The Computer Boys Take Over: 
Computers, Programmers, and the Politics of Technical Expertise (2010), in the 
history of computing the separation between software and hardware, as well as 
the emergence of the figure of the programmer, appears separately and later in 
respect to computers as a technology. 
These distinctions are historically embedded and, as such, they show how 
the narratives of production and consumption in video game culture, far from 
being fixed, have been changing and playing a significant role in shaping this 
medium. The Spacewar case highlights how the video game industry has not 
been oriented towards a progressive opening of the means of production but has 
revealed conflicting views on hardware and software and their accessibility 
(starting from the very distinction between hardware and software). 
 As Van Loon argues in Media Technology: Critical Perspectives (2008: 11-
13), media cannot be understood without taking into consideration their 
historicity, the historical context in which they come into being. This not only 
works ‘as an antidote to modes of thinking that attempt to read the “essence” of a 
medium purely from its internal, technological properties’ (2008: 12) but is also 
a methodological prerequisite to understanding media and their evolution 
through the cultural context in which they have been developed and used. This is 
what Van Loon calls the cultural embedding of a technology: ‘culture highlights 
that meaning and significance emerge from practices and do not exist in 
themselves’ (13). 
 The historical looks at the origins of digital games have mostly 
reconfirmed the distinctions and categories that were already known at the time 
of writing. It can also be argued that most of the historical reconstructions of the 
medium have been published from the early 2000s, with the exception of J. C. 
Herz’s Joystick Nation (1994). In that period the video game industry had taken a 
clear direction in becoming the source of entertainment for mainstream 
audiences, particularly in Western countries and many Asian markets. Moreover, 
software and hardware were already being discussed in that period through 
metaphors that contrasted openness and closure in the production of both. This 
dualism can be best understood through recourse to the metaphors introduced 
by Eric S. Raymond (1999) in The Cathedral and the Bazaar, a hugely influential 
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text on the discourses surrounding software development. Raymond criticised 
the earlier vision of Frederick Brooks, in which software is seen as a ‘cathedral’: a 
work designed by an engineer, the use of which is authorised only after 
completion, ‘carefully crafted by individual wizards or small bands of mages 
working in splendid isolation, with no beta to be released before its time’ 
(Raymond 1999: 29). There is a certain secrecy attached to the engineer’s plan, 
one that resembles a form of magic or esotericism. This view, inspired directly by 
the theories on software engineering of the 70s and 80s, is criticised by 
Raymond, who, borrowing from the rhetoric of the open-source movement of the 
90s, states that software can be engineered instead as a bazaar. According to 
Raymond, it is better to release software as often and early as possible, allowing 
users to contribute by finding errors and improving the software in a way that 
resembles a disorganised but efficient bazaar. 
After the introduction of this dualism, it was possible to think of Russell’s 
game Spacewar as a bazaar, with an unknown and theoretically limitless number 
of contributors, and Baer and Bushnell’s products as two cathedrals. In a 
cathedral the architecture is complete, self-sufficient and not supposed to be 
modified. It is what Baer and Bushnell aimed to achieve with their boxes: closed 
environments that could be accessible only for a specific purpose (to play the 
game). In a bazaar, however, there is neither an entrance nor an exit, and the 
space can be expanded or closed with no restrictions as the limits are continually 
redefined. The perception of video game software either as a locked box or as an 
open application of pre-existing hardware is something that shifts and changes 
over the history of video games. In recent decades, video game software has 
again started to display features that are typical of the bazaar. Examples of this 
are programmable consoles and game construction sets. The open engine of 
Doom, released for free in 1997, has been seen by many as one of the most 
significant steps towards the inclusion of gamers in the production of game 
content and modifications. Other experiences, such as the first gamers 
communities (for example, the one organised around the newsletter The 
Arcadian)25 or the continuous reappearance of closed consoles, further 
                                                 
25 Following the failure of Bally’s Professional Arcade, a home video game console released in 
1977, a community of users organised themselves around the newsletter The Arcadian. The 
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complicate a linear reconstruction of the history of this medium. 
 However, those histories have been framing the succession of 
technologies, inventions and innovations around the presence of identifiable 
unities. The history of video games has been framed as a history of boxes that 
might sometimes become open to the interventions of their players. Even in the 
cases of popular games that have been conceived or later opened to the 
modifications of their players, such as Pinball Construction Set (1983), Doom 
(1993), Second Life (2003) and Little Big Planet (2008), the possibility of using 
the software of those games as toolboxes has been narrated by scholars, 
journalists and historians and even in the marketing of those games as the 
opening of something that is not expected to be open. The openness of Second 
Life, Little Big Planet, game construction kits or open game engines is mostly 
played at the discursive level, countering what is expected to be the norm, that is, 
that game products should not be modifiable.  
 The discursive game of opposing openness and closure to each other 
reinforces the structures around which discourses on video games can be 
organised. As with media archaeology, confidence in the structures of the present 
narrows down the possibilities of the things we can say, and know, about gamers 
and games. Openness and closure, boxes and engines, cathedrals and bazaars, 
software and hardware all constitute metaphors and dualities that allow and 
constrain the discourses surrounding certain objects and practices, including the 
questions that are asked about their histories and genealogies. Gamers and 
games operate similarly, as a structure for talking, knowing and doing things 
within the field of video game culture. The comfort given by these notions can be 
so reassuring that the same notions are found in the past even when they could 
not possibly exist and be named as such. 
To what extent is discourse framing and establishing the notions used to 
understand the past (and present) of the medium of the video game? In the 
following section I will continue to concentrate on the concept of archaeology, 
and see how one more false duality, the one that separates language and 
                                                                                                                                            
newsletter was published by Robert Fabris and collected contributions from fans and hobbyists 
who often designed and shared with The Arcadian the games they programmed in BASIC 
language (the games were supposed to be typed by the readers of the newsletter on the 
Professional Arcade’s programming tools). The Arcadian continued being published until 1986, 
and released several ‘best of ’ cassettes of the most popular games made by its readers. 
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materiality, comes to provide a sort of easy escape from more troubling 
questions on the performativity of discourses and narratives in the 
understanding of video games. 
 
 
E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial: materiality as evidence 
 
On Saturday 26 April 2014, Microsoft spokesman Larry Hryb announced via 
Twitter that the expedition to find the buried cartridges of the 1982 video game 
E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial had been successful. The story of the game attained the 
status of urban legend in video game culture. As reported in many texts about the 
history of the medium, the video game E.T. was developed by Atari after a highly 
anticipated deal with film producer Universal Pictures, which gave Atari the 
rights to release video games based on the successful film directed by Steven 
Spielberg. However, the game turned out to be very disappointing, and it was 
released in a period, the early 80s, when the video game industry was struggling 
to sell sufficiently to maintain itself. As the legend goes, Atari decided to 
eliminate the unsold cartridges by burying them in the desert near Alamogordo, 
New Mexico. In 2014, Microsoft and the film company Fuel Industries obtained 
the rights to excavate the area to try to find proof of this legend and as part of a 
documentary project on video games [See Appendix: images 17 and 18]. 
 The story of the discovery of Atari’s dumped cartridges, as it has been told 
by Microsoft and other press sources, can be taken as an example of the ways in 
which historiographies of the medium of the video game often tend to operate. In 
fact, the excavation was attempting to discover evidence of a story already 
written and repeated in several contexts, more or less official, where the events 
around game company Atari were analysed. The archaeological endeavour was 
aimed at providing proof of something that was already expected to be true – 
that copies of the game E.T. had been buried in the desert. The contemporary 
knowledge about the story of the game company Atari was seen as the point of 
destination, as the safe arrival of the archaeological research. 
I propose that other questions, apart from the existence of dumped 
cartridges in the desert, can be posed in relation to the anecdote about E.T. What 
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are the conditions that make it possible to tell the story of E.T. and its successive 
excavations in the way it has been told? Or, to put it differently, what is it that 
makes it possible to talk about E.T. and that makes the finding of proof of its 
existence relevant in a certain moment in history? The story of the excavation in 
the desert of New Mexico could be understood as a non-event, particularly if we 
look at it only as a research of the trashed copies of the game. The answer to the 
question posed by the game archaeologists is already known, and constitutes the 
reason behind the excavation in the first place. The story, as it is known, says that 
the cartridges were trashed in 1982 in the same place they were found in 2014 – 
an almost tautological endeavour that finds exactly what it was looking for in the 
place it was known to be. If we ask instead why is it that we know this story as 
narrated in this precise way – as a peculiar event that affected one of the major 
video game companies of the past decades – then the answers are less safe and 
straightforward.  
I believe there are at least three possible arguments to be exposed when 
trying to answer these questions. Firstly, the story of E.T. is known as such 
because the history of the medium of the video game is mostly a history of boxes, 
as I have already argued. In this case, this is quite literally true. The story that has 
been narrated about the game is a story of the cartridges published by Atari and 
how they came to constitute a storage problem for the video game company. 
More generally, the story of the game is known because historians of the medium 
have focused mostly, if not solely, on what has been happening around the video 
game industry. Therefore, economic successes and failures constitute the main 
events to be narrated. 
Secondly, the story of E.T. is known as such because myths and legends of 
gamers’ communities are organised around the discourses of the video game 
companies and the historical reconstructions written about these companies. It 
is, again, a culture, or possibly a subculture, that elaborates a history of boxes, of 
commercial products and of the narratives surrounding them. Because of this, 
the apparently marginal story of E.T. is known by many of the hard-core gamers 
and can still attract the attention of documentary filmmakers and their sponsor 
Microsoft. 
Finally, and more importantly, it can be said that the project to find the 
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boxes of E.T. satisfies the anxiety that might originate from not knowing for sure 
whether what has been told so far about the failure of the game is in fact true. 
The response to this is represented by the search for evidence that could confirm 
our knowledge of the history of Atari. As in the theoretical approach outlined by 
media archaeology, the answer is almost always to be found in the so-called 
materiality of objects. Touching and seeing the E.T. cartridges is the answer, or 
response, to the need to confirm the present notions about the history of video 
games. Materiality, in these archaeological approaches, is the concept that 
enables transparency: the possibility of saying the truth about anything, of 
confirming what we already know, and of talking about what we have been 
searching for in the location and position in which it was known to be found. 
In Game After: A Cultural Study of Video Game Afterlife (2014), Raiford 
Guins approaches the story of E.T. from what he defines as an archaeological 
perspective. In his text, this means looking at the documents and remains of E.T. 
in a very detailed analysis of the first-hand accounts of residents of Alamagordo, 
searching the co-ordinates of where the game boxes were buried and the articles 
and interviews about the story of Atari and the development of the game. In 
Guins’ work there is a strong focus on experiencing, in the first person, the 
stories that make video game culture, by witnessing, seeing and hearing what 
video game collectors, designers and hobbyists have to say and getting in touch 
with what is left of old coin-operated machines and video game consoles. Objects 
and things, Guins argues, have an afterlife: after their disposal they continue to 
exist as collectables or in museum archives, and in some cases, as happened with 
E.T., as trash. Yet this is trash that continues to inspire stories and events, such as 
the excavation that recently took place in New Mexico. 
Drawing on the work of Don Ihde, Guins argues that objects are 
‘multistable’, as they can be ‘many things at once’ (2014: 12). From this, Guins 
proposes that in the analysis of video games, and artefacts in general, we should 
ask not only what something is but also when and where it is, how it emerges 
and how it is used. This would amount to taking into consideration its afterlife. In 
Guins’ analysis of E.T. there is great consideration of how the game was originally 
perceived by journalists and critics and how it is now perceived in gamers’ 
communities, how the packaging was done and what the economic conditions 
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were that caused Atari to suffer from such a commercial disaster. 
Raiford Guins effectively illustrates the stories surrounding the video 
game E.T., however, his approach to what this game is evades too easily the 
problems deriving from the ontological questions he formulates. The solution 
Guins finds, as in many other media archaeological accounts, is in the context: 
E.T. needs to be explained through the context in which it was conceived, 
produced, played, trashed and excavated. His definition of archaeology is to ‘look 
around things’ in order to understand them (2014: 7). Archaeology therefore 
remains a form of truth seeking (234), and what enables truth is, once again, the 
materiality of things (18, 26). 
The necessity to refer to a context, in which things could be looked at in 
their original form, is significant of the flaws of the division between language 
and materiality that Guins, and others, assume. As long as materiality and 
discourse are treated as separate, language is secluded in a space from where it 
can only work as a signifier of reality: it can describe, illustrate, point at and 
present how things are. Indeed, from this perspective the context is necessary, as 
it provides a limit to what can be rightly said about materiality. However, in 
Foucault’s theory of discourse, which is the foundation for his notions of 
archaeology and genealogy, discourse is not simply regarded for what it says, but 
mostly for what it does. That means that discourse is always already material, it 
affects and solicits bodies; discourse is, in fact, an event (Foucault 1981). Thus, 
discourse does not look at contexts but it creates contexts, continuously, making 
the concept of context quite useless – precisely by eliminating the strict 
separation between language and materiality.  
In the introduction Guins refers to the early work of J. C. Herz, Joystick 
Nation, where the author asks herself what is it that constitutes the video game 
Space Invaders: is it the code, is it the original document written by the game 
designer, or is it a specific coin-operated machine? The answer provided by 
Guins, in the practice of his work, is oriented towards accuracy and inclusion. 
Many different objects are counted as part of the game, and these are described 
with as much detail as possible in their histories, uses and understandings in 
video game culture. As this list has to stop at some point, it is materiality that 
provides, once again, the safety to consider a description exhaustive and 
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transparent. Guins reminds us in many points of his text that as long as historians 
get their hands dirty in the archives, museums, and houses of game collectors, a 
more precise explanation of what games are can be offered. 
 The story of E.T. is not too different from the stories of Spacewar and the 
game designer Roberta Williams. In the cases of Spacewar and Williams, 
however, the problem for game historians is the absence of what is instead 
considered to be taken for granted: Spacewar was not a boxed product and 
Williams was not a gamer, as expected by those who have tried to explain their 
stories. In the story of E.T., instead, what has been found is exactly what was 
known to be there: a pile of boxes and mud that confirmed the legend of the 
game. But in all these cases a historical preconception persists, together with the 
need to search for a confirmation of that preconception. In all cases the past is 
approached through the questions and modes of thinking of the present, 
assuming the present time is not influenced by temporality, and by what makes 
the current questions only temporary and partial in relation to the past. 
This problem, which I see in the work of Guins and in the many accounts 
of game archaeology, has to do, as I will now argue, with the notion of the 
performativity of discourse. Acknowledging discourse as performative entails 
that the enunciation of a history has to be looked at in its relation to the act of 
speaking or, as Foucault would put it, for what it does and not only for what it 
says. Foucault himself noticed that the performativity of discourse can be 
accepted only as long as discourse is seen in its materiality. A perspective which, 
Foucault argues, brings a certain level of anxiety: ‘anxiety about what discourse is 
in its material reality as a thing pronounced or written; anxiety about this 
transitory existence which admittedly is destined to be effaced, but according to a 
time scale which is not ours’ (1981: 52). 
 
 
 
Close encounters of the narrative kind: on the performativity of narratives 
 
In the work of Guins and many other game archaeologists, the materiality of 
documents, cartridges, interviews, newspaper articles and so on appears as the 
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final level obtainable in reassuring the correctness of the retrospective looks at 
the past. Materiality is presented as the outcome of a purely objective excavation, 
and as such represents the moment of rebuttal of performativity as a 
methodology for understanding how we are implicated in the discourses we 
produce. In fact, objectivity is only possible assuming a certain margin of 
distance from the things that are analysed, described or excavated. Conversely, I 
argue that considering the performativity of discourse is a potentially alternative 
perspective if we are to understand phenomena and our interventions. The story 
of E.T. can tell us precisely how even the most objective excavations contribute to 
frame, and constitute, the remnants, relics and ruins they attempt to bring back 
to light. 
 As soon as the first pictures of the retrieval of E.T. appeared online, 
gamers and video game collectors started speculating about the evidence that 
was provided. As reported on Ars Technica, a website that extensively covered 
the event, many interruptions had slowed down and postponed the moment 
when the cartridges were revealed. The website argues that the first two 
excavations, to which selected journalists and a number of interested fans had 
been invited, were unsuccessful. Initially, some of the pits were inaccessible. 
Later on, other excavations produced no results. It was only after the first two 
attempts that press and fans were invited to a third excavation. This last attempt 
revealed almost immediately a copy of E.T., buried quite superficially in the 
desert. Moreover, only one copy of the game was shown, and a few other Atari 
products appeared in the photos of the excavated area. Speculation was that the 
mission produced no results, but because the production of the documentary 
needed footage of that part of the story some sort of evidence had been thrown 
in the pits overnight, enough to collect photos and video and document the 
apparent find. Kyle Orland from Ars Technica comments: 
 
The simple fact that the film crew found some cartridges seems unlikely to fully 
kill the legend. Even today, new conspiracy theories are popping up to replace 
the old. Some Internet trolls are already suggesting that the Microsoft-affiliated 
film crew planted the cartridges for the benefit of the cameras and that the 
media has either been snookered or is in on it. Yesterday's dig did debunk some 
of those ‘I heard...’ myths (there were some games down there besides E.T., for 
instance), but it left others frustratingly unaddressed (archaeologist Andrew 
Reinhard told Ars ‘there’s no way’ to estimate how many games were buried). 
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(Orland 2014) 
 
Through the speculation and rumour that circulated in online communities and 
video game magazines, the materiality of the cartridges of E.T. lost its apparent 
solidity. When confronted with the multiple narratives that make sense of their 
presence, solid objects tend to sublimate. Materiality had been used as evidence 
in the story of E.T., but what made the cartridges and their photos relevant as 
evidence was mostly a discursive construction, a series of narratives told and 
repeated in books, online forums and the press releases from the documentary 
filmmakers. The evidence was revealed to be relevant because of and for the 
words and the meanings associated with it in a specific community. Those same 
words can be said to be the very event that constituted the re-discovery of E.T.: 
the discourses generated by the archaeologists and the gamers communities 
were always already material and were the reason for the generation of further 
discourses about the discovery of E.T. and its later refusal.  
As long as the question we pose is concerned only with finding out the 
truthfulness of the story of Atari’s E.T., there can always be alternative stories to 
tell. Thus, because E.T. is important essentially as a story, it is probably more 
interesting to inquire into these stories and ask instead what the conditions for 
telling the truth about Atari’s E.T are, and what is at stake in inventing other 
stories (and not necessarily true ones). 
 It is through discourse that narratives are replicated, and materiality 
participates in this game of stories. The archaeologists, the film makers, the fans 
and the gamers have been involved in shaping multiple narratives of E.T., and 
finding the cartridges is a part of those narratives. In exactly the same way, we 
are involved (myself included, as gamer, academic and author of this chapter) 
and are responsible for determining what constitutes the objectivity of the 
history of games. We are involved, and we always have been, in deciding why and 
how the story of E.T. is relevant. 
 Thinking of game and media histories as performative does not mean that 
the list of things to be included in the definition of what a game is should simply 
expand the number of elements to look at and analyse, or that everything makes 
sense according to the context of its interpretation (which would, at best, amount 
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to a platitude). Understanding game histories in their performativity means, in 
my proposal, thinking less through ontological questions and more about 
relations and processes of becoming. The problem is not what E.T. is but how it 
becomes what it is, and what else it could be. The articles in Ars Technica, an 
online magazine about technology and culture, phrase this problem well by 
asking: ‘Why are we so interested in some buried hunks of plastic and silicon?’ 
Questioning the reason these stories are told is a way of introducing the problem 
of the present, seen as an unstable position from which to look at the past. The 
instability that results from this other archaeology is also something we will have 
to take care of. 
 Michel Foucault maintained exactly this in his consideration of the unities 
of history: ‘I shall accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them 
at once to interrogation; to break them up and then to see whether they can be 
legitimately reformed; or whether other groupings should be made’ (1972: 29). 
The responsibility of searching for other unities is what makes telling history a 
form of intervention, what makes it responsibly and ethically performative. Video 
game histories, or archaeologies, could be less about facts and more about the 
telling of those facts, about what keeps a series of statements together so as to 
constitute a fact, and how we can intervene in and by telling those facts. 
Michel Serres proposed that historical eras, as well as objects, can be seen 
as multifaceted and as continuously folding into different unities: ‘every 
historical era is likewise multitemporal, simultaneously drawing from the 
obsolete, the contemporary, and the futuristic. An object, a circumstance, is thus 
polychromic, multitemporal, and reveals a time that is gathered together, with 
multiple pleats’ (Serres and Latour 1995: 60). From this perspective an 
archaeological look cannot take the present for granted as this becomes the 
result of a discursive, temporary and strategic folding. The present time in the 
archaeological perspective is a unity caught through discourse while in its 
undoing. 
 In the following chapter I will look at the story of the hacking of the video 
game console PlayStation3 and its related online service PlayStation Network in 
2011. This case will be seen as a series of events whose unity came to be 
disputed through several contexts and actors (online communities, press and 
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industry analyses, legal trials between Sony, the consumers of its products and a 
group of hackers, and an uncountable number of other events). The boxing of 
PlayStation3 and PlayStation Network, as technologies and products, was 
disputed and redefined through the events of the hacking of Sony’s console. The 
narratives surrounding this event (or series of events) performatively produced 
conflicting definitions of what a video game console is. The notions of producer 
and consumer similarly came to be debated and defined through authoritarian 
statements by Sony and its representatives, and by journalists and gamers.  
Putting the story of the hacking of PlayStation3 and the PlayStation 
Network in a historical context, it is significant to notice how early consoles and 
coin-operated machines have also been subject to innumerable lawsuits. Ralph 
Baer (who proposed video games for home entertainment) and Nolan Bushnell 
(the proponent of video games for public entertainment), were, from the 
beginning, blighted by innumerable accusations of copyright violation. The 
economic interests of the private companies that were releasing the games are 
one obvious reason for this. But an essential condition for a copyright breach is 
also the presence of an identifiable unity that can be copyrighted and then 
(illegally) reproduced, partially or completely. The hacking of PlayStation3 is, 
among all the cases of copyright breach in the game industry, the largest and 
most significant. It came to involve the accounts of millions of users and was 
debated for more than a year in mainstream news media.  
 The story of the hacking of Playstation3 will be seen for the opportunities 
it opened (and mostly disappointed): the discourses surrounding the game 
console had to consider how producers and consumers, game products and 
users, actors and objects came to define themselves through their mutual 
relation. The boxes that make up the history of video games became, in the 
breach of PlayStation3, sources of conflict. The narratives of conflict that resulted 
from these events will be seen in the next chapter as an example of how the study 
of gamers’ games can become a study of relations rather than a study of 
separated objects, and how gamers, games and the readings of them both can be 
destabilised and fold on each other.  
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Chapter 3 
Narratives of conflict: the hacking of PlayStation as a 
Network 
 
 
 
 
The series of events that became part of what was known as the hacking of 
PlayStation3, as happened between 2010 and 2011, has been the source of a 
multitude of discourses in which the object – PlayStation3  – opened up to 
several temporary framings. Individuals and groups of gamers took a stand to 
define their own position and freedom in relation to the games they were playing 
and to the publishers of those games. Defining what PlayStation3 is, its limits and 
boundaries in time and space, became the point of debate in a conflict of 
definitions, in which Sony and its representatives were claiming opposing ideas 
to those expressed by the consumers of their products. 
The case of the hacking of PlayStation3 is relevant precisely as a process 
of unboxing of a supposedly closed technology. In its undoing, PlayStation3 
became many things. According to Sony, it was a product released to customers 
on a licence, which Sony reserves the rights to change in its features and services 
one year after its release to the end user. For this reason (or using this as an 
excuse), Sony sued hacker George Hotz, who was responsible for releasing a 
method of his own invention to recuperate a feature of the PlayStation3 console, 
known as OtherOS, that Sony had decided to remove through an obligatory 
update of the operating system (the details of this turn of events will be 
explained throughout this chapter). George Hotz, in fact, declared that 
PlayStation3 is something you own once you buy it, and ownership also implies 
the right to modify. This is also what the consumer associations and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation claimed when they sued Sony, in their turn, for 
having changed, with the removal of the OtherOS feature, the product as it was 
advertised to customers.  
 The hacking of PlayStation3 also generated a large number of different 
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gamers. There were gamers as consumers and customers, who defined 
themselves as such by claiming rights in the product they bought. There were 
also gamers as hackers, who proposed that playing with PlayStation3 might also 
include the modification of the console itself through hardware and software. 
There were gamers as fans of Sony’s products, organised in online communities, 
who were the first to complain about Sony becoming an authoritarian and almost 
dictatorial figure. There were gamers as thieves, who stole the sensitive data of 
about 70 million users of the online PlayStation Network service in one of the 
largest hacking operations ever undertaken in the video game industry. Finally, 
Sony itself, as a video game producer, publisher and corporation, was also playing 
its own game, claiming to be the only subject to decide what can be done with 
PlayStation3, what the uses of this technology are and, ultimately, what it is. 
In this chapter I want to argue that the multiple definitions of 
PlayStation3, produced by different actors in several contexts over almost a year 
of debates and controversies, created not only multiple PlayStation3s but also a 
large number of subjects and identities. Discourses will be seen here as putting 
subjects into effect and enabling their presence. As Foucault argued, to describe a 
statement means determining ‘what position can and must be occupied by any 
individual if he is to be the subject of it’ (1972: 107). Moreover, identity, as 
‘performatively constituted by the very “expression” that are said to be its results’ 
(Butler 1990: 34), is the outcome of the series of statements produced by the 
actors involved in the stories of the hacking of PlayStation3. Identity will be 
understood in this chapter as an effect (in accordance with Butler’s theory on 
gender), and through the political layers that pervaded the discourses 
surrounding the hacking of PlayStation3. However, I will also argue that, in the 
same series of events, the determination of subjects and identities has also been 
closing down the possibilities and alternative forms of political action that could 
have emerged from the hacking of PlayStation3. The statements pronounced in 
several institutional contexts, such as the district court of California or interviews 
on television shows and newspapers, has quickly identified specific subjects with 
precise identities. Gamers, Sony and the hackers have all been used as labels to 
mean precise groups of people, although such precision is difficult to achieve in 
the multiplicity of voices that overlapped with each other while the events 
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unfolded. 
I will map what sorts of political ideologies have been replicated in these 
events, and how these operated as formations around which to orient statements 
and performances and, consequently, their subjects. Through the ideologies of 
freedom and the often evoked right to hack, I will contest the allegedly 
revolutionary claims that surrounded the breach of PlayStation3 and its online 
service PlayStation Network. I will present these claims as replicating the 
ideology that framed Sony’s decisions and its rather aggressive and non-
participatory approach to technology and freedom.  
The hacking of PlayStation3 will be seen as a process of unboxing, in 
which the uses and interpretations of the video game console are proposed to be 
changed by the actors involved in the hacking. In order to make sense of this 
process of transformation, taking place at the interplay of social and material 
boundaries, I turn to actor-network theory, as originally formulated by Bruno 
Latour, as a theory of unstable relations and mediations. The concept of the 
network, in particular, will be understood through its multiple meanings. It is the 
name given by Sony to the console’s online service, the PlayStation Network. 
According to the reconstructions of the international news media, PlayStation 
Network was the first service to be infringed in the more complex series of 
hackings of Sony’s products. A network can also be a place through which 
connections happen and information is exchanged and flows. As Latour argues, 
flow and exchange can be static as much as transformative. It can be a relation 
between intermediaries that do not alter information as it passes from one point 
to another. But the points in a network can also be, or become, mediators. They 
can introduce and become sources of transformation (Latour 2005: 27-42). 
Connections have been made between gamers and games in many 
different ways through the discourses surrounding the hacking of PlayStation3. 
The transformations they have been subject to puts the network at the centre. 
The stories narrated in this chapter are not, strictly speaking, about the gamers 
who played with PlayStation3 but about how they became gamers by relating to 
the video game console in a conflictual fashion. PlayStation3 became a network 
of transformations, a technology to be defined strategically and in accordance 
with new and temporary identities. Rephrasing Martin Heidegger’s famous line, 
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it could be said that the essence of Playstation3 is by no means anything 
technological (Heidegger 1977: 6): the question concerning its essence soon 
became a debate on what can be done with video game products, who owns them 
and for what purposes. In other words, what these products are and who their 
users are.  
The question concerning the essence of Playstation3 also became an 
instrumental question, imbued with conflicts and ideological claims, to be used 
by conflicting parties to define and settle their own unstable identities. The 
network became stable again at the end of the story through the same libertarian 
ideology that many of the hackers expected to oppose. In fact, Sony and the 
hackers made similar but oppositional claims about the possibility of removing 
any constraint to what can be done with and to technological products. Sony, the 
hackers and the consumer associations resolved their instability through 
authoritative statements, such as those produced by the California state court. 
The hacking of PlayStation3 ended with resolutions and agreements of peace. 
However, the opposition had the main consequence of defining and reinforcing 
producers (Sony) and consumers (everyone else) as separate subjects. Such an 
opposition, and particularly with regard to the PS3 hack case, closed down the 
space for alternative forms of production and consumption of video games and 
was based on the same assumptions about producers and consumers that 
originated the problem they pretended to fight. 
The kind of freedom demanded by the PlayStation hackers was a 
libertarian and typically masculine claim for the right of an individual to tinker 
and produce.26 The reconfiguration that emerged from the activity of the hackers 
was neither radically different nor more desirable than what they sought to 
supplant. In the end, the imagined and desired scenario from the side of the 
rebels still involved a marked separation between those who were capable of 
producing and opening up the video game console and the mass of unskilled 
passive consumers. 
                                                 
26 Dovey and Kennedy (2006) already noticed how the ‘dominant technicity’ imagines the gamer 
as a ‘lonely individual genius’, as a character that almost perfectly overlaps with that of the hacker. 
Women appear as marginal figures in the same stories, if they are not completely absent. Women 
as gamers or game developers are narrated only through voices that are alternative to the 
dominant culture (2006: 63-83). The gamer/hacker character described by Dovey and Kennedy 
reappears, with its aggressive behaviour, in the events surrounding the hacking of PlayStation3.    
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I propose that we reconsider the claims surrounding the PS3 hack case 
and, more generally, the attraction expressed by many critics towards similar 
narratives of opposition in the video game industry. I want to offer what will 
hopefully be a more productive understanding of these narratives of conflict, 
taking as a starting point the statements produced in their favour by both 
specialised and mainstream media. I acknowledge the potential of these debates 
for legislative purposes and as a basis for more participatory practices among 
video game consumers. However, I suggest considering these reactive tactics as, 
possibly, an initial step towards more proactive strategies where practices of 
opposition could establish new networks of co-operation and propose an 
alternative to the linear and hierarchic model of production and consumption 
(Andersson 2009). Such a form of opposition would be oriented to the inclusion 
of users in the learning and sharing of experiences and know-how. The Arduino 
project, discussed in the conclusion, is an example of a similar form of inclusion, 
as it offers new opportunities for the involvement of potential producers and 
collective co-operation. I do not consider this option as necessarily preferable to 
the model offered by either Sony Computer Entertainment or by the hackers of 
the PlayStation3 console. It is, rather, a tactical manoeuvre to put at the centre 
the introduction of consumers into the production process and a strategy for 
preserving multiple definitions of hacking. 
 By providing an account of the events surrounding the hacking of 
PlayStation3, I outline a different reading of the relation between video game 
consumers, producers and video game technologies. Through this analysis I 
highlight the social, historical and political assumptions underlying many of the 
discourses produced in this context and the potential of cultural analysis for 
indicating different directions. Hacking will be interpreted as a process of 
mediation (Latour 2005) that effects an unboxing of technologies and establishes 
new hybrid networks (Michael 2000). The problem I intend to raise is, ultimately, 
about the quality of those networks and the possibility of evaluating them. 
Drawing on the work of Mike Michael (2000) and Lucy Suchman (2007) I argue 
that the problem with networks does not reside simply with the understanding 
of how material and human nodes are framed, but with how we become hybrids 
in our own turn and further mediators within those same networks. By narrating 
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some of the many different constitutions of temporary networks of human and 
non-human nodes that make PlayStation3, and through my own personal 
involvement in these narratives, I want to re-evaluate authorship and 
responsibility in deciding how relationships are, and how differently they could 
be. In this chapter the network will be considered as a metaphor also to the 
extent to which it makes it possible to be personally entangled into it, to be part 
of it. 
The metaphor of the network will be useful as a method for breaking up 
the dualities (Sony vs the hackers, Sony vs the consumers, and so on) that the 
stories surrounding the PlayStation hacking appear to have put so often at the 
centre. However, a purely ANT inspired approach might still run the risk of 
limiting itself to a description of such dualities, rather than providing a theory of 
the differences and similarities that the description itself is bringing into the 
discourse. John Law (2007) has argued that ANT is descriptive ‘rather than 
foundational in explanatory terms’ (3). I believe instead that descriptions need to 
be explanatory of their own presence by justifying and making sense of their 
existence. 
The potential of the stories told in regards to the hacking of PlayStation3 
lies precisely in the possibility of delineating new stories and new networks, 
highlighting less represented modes of using a game console and the emergence 
of unusual forms of communication between gamers (such as those who shared 
the anti-firmware developed by hacker George Hotz). Thinking about the hacking 
of PlayStation as a network means thinking, in my account, of the conflicts that 
emerged in that context as being composed of a multitude of nodes. Hacking can 
be seen as a way of introducing and altering those nodes and as a method for 
playing with the porosity of a video game console.  
 
 
The many narratives of the PlayStation hacking 
 
The PlayStation hacking, the series of events that started on 28 March 2010 and 
proliferated until summer 2011, has been described by journalists, video game 
players and industry experts as a revolution in the relations that Sony, one of the 
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leaders in the video game industry, had with its consumers. The casus belli for 
hacking into the PlayStation3 system was the release of Sony's firmware 3.21. 
This release was intended to prevent, or at least reduce, digital piracy, and was 
presented as an obligatory update for all PlayStation3 consoles, automatically 
downloaded as soon as the console connected to the PlayStation Network 
Internet service. 
 However, in attempting to prevent digital piracy, the new firmware also 
removed the OtherOS feature from the consoles. OtherOS was the name given to 
an unprecedented possibility in the history of video game consoles, which 
allowed users to install any operating system on their video game consoles. 
However, the update to firmware 3.21 and the removal of OtherOS became 
mandatory in order to have access to many of the services Sony had been offering 
to the gamers until that moment, including new video game products. Also, 
online services such as PlayStation Network became inaccessible without the 
new firmware. Firmware 3.21 removed features and services without giving any 
real advantage back to the users. In fact, the new firmware curtailed many of the 
previous functions of the PlayStation3 console, which were probably not initially 
predicted by Sony but were definitely possible when the console was first 
released in 2006. As the protesters argued, installing Linux and connecting 
several PlayStation3s in a grid was an economical and effective alternative to 
buying expensive mainframes. OtherOS made it possible to use a PlayStation3 as 
a computer and therefore extended its potential uses far beyond those strictly 
related to digital gaming. The new firmware was therefore received by the 
consumers as a limitation rather than an advancement.  
 When the suspension of this feature was announced on 28 March 2010, 
users expressed their dissatisfaction by posting comments on online forums and 
on the official PlayStation blog, where the news first appeared. The official 
release of the firmware was scheduled for 1 April 2010, a date that caused many 
PlayStation3 users to think that this was Sony’s attempt at an “April fool”. This 
was not the case. The firmware was effectively released as announced, and its 
consequences were exactly those described by Sony. Even the official PlayStation 
blog shows the level of disappointment on the part of the consumers: the 
comments on the first announcement unanimously accused Sony of limiting the 
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activity of its users.27 
 The decision was described by the gaming community as an act of 
tyranny, an authoritarian decision that threatened their freedom. The reactions 
showed feelings of both disillusionment, as Sony is often considered one of the 
most successful companies in the video game market in terms of receiving and 
satisfying its customers, and violation of the privacy and rights of the players, 
who had their data changed or deleted at short notice. More importantly, and this 
will be a key element in the reconstruction of the events that followed, the 
definition that Sony was providing of its own product was seen as arbitrary and 
old-fashioned. New video games and online gaming, as well as uses of the game 
console that were not strictly related to gaming (such as using the console to 
watch movies from Blu-Ray discs or connecting PlayStation3 consoles in Linux-
based grids), were all considered by Sony as features or extras. As such, they 
could be activated as well as removed. Consumers on the other hand held the 
view that PlayStation3 should be considered as a piece of hardware whose 
functions could be determined and implemented by its users. According to most 
consumers, nobody has the authority to determine what a legitimate or 
illegitimate use of the hardware is.  
 From this description of the events we can already draw a more nuanced 
analysis of the opposition between Sony and the consumers of its product. It 
appears in fact that the dispute is much more problematic and difficult to define 
than has been suggested by the news media. Actually, I would like to argue that 
the “war” between consumers and producers in the hacking of PlayStation3 was 
fought precisely to determine the boundaries between consumer and producer in 
the first place. At stake, in defining the very terrain of the battle, was the 
definition of both the contenders. The contenders were mostly defining their 
own possibilities for intervention over PlayStation3, although posing primarily 
the question of what PlayStation3 is.  
 The events that followed, extensively reported in the news media, were 
most frequently described as PlayStation hack or PS3 hack. These included first 
the development of a counter-firmware to contrast with Sony’s firmware 3.21, 
                                                 
27 The original post by Sony and its comments are available on the official PlayStation blog: 
http://blog.us.playstation.com/2010/03/28/ps3-firmware-v3-21-update [Last accessed 
21/10/2014] 
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and later the hacking of the PlayStation Network in April 2011, during which the 
sensitive data of 77 million accounts (including credit card information) were 
illegitimately accessed and saved on a private database. 
 Indeed, the sensationalist terms that have been used by news media in 
introducing the developments of the PS3 hack case are justified by the numbers 
of users involved and the significance of PlayStation3 as a product sold on a 
global market. The hacking of the PlayStation Network has been described as a 
breach of an allegedly closed system,28,29,30 which tested consumers’ patience and 
trust.31 However, I believe that the grounds for interest in this case are quite 
different from those presented by newspapers and online magazines. The PS3 
hack has been narrated as a massive break-in to an allegedly super-protected 
environment that has been responsible for enormous damage, in economic terms 
and in terms of public image, to one of the biggest companies in the hi-tech 
industry. The hacking has indeed had massive consequences, and the reasons are 
undoubtedly relevant to discourses relating to the ownership of technological 
products and user privacy. The implications of this case, however, are much 
deeper, and possibly much more sensational. 
  I believe that the PS3 hack case magnifies the narratives of conflict that 
were already present in video game culture but never reached such high levels of 
opposition. Digital piracy has been one of the reasons for video game publishers 
to adopt authoritative decisions over copyright, intellectual property and digital 
formats. Also, forms of opposition between producers and consumers of video 
games have been emerging, for example in the form of gamers’ strikes, where 
players stopped playing online games or caused servers to crash in protest at the 
decisions of the games’ designers, or in the form of hacking and modifying video 
game hardware and software. 
                                                 
28 Baker, L. B. (26 April 2011), ‘Sony PlayStation suffers massive data breach’, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-sony-stoldendata-idUSTRE73P6WB20110426 
[Last accessed 21/10/2014] 
29 Morris, C. (26 April 2011) ‘Sony: PlayStation breach involves 70 million subscribers’, CNBC, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/42769019/Sony_PlayStation_Breach_Involves_70_Million_Subscribers 
[Last accessed 21/10/2014] 
30 Carnns, A. (27 April 2011) ‘The PlayStation breach: Why you should remain calm’, The New 
York Times, http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/the-playstation-breach-why-you-
should-remain-calm/ [Last accessed 21/10/2014] 
31 Schiesel, S. (27 April 2011) ‘PlayStation security breach a test of consumer trust’, The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/arts/video-games/sony-playstation-security-
flaw-tests-consumer-trust.html [Last accessed 21/10/2014] 
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 One of the most recent examples of this occurred in June 2011 when a 
significant number of players of the online role-playing game EVE Online decided 
to protest against the decisions of the publisher of the game. The changes were 
supposed to concern the economic exchanges within the video game 
environment. Following a leak from an internal newsletter supposed to circulate 
only among the game designers, it became common knowledge that the game 
was about to change and introduce real-money transactions. This was to follow 
other changes that had already limited gamers’ options. On 21 June players 
decided to gather in the online space, on a planet in the simulated galaxy of the 
game environment. By gathering together at the same time, the gamers caused 
the servers to crash and forced the designers to acknowledge that their decisions 
were not necessarily going to be accepted peacefully.32 
 Illegal modifications, both to game software and video game console 
hardware, have also been popular for a very long time and pertain to almost 
every video game product ever released. During the 1980s the most common 
storage technology for video game software was the audio cassette, which could 
be easily copied and distributed outside the market officially intended for it by 
the original producer. Similarly, CD-ROMs in the 1990s were copied and shared 
or re-sold at lower prices than those proposed by the original publishers. Sony's 
PlayStation console (1994), later re-branded as PSOne (2000), was the first case 
of a video game console being illegally modified on a large scale. The hardware 
could in fact be modified to bypass regional blocks and also read illegally copied 
CD-ROMs. However, in those earlier cases the illegal modifications were rarely, if 
ever, justified through political discourses. Piracy was intended as a more 
convenient way to access video game software. Also, those modifications did not 
attract the attention of the mainstream media, unlike the recent hacking of 
PlayStation3, probably because there was no relevance for the general public as it 
was mostly an issue for video game publishers – and potentially important only 
to a still relatively limited number of video game consumers. 
 In the PS3 hack case, however, the dialectic of opposition exploded in such 
a violent and significant way that its consequences could not be ignored either by 
                                                 
32 The story is explained in detail at http://www.myth-games.com/news4927.htm [Last accessed 
21/10/2014] 
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specialist or mainstream channels of information. The massive media coverage 
went far beyond the report of an alleged and unconfirmed leak of credit card 
details from Sony’s database. The high number of video game consumers 
contributed to making this story more relevant to the general public. However, I 
believe that the reason for the wide attention given to this story is the intrusion, 
in the narratives that justified and framed this series of actions, of a political 
discourse. According to the reconstructions of the PS3 hack case, the event did 
not occur only for the sake of more convenient access to digital games. It was not 
pursued to enrich the experience of a game (e.g., to bring forward a specific 
request to the game designers, as in the case of EVE Online). The main reason was 
not even to open a supposedly closed system and play pirate copies of video 
games (although this was the accusation brought by Sony). The story became 
popular on news media, instead, as a political statement that involved the privacy 
of users and their freedom to use a product in any way they wanted. 
 
 
Conflicting freedoms 
 
The concept of freedom so often invoked by the hackers, as reported in press 
releases and public announcements, appears to be inspired by a libertarian 
ideology. The stress on the individual and his/her potential is a founding element 
of libertarian discourses. Also, as pointed out by Richard Barbrook and Andy 
Cameron in ‘The Californian Ideology’ (1996), technology appears in these 
discourses as a determining force for social change. In the PS3 hack case, the 
release of both hardware and software, by Sony or by the hackers, is understood 
as a potentially revolutionary moment, which changes the configuration of the 
producer-consumer relation. According to the hackers, it is because of this 
potential that consumers should be free to tinker with technology, otherwise 
they would be passive subjects of this process.33 Barbrook and Cameron note 
                                                 
33 Ben Kuchera reports George Hotz’s words in the article ‘Donations pour in for PS3 hacker’: 
‘Once it's paid for and mine, I have the right to unlock it, smash it, jailbreak it, look at it and hack 
on it’ (Wired.com, 22 February 2011). George Hotz also sang a rap song related to his personal 
story and released it on YouTube. Through the lyrics, reported in the same article, Hotz claims to 
be ‘a personification of freedom for all’ (http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/hotz-
donations/ [Last accessed 21/10/2014]). 
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that this approach to technology started in the 60s in California and was inspired 
by (although through several processes of simplification) Marshall McLuhan's 
ideas on media. According to Barbrook and Cameron, such a view oversimplifies 
the social and economic complexities of technology, as it puts the individual at 
the centre of technological development overshadowing more complex relations 
of power and the ideological backgrounds to the notion of innovation. Moreover, 
technological development becomes, in the Californian ideology, an engine for 
social development, as society and culture are seen in direct relation with 
technological changes. Barbrook and Cameron use the importance of public 
intervention as an example of the complexities that this ideology overshadows. 
State-funded initiatives can be crucial for the development of private industries, 
which often rely on publicly funded infrastructure. The Internet itself is seen in 
their work as an invention that strongly relied on existing public infrastructures 
for its initial development. Barbrook and Cameron see in Thomas Jefferson the 
precursor to this sort of Californian ideology. A slave owner and latifundist 
himself, Jefferson’s claims regarding freedom appeared to ignore the extent to 
which this notion of freedom often comes at the cost of restricting the 
possibilities of others. 
Similarly, in the PS3 hack case the freedom to manipulate the 
PlayStation3, according to the statements produced by the hackers and their 
supporters, comes at the cost of limiting Sony’s freedom to change its own 
product. The ideology espoused by the hackers conceives of freedom as a right of 
the individual and describes its own proposal as purely positive, while it also 
implies that the original publisher should not control or own developments 
resulting from their initial product. Also, freedom to manipulate does not 
necessarily involve the extension of the know-how to include further potential 
hackers. It is rather oriented to individual freedom to tinker and manipulate. 
 When describing the conflict in terms of a battle for freedom, we can 
already see several different discourses intersecting with each other, many of 
which come from fields that are not, strictly speaking, related to video game 
culture. When the dispute revolves around the possibility of manipulating the 
hardware of PlayStation3, the definition of freedom tends to be a classical liberal 
one, as in free speech or freedom of thought. It involves a concept of sharing 
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software modifications with the community of users. However, Sony’s 
manipulation of software is evaluated as oppressive because it limits further 
interventions. Andersson points out that this seems to be a common 
understanding of the term in the debates in favour of digital piracy: 
 
Along with its countercultural connotations and romantic aura of dissent, 
‘piracy’ here invokes positive liberty: freedom to rather than the negative 
freedom from. It is a means to assert one’s autonomy, a way of becoming 
proactive (strategic) rather than reactive (tactical). Piracy here defines the 
ability to make one’s own destiny, to open the black box of technology and 
utilize it for one’s own ends – while doing this in the open, even forming part of 
the ‘mainstream’. (Andersson 2009: 10) 
 
The proactive strategies enumerated by Andersson seem to be absent in the PS3 
hack case. As Laura Murray (2009) writes while reviewing the movie Rip! A 
Remix Manifesto, claims for a wider freedom are often continuous with ‘the base 
concept of market capitalism, with all its contradictions, rather than a challenge 
to it’ (5). Freedom in this context means freedom to tinker, and as such it also 
appears as a strongly gendered claim that involves a very limited category of 
consumers. We can see this in the PS3 hack case, where there does not appear to 
be a particular attempt to actively include in the protest, and its positive aims, an 
audience broader than the original participants. In fact, the “we” defined by the 
hackers’ statements appears to be a very conservative group whose aim is to join 
Sony in a position of power rather than open up freedoms to a broader 
demographic. 
George Hotz, also known as GeoHot, a hacker who became famous for 
previous hackings of Apple’s iPhone, decided to provide a solution to circumvent 
the limits imposed by firmware 3.21. The hacker group known as fail0verflow 
had already attempted to break into Sony’s highly secure system. When Hotz 
succeeded, he released the anti-firmware on his website. In response to this 
action, Sony sued Hotz, who suddenly received support from many gamers, 
mostly thanks to the work of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The foundation 
defended their decision to support Hotz and garnered media attention with the 
following statement: 
 
Sony is sending [a] dangerous message: that it has rights in the computer it 
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sells you even after you buy it, and therefore can decide whether your tinkering 
with that computer is legal or not. We disagree. Once you buy a computer, it’s 
yours. It shouldn’t be a crime for you to access your own computer, regardless 
of whether Sony or any other company likes what you’re doing (Kushner 2011: 
online) 
 
As Hotz declared during an interview on the online video programme Attack of 
the Show!, there is much more at stake in the legal controversy than the destiny 
of a single man against a corporation, as ‘the case is about whether you own that 
device that you purchased’.34  
 Similar statements emerged a few months earlier in different media 
contexts. The music, movie and book publishing industries have faced similar 
debates concerning the ownership of digital content. The possibility to copy and 
share digital files undermines the business of most publishers, thus media 
industries have reacted by implementing forms of control over the digital content 
they distribute online. Digital rights management (DRM) is one of the most 
widely adopted anti-piracy technologies for containing the user’s control of 
digital files. Amazon’s Kindle, for example, was subject to criticism from 
consumers and technology reviewers when Amazon deleted a limited number of 
digital books from Kindle devices without notice, although the consumers were 
reimbursed. This was seen by many consumers as a breach of their privacy and 
illegitimate manipulation of an owned device, despite the fact that Amazon 
explicitly (although not with sufficient transparency) reserved the right to act in 
similar ways regarding digital copies sold through Kindle.35  
 Similarly to the PS3 hack case, the use of DRM in other industries raised 
debates about the effectiveness of this method in preventing digital piracy and 
about the limits to the privacy and rights of the consumers.36 The fact that the 
release of digital content through Kindle had explicit references to the limitations 
to the ownership of files did not prevent criticism from consumer organisations 
                                                 
34 The interview ‘Hacking and Jailbreaking with George Hotz’ is available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tG9r7cCpk_g&feature=player_embedded [Last accessed 
21/10/2014] 
35 Claburn, T. (17 July 2009), ‘Amazon says it will stop deleting Kindle Books’, Information Week, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/personal-tech/digital-content/218501227 [Last 
accessed 21/10/2014] 
36 Both perspective are addressed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s collection of cases, 
white papers and press releases, available online at https://www.eff.org/issues/drm [Last 
accessed 21/10/2014] 
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such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who were also very active in 
defending the hackers of PlayStation3. The Kindle case appears very similar to 
the PS3 hack case as it concerns the ownership of both software and hardware. 
The controversial release of firmware 3.21 by Sony and its effects on the use of 
the PlayStation3 console have been discussed in similar terms to the removal of 
specific book files from the Kindle devices sold to the public. Interestingly, both 
cases were discussed, in online forums and news media, in terms of freedom. 
Questions concerned the meaning of buying a technology and to what extent this 
makes the consumer free to have complete access and control over it. Jack 
Schofield, writing in The Guardian, describes the Kindle thus: 
 
Although we are used to PCs that offer a wide range of choices at every level, 
the Kindle is a typical vertically-integrated consumer platform. In these, a 
single company owns or controls everything (or as much of it as it can) from 
top to bottom: hardware and software design, content distribution, retailing 
and sometimes pricing. Apple’s iPad and Nintendo’s Wii are also examples. 
Vertically-integrated businesses can develop more integrated products with 
greater ease of use, while freeing consumers from all the burdens of choice. 
Basically, you give up your freedom in exchange for a simpler and perhaps more 
satisfying life. (Schofield 2011) 
 
What are the implications of ‘giving up your freedom’, and what does it mean to 
claim it back or demand a more radical scenario of complete choice? The notion 
of a vertically integrated business not only has consequences in the number of 
options and the respective ease of use that a technology can offer. It also 
reinforces a hierarchical separation between those at the top of such a vertical 
process and those at the bottom. As I will argue, the story of the hacking of 
PlayStation3 did not do much to rethink this metaphor of a top-down concession 
(or privation) of freedom.  
 In fact, a few weeks after the Sony vs Hotz case became public, a class 
action against Sony followed, issued by a group of PlayStation3 consumers. The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California in San 
Francisco followed both the cases. In February 2011, the result of the class action 
declared Sony guilty of having violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
Sony’s fault was to have advertised OtherOS and then stopped supporting the 
service. The Sony vs Hotz trial, however, was ended by an agreement between the 
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two parties. Sony accused Hotz of helping the piracy industry, while Hotz claimed 
that his hack was intended to let consumers run their homebrew software and 
emulators, thus bringing back a greater level of openness into the PlayStation3 
system. As part of the settlement of the lawsuit, Hotz agreed not to commit any 
further hacking offences against Sony. In his official statement he declared, ‘it was 
never my intention to cause any users trouble or to make piracy easier. I'm happy 
to have the litigation behind me.’37 
 In the meantime, the lawsuits received intensive media coverage. The 
group known as Anonymous decided to take revenge on Sony, which was accused 
of not respecting its consumers and their freedom to use technologies to their 
full potential. Anonymous started what is known as Operation Sony, also called 
OpSony. On 19 April 2011, a few days after Sony and Hotz settled their lawsuits, 
Sony’s servers in San Diego, California, which backed the online service 
PlayStation Network, reported an anomalous overload. The hacking into the 
servers forced Sony to suspend PlayStation Network. Officially, Anonymous 
denied responsibility for this hack. However, the hacking of PlayStation Network 
took place at around the same time as Anonymous announced OpSony. The link 
between the group and the hack seemed evident to most of the news media that 
covered this story in the following days. Therefore, in the reconstructions that 
were publicly released, OpSony and the hacking of PlayStation Network, 
including the hacking by George Hotz and the following legal debates, all come to 
constitute a unique story.38 The hacking of online databases and services of other 
video game publishers in the following days (Codemasters on 10 June, SEGA on 
19 June and Bioware on 24 June) seems to confirm that the events surrounding 
Sony’s PlayStation Network were not necessarily related to the release of 
                                                 
37 The statement is reported by Gilbert, B. (11 April 2011), ‘Sony and PlayStation3 jailbreaker 
George Hotz settle out of court’, Joystiq.com, http://www.joystiq.com/2011/04/11/sony-and-
playstation-3-jailbreaker-george-hotz-settle-out-of-cou/ [Last accessed 21/10/2014] 
38 In an article published by Keith Stuart in The Guardian (29 April 2011), the events (George 
Hotz’s hacking, Anonymous’s OpSony and the hacking of PlayStation Network) are distinguished 
from one other, however, they are analysed as possibly connected to each other. In the words of 
Peter Wood of First Base Technologies, the encryption of Sony’s firmware is seen as a possible 
starting point for the more damaging hacking of PlayStation Network. In this version, the events 
appear separated but also the cause of one other. However, I note, this does not explain the 
hacking in the following days of different video game publishers’ databases, which were not 
attacked prior to Spring 2011. The article is available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/gamesblog/2011/apr/29/psn-hack-industry-
reactions?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 [Last accessed 21/10/2014] 
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firmware 3.21 and the deterioration in their relationship with their consumers. 
More likely, the hacking of PlayStation Network was oriented to steal sensitive 
data from the users’ online transactions. Fairly significantly, the hacking into 
other publishers’ databases received minor media coverage compared to the 
larger PlayStation3 case. The PS3 hack case became part of a complex narrative 
that started with the release of firmware 3.21 in April 2010 and ended with the 
break-in to PlayStation Network and the data of 77 million users being stolen. As 
I will go on to argue in this chapter, understanding the order of these events 
constitutes a key process in the establishment of the narrative of the PS3 hack 
case. Such a narrative, in its turn, frames the roles and definitions of the subjects 
involved in it, including what is or could be expected from them. 
 
 
Sony’s network: ‘it said one year’ 
 
Following the events of the PS3 hack case, Sony had to publicly excuse itself for 
having overlooked the safety of users’ data. As soon as it was rumoured that data 
relating to the credit cards of millions of users could have been stolen, Sony’s 
data protection system came under critical scrutiny. At the beginning of May 
2011, Sony received further criticism from the mainstream media for having 
refused to testify before the US Congress, which was reasonably concerned with 
the loss of millions of American citizens’ sensitive data. On 1 May 2011, Sony’s 
executive vice president Kazuo Hirai and company executives Shiro Kambe and 
Shinji Hasejima delivered apologies in a press conference. The image of the three 
bowing to the public appeared in several online and printed newspapers. Video 
game critics rapidly announced the decline of the Sony brand and the PlayStation 
– a steady collapse from the peak of the first video game console, PlayStation, 
released in 1994, to the partial failures of PlayStation Portable (2004) and 
PlayStation3 (2006). The critics were mostly concerned with what soon came to 
be defined as Sony’s misunderstanding of the evolution of the video game 
audience in the last decade. As Colin Campbell summarised on Gamasutra.com: 
‘Sony’s values have always been attractive and alluring. Right now, Sony is hiding. 
That’s not attractive. It does not allure. It frustrates and it annoys’ (Campbell 
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2011). The same position is maintained by a comic video, entitled ‘PS3 song’ and 
published on YouTube in February 2007, which ridicules Sony and its poor 
choices regarding the PlayStation3. As the events surrounding the PS3 hack took 
place, it reached over six millions viewers, becoming a reference for many of the 
debates against Sony.39 
 The PS3 hack case can be understood in more depth if looked at in 
relation to the longer history of Sony’s customer relations. Most of Sony’s history 
can be read in direct contrast to recent events, as a history of increasing 
openness and involvement of the consumers in their products, rather than the 
restriction of their activities. Interestingly, the first company to consider open 
software as an opportunity was exactly Sony Computer Entertainment with the 
Net Yaroze console. When Sony released Net Yaroze on 31 December 1997, no 
one would have predicted that the same publisher would in the future be the 
victim of a large-scale hacking operation because of its compromised 
relationship with its consumers. Net Yaroze was the first fully supported 
development kit for amateur video game producers. Its name is a Japanese 
expression meaning “let’s work together”. In an interview published on the 
online magazine Joystiq.com, Sony Computer Entertainment’s chief Phil Harrison 
stated: ‘I fully support the notion of game development at home using powerful 
tools available to anyone. We were one of the first companies to recognize this in 
1996 [sic] with Net Yaroze on PS1’.40 Soon after, Phil Harrison himself spoke in 
support of a new publishing concept, tentatively called Gaming 3.0. Already 
introduced in this dissertation, Gaming 3.0 aims to involve the player in the 
production of content for existing games or of completely new games. As 
reported by Bloomberg Businessweek in an interview with Phil Harrison: ‘Game 
3.0 takes connected consoles to a new level by leveraging online collaboration 
and user-generated content. Suddenly the content is dynamic and, as Sony says, 
Game 3.0 “puts the spotlight back on the consumer”.’41 
                                                 
39 The video is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R98qC0fd_1w [Last accessed 
21/10/2014] 
40 Doerr, N. (23 April 2007) ‘Phil Harrison answers your questions again…’, Joystiq.com, 
http://www.joystiq.com/2007/04/23/phil-harrison-answers-your-questions-again/ [Last 
accessed 21/10/2014] 
41 Radd, D. (9 March 2007) ‘Gaming 3.0’, Bloomberg Businessweek, 
http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/mar2007/id20070309_764852.htm [Last 
accessed 21/10/2014] 
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However, in 2009 the database where Net Yaroze’s games were preserved, 
as well as the online forums of Net Yaroze’s fans, were officially shut down by 
Sony.42 The anti-piracy policy that led to the release of Firmware 3.21 in April 
2010 has been understood as consistent with a new understanding, from the side 
of Sony, of the role played by consumers in the production of content through 
their technologies. These events were connected in accounts published by video 
game magazines of what they considered to be a new policy by Sony, now much 
more conservative, authoritarian and interested in asserting and preserving its 
position as opposed to allowing consumers to reinvent their products. From the 
affective engagement offered through Net Yaroze, Sony began to propose 
different forms of involvement for the consumers and defined these as part of a 
new business model. 
 There is one particular case where Sony’s attitude towards its 
technologies emerges clearly. In defending, in the context of the legal trials, the 
release of firmware 3.21 and the consequent abandonment of the OtherOS 
feature, Sony claimed that PlayStation3 is sold with a warranty of one year and 
any modification after that period should be perfectly acceptable. All the features 
and even the availability of game software are not, strictly speaking, guaranteed 
more than one year from purchase. Sony in fact reserves the right to update the 
software installed in the console through the online connectivity provided with 
each unit. Failure to update the console might exclude the user from Sony’s 
services. Luanne Sacks, attorney for Sony’s defence, reported to the court that 
‘the only thing that Sony told anyone about the duration of any feature of the PS3 
is what it said in the one year express limited hardware warranty. It said one 
year’.43 As part of Sony’s defence, another important fact emerges. The written 
express warranty, the ‘System Software Licence Agreement’ and the ‘PlayStation 
Network Terms of Service’ provide the purchasers with a licence, not ownership. 
On top of this, the ‘Terms of Service’ agreement gives Sony the right to disable or 
alter software features, and also to terminate or limit access to the PlayStation 
                                                 
42 Video game online magazine Joystiq.com reported the news with a feeling of melancholia, see 
Fletcher JC (29 June 2009) ‘Sony’s Net Yaroze homebrew PS1development community shutting 
down’, Joystiq.com, http://www.joystiq.com/2009/06/29/sonys-net-yaroze-homebrew-ps1-
development-community-shutting-do/ [Last accessed 21/10/2014]  
43 An extended analysis of the case is reported on Groklaw.net (21 February 2011) 
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20110218181557455 [Last accessed 24/10/2014] 
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Network, and this includes issuing firmware updates. In the transcript of the 
‘Sony PS3 OtherOS litigation’, as it was debated in the district court of San 
Francisco, California, on 4 November 2010, we can also read how Luanne Sacks 
attempted to propose that Sony should have no responsibilities one year after 
selling a product and is free to alter as many parts of that product as it wishes: ‘if 
[Sony Computer Entertainment America] cannot have liability under California 
law for the PS3 completely failing to perform after one year, how can it have 
liability for the fact that it does 99 percent of what it was advertised to do, and 
just not one [i.e. the OtherOS feature]? That is completely irrational and cannot 
be’.44 
 These statements contribute significantly not only to Sony’s defence in its 
legal disputes but also in defining Sony as a subject. Sony here presents itself as 
the author of the agreements, the entity that is in charge of writing what it is 
acceptable to do with PlayStation3. From this position of power, Sony is defining 
PlayStation3 not only with regard to its legal implications but also in its material 
boundaries. The legitimate uses of PlayStation3 are dependent on what 
PlayStation3 is. In the words of Sony’s attorney, it is a product whose hardware 
and software are conceded to the user, and this concession is regulated by a 
temporary licence. The possible uses of both hardware and software are defined 
even in time. In fact, the product is only guaranteed to offer what is advertised for 
one year after its purchase. After that period Sony reserves the right to modify 
PlayStation3. This act of redefinition is a reframing of which nodes, both material 
and cultural, human (consumers and producers) and non-human (software and 
hardware), might be included or excluded in PlayStation as a network. 
 
 
Hybrid mediators: becoming part of the network 
 
Sony’s defence can be summarised as such: Sony reserves all rights over 
PlayStation3 and by “PlayStation3” Sony means the hardware as well as its 
software and online services, and also their legitimate practices of consumption. 
                                                 
44 The transcript is available online at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf2/SonyPS3OtherOS-109.pdf 
[Last accessed 21/10/2014] 
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In so doing Sony reframes PlayStation as a network, claiming that its definition 
must include its software and hardware, their features and their possible uses, 
and thus the implication is that Sony can then exercise its power over all these 
varied elements. By stating this, Sony proposes a definition of what PlayStation3 
is and, more importantly, claims the right to introduce in the future any further 
definition. Sony’s legal defence not only seeks to preserve the rights of the 
producer in its product but also raises ontological assumptions about the 
definition of the technology itself. 
The controversy forced the opposing notions of networks as presented by 
Sony and the hackers to confront each other. However, both were definitions of 
what PlayStation3 (and generally any video game console) is or should be. 
Through these statements, in the legal dispute in front of the court, Sony became 
the producer. Hierarchically superior, authoritative and therefore distinct from its 
consumers, Sony is not authorised to define PlayStation3 because of its position; 
quite the opposite, it assumes this role through the process of defining 
PlayStation3. The statements pronounced in the court performatively defined 
Sony and assigned to the corporation the role of the producer of PlayStation3. 
What I am proposing is therefore to reverse the order of causation as it is usually 
presented in the narratives surrounding the PS3 hack case. The definition of 
what Sony, the hackers and even PlayStation3 are is not the basis of the debate. It 
is rather its final outcome.  
Is it possible to change that outcome, by reopening the debate on what 
these characters can be? I will attempt to answer this question by reinterpreting 
the notion of network, and understanding how it could be useful in delineating a 
further mediation of the hacking of PlayStation3. 
 Edge magazine (2011) reported a statement by Sony’s executive Shinji 
Hasejima regarding the hacking of PlayStation Network: ‘The network 
vulnerability was a known vulnerability. But Sony was not aware of it … was not 
convinced of it’ (19). Such a statement fits quite perfectly all the meanings of 
network that are presented in this chapter. The Sony executive chooses the word 
to refer to a database of users’ data, and possibly also evokes the name of Sony’s 
online service, PlayStation Network. By stating that what is at stake in these 
events is actually the hacking of PlayStation as a network, I am indeed suggesting 
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a reversal of the meaning of the word. I intend to use it instead as it has been 
adopted by actor-network theory (ANT), and in particular Bruno Latour (1999, 
2005). Considering the involvement of very different elements (social, 
technological, legal and economic) in the enactment of the definitions of 
PlayStation3, I believe Latour's ANT can provide an understanding of the 
implications of this case. 
 The dissimilarities between the different uses of the word “network” 
suggest significant considerations. Sony’s network, the database of information 
about the users, is a fixed one. It works by accumulation (the number of 
registered users is supposed to increase in time) but is mostly a record of 
information, an archive. Network can also be understood as a point of access to 
online services (PlayStation Network) but in any case it does not entail 
transformations of any sort along its nodes. Latour reminded us, instead, to be 
aware of this new use of the word, as it might evoke ‘the Internet’, and be 
associated with the idea of information exchange and ‘transport without 
deformation’ (1999: 14). The concept of network he proposed instead, and the 
one I am considering when debating PlayStation as a network, is composed of 
plural relations – associations that ceaselessly transform themselves. These 
continuous transformations have some forms of rigidity, which is reached 
through discursive performativity. As argued by Law (1999), entities acquire 
their attributes as a result of relations with other entities. ANT has to do with the 
displacement, dissolution and fractionality of those relations. Moreover, ANT 
includes all materials, not only the linguistic side of social phenomena. Networks, 
Law explains, are composed of linguistic and non-linguistic, human and non-
human materials (3-4).  
As Latour (2005) points out when describing ANT, we can understand the 
study of society both as a study of a state of affairs and as a study of associations. 
Latour is in favour of the latter, and notices how this type of sociology works 
particularly well when the participants in the social phenomenon are not 
‘assembled’ yet and are still in a very open process of defining themselves (2005: 
12). This sociology of associations is based on the understanding of the 
connections as they occur, as they frame themselves, and it is in this sense that I 
read the events of the PS3 hack case – not as a social event, structured and ready 
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to be deciphered, but more as an intricate network whose threads can be 
untangled in innumerable ways and yet reassemble themselves in a new shape 
every time they are unfolded.  
Crucial in this process of change is the role played by what Latour calls 
mediators: ‘mediators […] cannot be counted as just one; they might count for 
one, for nothing, for several, or for infinity. Their input is never a good predictor 
of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time. 
Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements 
they are supposed to carry’ (2005: 39). ANT is about understanding mediators, 
identifying them and evaluating the changes they introduce. Examples of 
mediators are, according to Latour, two interlocutors in a conversation, or even a 
computer that breaks down and generates unpredictable outputs, becoming an 
agent to understand and decipher. 
In the ‘sociology of associations’ that Latour proposes, mediators can be 
looked at for the modifications they introduce in a network. As Mike Michael has 
argued (2000), ANT has been concerned since its inception with social 
phenomena in their complex constitution of relations and entities. ANT, however, 
left us with the question of where the list of entities and relations ends in the 
constitution of such networks. The list is potentially infinite, and there is some 
degree of arbitrariness involved in their constitution that allows networks to be 
understandable as partially closed entities (41). What comes to be included and 
excluded in those networks is the point Michael intends to discuss and present in 
a different light. He argues: ‘a particular human or a human collectivity, a specific 
technology or a technological system, is the upshot of ongoing configurations of 
heterogeneous associations’ (22). The process of the establishment of a network 
transforms heterogeneous assemblages of human and non-human entities into 
collective subjects. To take account of heterogeneity of a collective subject, as it 
loses its diverseness, Michael proposes to look at the hybridity of networks and 
nodes, their co-constitution and the temporary new assemblages that these 
might constitute. 
In fact, the author seeks to invent hybrids, ‘that is to say […] characters 
made up of a few humans and non-humans (including mundane technologies and 
aspects of “nature”) by which to narrate the processes of ordering and 
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disordering’ (42). Michael then seeks to consider himself as a hybrid, mutually 
influenced by his own writing, and emerging as a linking entity of ‘familiar and 
novel co(a)gents’ (17). It is from these co(a)gents that the writer of the book 
emerges. Mediators can be seen as being essentially and necessarily hybrid, and 
the author of a text, as a source of transformation, can also be looked at as a 
hybrid mediator. 
As argued by Lucy Suchman, ANT is seen by its authors (particularly in 
the words of Michel Callon) as a configuration of ontologies in which agents take 
the shape of the relations in which they are involved (Suchman 2007: 260-261). 
One of the problems with this formulation of ANT lies in the symmetrical division 
between the human and the nonhuman, and the reliance on agency as the crucial 
notion for making sense of relations between the two sides. Agency is seen as the 
outcome of the relations between humans and nonhumans. However I argue, 
drawing on the work of Suchman, that ANT can only continue to replicate a 
purely descriptive look on networks, nodes and relations, as long as the focus is 
on the agency of those same networks, nodes, relations and descriptions that 
ANT brings about. The author of the analyses of actor-network relations stays 
invisible and detached as long as the focus is on the notion of agency. In this view, 
the author of the network stays safely in a purely discursive realm, seen as 
separated from the material network of human and nonhuman agents. The 
author is put again in the ‘Middle Kingdom’ (Latour 1993: 77-78) of human-
nonhuman relations when the focus is instead on how discursive 
reconfigurations make differences matter, thus when discourse and materiality 
are no longer considered as separate. 
In this chapter I look at the hackers of PlayStation3 not simply through 
their agency, but for ways in which they have multiplied the possible 
configurations of the network, becoming themselves part of it. The hybridization 
of the hackers is in this case, I believe, particularly evident: hackers have not only 
said what PlayStation3 is (or should be), but in doing so have involved 
themselves in that same definition, in often contradictory ways, by imagining 
their own position (as gamers, tinkers, thieves and so on) within the network. My 
own entanglement within this network of narratives of human-nonhuman 
relations brings about several further narratives and possibilities of how the 
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hackers of PlayStation3 could have imagined themselves. Thus, the concept of 
network is here used less for the purpose of studying ontologies and more as a 
strategy for saying something about what made the difference in the stories 
surrounding the hacking of PlayStation3. 
 What about the numerous characters composing the narratives of the 
hacking of PlayStation3? What sort of mediators are they, and how do they take 
account of their hybrid condition as describers and modifiers of a network that 
involves them from the very beginning? 
The hacker, a figure considered central to the events surrounding the 
breach of the PlayStation3 database, could be seen as a hybrid character. The 
hacker, in the narratives of conflict surrounding the PS3 hack, has been 
responsible for creating new links, enabling new channels, and allowing entities 
to become relevant and central. George Hotz, for instance, has not only managed 
to invent a way to bypass Sony’s firmware but has also distributed his counter-
firmware through his website to a countless number of other PlayStation3 users. 
By doing so, he has highlighted the presence of other channels of communication, 
from gamer to gamer, and marginalised Sony and its direct control of 
PlayStation3 consoles. George Hotz, however, as I have debated, justified and 
narrated this act of bravado with a strongly masculine and aggressive approach, 
challenging Sony as the enemy. In doing so he has restated that the conflict 
involves a duality of forces, Sony and the hackers/gamers, one against the other. 
His act of hacking, instead, opened the possibility of looking elsewhere than this 
duality. 
The hackers I have been looking at so far seem to have lost the 
opportunity of becoming interesting ‘parasites’ (Serres 1982): noises in a system 
capable of generating new, parallel and alternative channels of communication. 
We can look at the hacker as a mediator, in the Latour sense, of the networks 
underpinning the PS3 hack case, but also explore their hybridity as mediators 
involved in the network itself, trying to respond to Sony’s decisions by inventing 
new positions and definitions for themselves. What sort of subjects are these 
hackers then, and what other forms of hybrid mediation could they have been 
responsible for? 
 
 137 
 
Hacking networks: the hacker as subject 
 
We can interpret the concept of subject in at least two ways. On the one hand we 
can use this word for designating human beings, thus recalling a sociological 
understanding of a phenomenon. On the other hand we can intend it as subject of 
discourse. In the latter definition a subject does not necessarily equate to one 
specific human being, nor even to a multitude of humans, but it can also be a 
concept or an abstract entity. Also, as Foucault pointed out:  
 
The subject of the statement should not be regarded as identical with the 
author of the formulation – either in substance, or in function. He is not in fact 
the cause, origin, or starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken 
articulation of a sentence; nor is it that meaningful intention which, silently 
anticipating words, orders them like the visible body of this intuition (…) It is a 
particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals (…) If a 
proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called ‘statement’, it is not 
because, one day, someone happened to speak them or put them into some 
concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the subject can be 
assigned. To describe a formulation qua statement does not consist in analysing 
the relations between the author and what he says (or wanted to say, or said 
without wanting to); but in determining what position can and must be 
occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it. (Foucault 1972: 107) 
 
 
From this specific understanding of subject I would now like to analyse how 
‘propositions, sentences and groups of signs’ produced in the context of the PS3 
hack case contributed to assign the position of the subject usually called 
“hackers”. In this case, the label of hackers has, as I have already discussed, been 
used to group very different practices and approaches to video game 
technologies. George Hotz and his attempt to bring back a feature of 
PlayStation3, and the hackers who stole credit card information from PlayStation 
Network seem to belong to different, if not opposed, approaches to the uses of a 
technology; the former oriented to debate and challenge the allegedly linear and 
hierarchical process of regulating the distribution and consumption of 
technologies, the latter interested in possibly profitable forms of digital piracy. 
 George Hotz, the hackers of PlayStation Network and the group 
Anonymous are defined by the discourses that regulate and determine their 
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capacities and actions. As Butler (1990) noticed, statements produced in regard 
to feminism produce and restrain the category of women. In a similar fashion I 
believe that the term hacker has been defined and limited as the result of several 
discursive practices since its first appearances. The hackers, in the accounts of 
the hacking of PlayStation3, appear to be actors opposed to Sony. George Hotz in 
particular, the only one in this case who has appeared in public (in interviews, 
personal press releases and also defending himself in court), in presenting a 
narrative of the events that led him to counter Sony’s decision to remove 
firmware 3.21 often considers his condition as one that does not only involve 
himself but has strong implications for the category of gamers in general. The 
case is presented by Hotz as an “us against them” narrative. 
 In fact, it appears clearly that this collective class to be defended is vague 
and unspecific. The same can be said for the group of hackers. Looking at the 
interview with George Hotz on the online programme Attack of the Show!, he is 
introduced as an unpredictable but highly skilled genius of super-protected 
systems who ‘is making Sony mad’. As I have stated previously, George Hotz (and 
hackers generally) are constituted by discursive practices, as happens in the 
presentation of Hotz in this online show. Thus, the vagueness surrounding their 
actual identity is not necessarily an issue to be solved, or at least not in the 
present context, but to be analysed and understood as the result of the 
constitution of a discursive formation. There is a lack of specificity around the 
role of Hotz, and also of a clear reason for his activity to be considered similar to 
the hackings that took place in the following months, which appear to be of a 
very different nature. The hackers as subjects are the product of a series of 
statements that also prescribe a series of actions to be expected from them. 
Hackers have been classified as a common category in the discourses 
surrounding the breach of Sony’s console: a group of people with predictable 
motivations and goals, highly skilled in the use of digital technologies and willing 
to show off their talent. Understanding the constitution of this generic subject is, 
I believe, a key element in the understanding of the implications of the PS3 hack 
case in the definition of the video game consumers as opposed to the producers 
of digital products. 
 A similar lack of specificity, and an almost identical fascination, appears in 
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the accounts of the work of Anonymous. As Gabriela Coleman points out (2011, 
2014), this should not thwart an appreciation of the potential of similar practices 
for political activism. However, we should be aware of oversimplifying these 
phenomena. It is certainly true that Anonymous achieves most of its collective 
actions thanks to the work of a few committed individuals, whose work is usually 
attributed to a generic unnamed actor. However this does not exhaust the 
potential of a collective anonymous identity for the realisation of forms of 
political activism that would otherwise be hindered by the lack of community 
work and collaboration. In the case of the PS3 hack, however, the hackers 
involved are very far from the ethos of Anonymous, as they do not seem to aim 
for any form of collaboration and, more importantly, they do not act on the basis 
of a strictly political objective. Thus, celebrating the activity of these hackers has 
often led video game critics to overlook the actual potential that the hacking 
attitude could bring to the relation between producers and consumers in the 
video game industry. Classifying the actors of the PS3 hack case as hackers has 
oversimplified not only the story but also the issues at stake. These hackers do 
not appear to be concerned with sharing their skills and results, their actions are 
not oriented to a supposedly collective benefit. As a matter of fact, it appears that 
the claimed opposition to the original producer is not rooted in an effective 
proposition for a more liberal process of production and consumption of video 
games, which could possibly confuse the roles of producers and consumers in a 
more effective way. 
 Gary Hall has expressed his scepticism about many of the statements 
produced in favour of digital piracy, stating that ‘for all the romantic, counter-
cultural associations of its apparent challenge to the commodity culture and 
property relations of late capitalist society, there is nothing inherently 
emancipatory, oppositional, Leftist, or even politically or cultural progressive 
about digital piracy’ (2009: 25). I also maintain this criticism in regard to hacking 
in the context of the PS3 hack case. George Hotz does not appear to wish to 
emancipate the gamers, the collective subject for whom he claims to fight. The 
scenario he is delineating with his actions is even more conservative than Sony’s. 
In his attempt to bring back OtherOS and access to those services that were 
accessible before firmware 3.21 was released, he is not attempting to institute a 
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further system different from the preceding one, but is attempting to re-establish 
what already existed. Furthermore, the hackers of the credit card data from 
PlayStation Network did not even pretend to appear to be actively proposing a 
different scenario. For these reasons, I believe that the expression hackers is used 
in this context with a considerable change to its meanings in earlier accounts. 
 This change seems to be rooted in a very stratified discursive formation, 
in which anyone who can gain illegal access to protected information is a hacker. 
To acknowledge a change in the use and definition of the expression raises the 
issue of what sort of scenarios these new hackers are trying to institute for the 
collectivity they claim to defend. Mostly, they appear to accept, rather than fight 
or oppose, the linear and hierarchical model of production and consumption. The 
attempt by George Hotz is to slightly expand the definition of producers for the 
PlayStation3 console, to include not only Sony but also highly skilled 
programmers. However, it is not his concern to establish a system of co-
operation where the two categories of producers and consumers are actually 
questioned.  
 This is confirmed by the way the lawsuits have been handled. Sony has 
been left with the opportunity to define through a juridical discourse the 
boundaries of PlayStation3, both in the class action against the company and in 
the lawsuit that Sony started against Hotz. Doing so, it has defined itself as the 
only subject that is authorised to define and decide the limits of PlayStation3 as a 
network. This confirms, in my opinion, that all these attempts to perform forms 
of opposition against Sony were based on the acceptance that Sony has a 
privileged position, as the producer. It has never been questioned whether the 
decision to expand the role of producer was actually an issue Sony had to 
authorise. Thus, these practices of opposition had the effect of reinforcing in 
discursive, practical and even juridical ways the separation between the roles of 
producer and consumer. 
A different approach would have been to co-operate in the establishment 
of a new network of human and non-human elements, one where PlayStation3 
consoles could be used independently from Sony, bypassing its updates and 
services, and co-operating with/in the production and consumption of video 
game software through new forms of official and non-official, collaborative, help. 
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PlayStation3 hardware could become, as a result of its hacking, a console where 
“we” can co-operate over and emancipate “our” productions from Sony’s 
regulations. In this way, the hacking of PlayStation3 could have transformed the 
console into a revamped version of Sony’s Net Yaroze: a piece of hardware used 
for the purpose of working together. 
Hackers could have been the subject of a different discourse and 
reassembled the network-PS3 in a different way. PlayStation3 could have been 
thought of as a hospitable network, one in which gamers could co-operate. Sony, 
in this new configuration, did not have to be the enemy at all costs but, at the 
same time, re-evoking Michel Serres’ parlance (1982), a host and a guest: 
hospitable towards the initiatives of the gamers, and a guest, a welcomed user, of 
the technologies redefined by the consumers. Consumption and production could 
have been questioned in terms of what keeps them separate. But they have not, 
and the hacking of PlayStation3 ended by confirming the same separations that 
existed before. The hackers acted as ‘consumers who want to become producers’, 
but this opposition never evolved in a successive formulation, and the liminal 
condition they confined themselves by was quickly dismissed by the 
authoritative statements of the court and the news media, which put the 
initiatives of the hackers in a defined context. 
 The relation between producer and consumer could have been not exactly 
oppositional but oriented to a form of reciprocal assistance. A similar aim would 
have been closer to the meaning of the expression hacker as intended by many 
authors and practitioners. As McKenzie Wark suggests 
 
To hack is to express knowledge in any of its forms. Hacker knowledge implies, 
in its practice, a politics of free information, free learning, the gift of the results 
in a peer-to-peer network. Hacker knowledge also implies an ethics of 
knowledge open to desires of the productive classes and free from 
subordination to commodity production. Hacker knowledge is knowledge that 
expresses the virtuality of nature, by transforming it, fully aware of the bounty 
and danger. When knowledge is freed from scarcity, the free production of 
knowledge becomes the knowledge of free producers. This may sound like 
utopia, but the accounts of actually existing temporary zones of hacker liberty 
are legion. (2007: 70) 
 
Bruce Sterling (1992) provides a historical account of the concept of hacking, 
which is probably less utopian and more based on the pleasure of tinkering. 
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Sterling also provides an extensive account of the legal issues the hackers and the 
phreakers (phone lines hackers) had to settle, and the police appear in his text as 
the enemy, the force to evade. This shows how the figure of the hacker seems to 
have been based on a form of opposition since its first uses. However, both 
Sterling and Wark, in very different periods, acknowledge that hackers are 
expected not to subvert for the sake of it but to propose, through their practice, 
an alternative to the mainstream practices of production and consumption. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have offered a reading of the hacking of the PlayStation3 video 
game console. Many of the statements produced by the authors of the hacking 
and their supporters offer an opportunity to consider legal questions relating to 
the ownership of a video game console. However, I have also argued that the 
hackers’ actions and their justifications of those actions, as they appear in the 
public statements produced in support of their work, present an underlying 
political perspective, which is possibly what justified the emergence of the 
hacking on such a large scale. Asking for a more transparent agreement over the 
terms of use of a video game console, and possibly a wider degree of freedom for 
its users, does not necessarily lead to such a level of vehement opposition. I 
believe that there is a further discursive level that played a key role in influencing 
the actors’ actions and their justifications, in the cases of both Sony and the 
hackers. 
 Having considered the wide mainstream media coverage of this case, I 
argued that the opposition between producers and consumers concerned the 
material and cultural boundaries of the PlayStation3 console. It was not simply 
PlayStation3 as a video game product to be hacked but the boundaries of 
PlayStation3 as a cultural-material object. What has been at stake in these events 
was the hacking of PlayStation as a network. The definitions and boundaries 
determining PlayStation3 were precisely the object of this controversy. To 
determine what could be included or excluded in a definition of PlayStation3, and 
the hierarchy between these elements, was the reason and final aim for both the 
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contenders. 
 Hacking into PlayStation as a network entails the involvement of a series 
of cultural and material nodes. These include pieces of hardware as well as 
human actors, software and firmware and their distribution through 
private/public channels (the ownership of the servers and of the platforms 
where data was saved and from where it was distributed has also been part of 
the problem). The full story, outlined in this chapter, included many different 
characters, such as hacker George Hotz, the millions of PlayStation3 consoles and 
the distributed copies of its operating system, the collective group Anonymous, 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Linux operating system, Sony’s servers in 
California, and also the American Constitution. It could have included many 
others, such as the collective LuLzSec (a subsidiary group of Anonymous 
responsible for further hackings targeted at Sony executives) as well as a rap 
song on YouTube that popularised the personal story of George Hotz for the 
gaming community.45 The story of how all the aforementioned characters 
combined and interacted with each other could have been formulated in many 
different ways. To determine the role that each of the actors played in this story 
means to reformulate and reshape the object PlayStation3. In fact, to say that the 
hacking concerned PlayStation as a network means that the clash concerned 
different formulations of a narrative that put producers and consumers in 
relation and opposition to each other. At each different configuration, a different 
narrative of conflict could have been formulated. 
The relation between Sony and the video game players reached a point of 
rupture when the two sides formulated two different understandings of what 
constitutes the object PlayStation3. Different networks resulted from the 
production of statements from the two opposing sides. However, these verbal 
and written performances were rooted in rigid forms. Discursive formations, 
surrounding video game culture but also digital piracy and different definitions 
of freedom, influenced the statements produced by both sides. The two sides 
actually emerged as subjects through these performative acts, but in emerging 
they also adapted to pre-existing visions that kept them separate. I have argued 
                                                 
45 The rap song is ‘The light it up contest – geohot’ and is available on YouTube at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iUvuaChDEg [Last access 21/10/2014] 
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that by looking at the emergence of these subjectivities different forms of conflict 
can be proposed. Different narratives can be imagined that would redefine these 
opposing forces and their roles and duties. 
One such alternative narrative suggested in this chapter is based on a 
different connotation of the term hacker, one that is probably closer to the 
meaning proposed by earlier authors. In this definition, the hackers recombine 
elements of a system for a more transparent and open network. This particular 
ethos could have framed a different narrative where the concepts of producers 
and consumers are not seen in rigid contradistinction but possibly merge into 
the same subject. 
 An example of how an alternative to the conflictual relation between 
producer and consumer could be articulated is the Arduino model. Arduino is an 
open-source computing platform. Among the many microcontrollers released so 
far, Arduino offers open-source and expandable hardware and software. The 
software is published as an open-source tool, based on C++, while the hardware’s 
modules, published under a Creative Commons licence, can be expanded and 
modified with no legal restrictions. The concept behind Arduino draws from 
existing models of computer technologies to propose a different relationship 
between producer and consumer. The result of this simplicity and openness, 
combined with low costs of production, is a wide and always expanding database 
of free and open software that is offered and modified by the consumers. The 
possibilities of what can be done with Arduino are not decided in advance. 
Arduino is designed for those interested in tinkering and programming, and 
encourages a collaborative environment where beginners and experts co-exist 
and can all take the best from the work of the others thanks to openly released 
pieces of code and tutorials. Arduino does not pretend to subvert or revolutionise 
existing models, and in its apparent simplicity eliminates the grounds for any 
narrative of conflict. This comes at the cost of lower profits for Arduino’s 
manufacturer, although if the offered working environment for the consumers 
were not so free and open the company would probably not be so large in the 
first place. Arduino is not necessarily the best solution in all circumstances but it 
is intriguing as a model for the video game industry, where such a solution has 
never been fully experimented with.  
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Similar attempts in the game industry have never reached the popularity 
of consoles such as Sony’s PlayStation. The handheld console GP32, for instance, 
produced by Korean manufacturer GamePark in 2001, offers an open 
environment for the production of home-made video games. GP32 does not 
require the payment of licences for the publishing of video games, and this has 
contributed to its popularity, which, however, is still relatively marginal and is 
confined to the communities of homebrew game developers. These experiments 
have never been combined using a model of co-operation similar to the one 
established by Arduino, but the technological and economic means to achieve it 
are currently available. 
 The reading I have offered in this chapter focuses on a relatively recent 
case but also attempts to address recent concerns emergent in video game 
studies. Critiques of the modes of consumption of video game products have 
often been employed in support of forms of radical opposition against video 
game publishers. While Sotamaa (2009) and Ku cklich (2005) argue that 
producer-consumer relations must be assessed in terms of their political 
implications, authors such as Galloway (2006) encourage forms of 
countergaming to subvert traditional ways of using game software, potentially 
for artistic as well as activist purposes. Authors such as Dyer-Witheford and de 
Peuter (2009) propose a broader, global context in which the medium of the 
video game entangles with the dynamics of oppression and power of capitalism. 
The ‘Empire’ introduced by Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, a direct reference to 
Hardt and Negri’s text with the same name (2000), is the video game industry 
nowadays: a conglomerate of power and wealth connected to the military 
industries and based on low-cost manufacturing in China and Africa. It is 
described as a colossal corporate complex that configures ‘machinic 
subjectivities’ as part of the global biopolitical machine of the Empire. The 
reaction to such a conspiracy should be to become nomads and migrate at the 
borders of the Empire. Forms of counter-play against the Empire include and are 
not limited to a refusal to play video games in the expected way (‘never play the 
fascist in [the war video game] Combat Mission’, 2009: 193), the design of activist 
and educational games, engagement in independent productions and the 
emergence of critical content in mainstream games. 
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 The perspective I have offered in this chapter attempts to outline an 
alternative to that of Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter. A strictly oppositional 
approach would only have the effect of reinforcing, or indeed establishing, its 
own enemy. An opposition, by placing two terms into a definite binary structure, 
undermines neither in its discursive enactment. The alternative proposed by the 
authors, to become a nomad, implies moving across the borders of the Empire, 
thus tracing these borders and defining the alleged Empire in its shape, giving it 
an inside and an outside. These practices of conflict do not appear to outline an 
oppositional force but a very consistent discourse and, therefore, very consistent 
forms of subjectivity. It is not by evading, roaming or countering the Empire that 
this will come to an end. Different subjectivities can only emerge through 
different discourses that do not aim to counter existing structures but to offer 
possibilities for alternatives. Applying the example of Arduino to the video game 
industry is already a more radical response than the one proposed by Dyer-
Witheford and de Peuter. The two authors do provide a ‘coherent account of the 
political economy of the industry’ (as argued by book reviewer Bart Simon in 
2011: online) but fail to understand the full potential of discursive practices, such 
as the one they provide in their text, in effectively shaping the structures they 
enact. 
 The hacker, defined as a hybrid mediator, could establish different 
networks and escape the binaries underpinning oppositional discourses. 
Reconfiguring existing games in both software and hardware, opening the black 
boxes, could be methods for exploring channels of communication between a 
multitude of nodes rather than just between producers and consumers. The 
conflict, in other words, is not necessarily between these two characters but also 
lies in the discursive and material nodes that establish a separation between the 
two in the first place. Becoming hybrid mediators also requires acknowledging 
that we are inevitably implied in the technologies we discuss, and that we 
participate in their definition. Being involved to such an extent also entails, in my 
opinion, agreement to take care of all the others implied in the same network, 
thus avoiding libertarian, individualistic and oppressive perspectives. 
 In the next chapter I will analyse a different narrative where the 
consumers, although not strictly opposing the main publishers of the video game 
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industry, attempt to emancipate themselves and claim a form of independence in 
the practices of production of new video games. While different from the 
discourses generated in the case of the PlayStation hacking, the notion of 
independence is similarly disputed through varied and conflicting notions of 
freedom. The question of defining independence recurs frequently, as will be 
seen, and never receives an ultimate answer. The undecidability of the condition 
of independence will be used to articulate a different way of thinking about the 
position of the producers/consumers of video games outside a structural binary. 
The impossibility of defining independence will be seen as a source of 
opportunity for the emergence of questions of hospitality towards those who are 
differently independent. An ethical endeavour that can supplant the ontological 
questions of what independence is and what producers and consumers, gamers 
and games, are. 
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Chapter 4 
Narratives of independence: taking care of one’s own 
game 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the emergence of various forms of independent 
production of video games. In the last decade the concept of independence has 
become increasingly important in relation to the practices of production and 
distribution of video game software. In the context of video game culture, 
independence generally refers to the possibility of financing, developing and 
releasing a video game independently from a mainstream publisher. Allegedly, 
this form of production brings benefits to the developer. The developer can in 
fact work at his or her own pace while experimenting with new forms of design, 
controlling the production process from beginning to end and potentially 
receiving, on top of personal satisfaction, all revenues from sales or in-game 
advertising. 
 However, the liberating effects of independence are often disputed. 
Mainstream publishers have quickly managed to appropriate some of the 
channels of digital distribution of those games, offering game producers visibility 
on these spaces and, consequently, higher revenues. This has reintroduced, for 
many independents, relations of power and control that were already in place in 
the previous, non-independent condition of work. Moreover, independence 
appears to mean very different things to those who profess to be part of it. For 
many game developers who attempt to receive attention and visibility on 
distribution channels controlled by new or pre-existing publishers, 
independence appears as a different way of organising work, taking sole 
responsibility for a larger and more diverse number of issues (game concepts, 
programming, storyline, budgets and so on) that would instead be assigned to 
specialised personnel in a non-independent production. In this understanding, 
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independence appears as a new mode of work management. For others, 
independence mostly constitutes the opportunity to express oneself outside the 
logic of the market, releasing games for free and claiming a larger degree of 
freedom in the choice of content and style in a game. 
 While critics of this concept currently claim that independent might not 
mean anything in particular nowadays,46 precisely because of the large variety of 
very inconsistent practices and games labelled as such, I believe and propose in 
this chapter that the notion could still be of use in video game culture. As an 
academic and gamer, I believe the novelty of the concept is not to be dismissed 
too quickly as it might still generate valuable forms of gaming. I am not referring 
to specific modes of game design but rather to new questions within the culture 
of game development that could help destabilise pre-existing notions of 
production and consumption. 
To achieve such a re-evaluation of independent gaming I propose to look 
at what it is that is actually generated by the difficulty of defining the concept of 
independence. In this chapter, I argue that independence can be seen as a 
repressive and productive concept at the same time, which forces game 
developers to confront their own definition and position in relation to other 
forms of independence and non-independence. 
Through the work of Ernesto Laclau, and particularly his theory of 
discourse developed in collaboration with Chantal Mouffe, I will look at 
independence as a floating signifier: a term that receives different ascriptions of 
meaning and that stays open to a variety of often contradictory fixations (Laclau 
1993a: 287; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 28). The undecidability of 
independence, of what it ultimately means, happens to be temporarily fixed and 
resolved through the production of definitions. This continuous production, from 
the side of game developers, game journalists, gamer communities, organisers of 
independent festivals and mainstream publishers, operates a temporary closure 
of the meaning of independence. In the theory of Laclau and Mouffe, 
independence might be seen as working as a hegemonic act, a concept the 
authors borrow from Antonio Gramsci: it is evoked in discursive practices to 
                                                 
46 McShea T. (10 July 2014) ‘We named the dog indie’, Gamespot, 
http://www.gamespot.com/articles/its-impossible-to-define-indie-so-we-should-stop-u/1100-
6420984/ [Last accessed 23/10/2014] 
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define and delimit specific forms of game development and distribution as 
independent. However, hegemonic fixations overlap with a multitude of 
diversely-hegemonic actors, who constantly let the notion of independence slide 
towards a different definition, sometimes contradictory to the previous one. 
Different ideas about what the consequences of independence are, as will be seen 
throughout this chapter, define the concept, but only temporarily. 
 Independence may appear in video game culture as a blanket that is too 
short: pulling it in one direction may reveal a gap in the other, leaving some self-
professed independents in the cold. However, it is also as scarce as it is necessary. 
Independence is not only a label to put on oneself but is also productive of that 
very same notion of the self. Through Foucault (1980: 78-108)47 I intend to 
consider independence as a productive force, precisely because of its floating 
condition. For the game developer who has decided to make and release his or 
her own game, the notion becomes a driving force to differentiate him- or herself 
and understand what it is that makes that product personal and unique from the 
undifferentiated outside of independence. Independence serves here to 
constitute a form of individuality. Becoming an independent and individual game 
developer is a process of self-definition, which in its turn offers the ground for 
disciplinary measures of self-regulation. As Foucault puts it, ‘the individual is no 
doubt the fictitious atom of an “ideological” representation of society; but he is 
also a reality fabricated by this specific technology that I have called “discipline”’ 
(1977: 194). 
 Discipline operates on a variety of levels and supports the regulation of 
the self. It appears in the constant production of discourses about the definition 
of the individual, for instance, as it is solicited by the interviews, application 
forms and festivals that are addressed to independents. As I will discuss in this 
chapter, examples such as the Independent Games Festival, Indie Game Night and 
other institutionalised conventions for independent developers constantly 
demand that the applicants and participants provide self-definitions and explain 
how exactly they relate to the notion of independence. In these contexts, 
                                                 
47 The relation between power and knowledge is indeed central in the work of Michel Foucault, 
and will be addressed in the rest of this chapter through a variety of sources. In particular, the 
notion is well explained and summarised in the lecture he gave on 14 January 1976 at the College 
de France, collected in the text Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-
1977 (1980). 
 151 
developers have to describe themselves and their work, and clarify how and to 
what extent it is independent. Discipline of the self is also operated through 
specific institutions of education and training. Incubators and workshops teach 
developers how to become independent, through specific practices of work 
management, communication with potential players of their games or specialised 
journalists, and also by means of self-motivation. As Foucault argued, discipline 
works through observation, normalisation and examination. It coerces and 
produces, and it is perfectly consistent with the presence and reinforcement of 
processes of individualisation (Foucault 1977: 170-194).  
 I believe that such a short blanket, so essential and uncomfortable at the 
same time, is also needed more broadly in the discourses surrounding video 
game culture because it introduces questions over the individualisation of the 
game developer. The developer becomes, in the discourses on independent 
gaming, an individualised subject but does so in a conflictual and unresolvable 
manner. The conflictual aspect derives from the indeterminacy of the concept of 
independence, which forces one to look at the other developers while 
constituting and regulating one’s self. 
The production of individuals requires a form of alterity to confront 
oneself with. Defining oneself as independent assumes the presence of a form of 
dependence, or non-independence, to be differentiated from. However, in order 
to confront two different independences, a certain degree of similarity must be 
acknowledged, at least in the presence of a conflicted idea of what independence 
means and from where a comparison could be established. The impossibility of 
resolving any form of contamination between different forms of independence 
brings us to an ethical question of hospitality and care of the diverse, the 
independent-which-is-not-me. Ultimately, I propose that the question of how to 
share the short blanket of independence with other sleepers, those who are 
already there or might be there, who might join later or who are already gone, 
offers a valuable supplement to the drive towards individualisation (and, 
occasionally, narcissism) that claims of independence often involve. 
 
 
The problem of defining independence 
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Defining what independence means, in the context of video game culture, is 
probably the most pressing and recurring question that emerges in relation to 
this phenomenon both from academics and practitioners. As I will discuss in 
what follows, the need to answer this question performs a double function. On 
the one hand, it reduces the possibilities of what should count as independent, 
putting boundaries around this notion so as to include and exclude specific 
practices. On the other, it produces the notion of independence and the idea of 
the independent game developer, giving it a clearer set of characteristic duties 
and responsibilities. This is, for example, how independent gaming is described 
in the documentary Indie Game: The Movie (2012) by James Swirsky and Lisanne 
Pajot. In this documentary, well received by critics and awarded the prize for best 
World Cinema Documentary Editing at the 2012 edition of the Sundance Film 
Festival, the directors interview four of the most celebrated independent 
developers: Jonathan Blow, author of the game Braid (2008); Edmund McMillen 
and Tommy Refenes, authors of Super Meat Boy (2010); and Phil Fish, author of 
Fez (2012). The directors celebrate, through their interviews, the changes 
wrought by independent gaming and, in particular, the emotional attachment 
that independents have to their games. This attachment, according to the 
documentary, has begun to diminish in the most recent major productions, 
where much larger budgets and numbers of developers are now required. In 
mainstream productions, according to this narrative, it is necessary to cover the 
initial input by trying to appeal to an overly broad audience. Meanwhile, the 
production process is broken down into undistinguished, mechanical tasks. In 
the same documentary we also see that mainstream productions are allegedly 
too polished and lacking in personality. Independent games represent, in the 
narrative replicated by those interviewed by Swirsky and Pajot, a sort of new 
opportunity where game designers are now finally free to express themselves as 
authors of their own work. In the words of independent designer Jonathan Blow: 
 
[…] part of it is trying not to be professional. A lot of people come into indie 
games trying to be like a big company. What those game companies do is create 
highly polished things that serve as large as an audience as possible. The way 
that you do that is by filing off all the bumps on something. If there is a sharp 
corner you make sure it is not going to hurt anybody if they bump into it or 
 153 
whatever. That creation of this highly glossy commercial product is the opposite 
of making something personal. (Indie Game: The Movie 2012) 
 
However, there are also different and co-existing interpretations of the same 
concept in video game culture. Some game designers define themselves as radical 
independents functioning in an antagonistic relationship not only with the video 
game industry but also with the more famous indies popularised by game 
conventions, magazines and documentaries, such as Swirsky and Pajot’s. 
According to these other independents, designers such as those interviewed in 
Indie Game: The Movie represent a sort of polished version of independence as 
they tend to replicate the same system of production and publishing as that 
embraced by mainstream productions, only on a smaller scale. 
An example of this understanding of independence can be seen in the 
collective Molleindustria, who define their works as ‘radical games against the 
tyranny of entertainment’.48 Molleindustria conceive game design as a political 
practice for activism and social critique. Their games are not commercially 
released and are available for free on their website. Molleindustria’s games 
usually articulate a political standpoint. Examples of this are McDonald's 
Videogame (2006), a game about the unsustainable business of food 
corporations, Oiligarchy (2008), a critique of the exploitation of natural 
resources, Operation: Pedopriest (2007), about the Vatican sex scandal, and 
Unmanned (2012), a game about the life of a drone pilot in the American army 
[See Appendix: images 19-22]. Moreover, the founder and main spokesperson of 
the group, Paolo Pedercini, has publicly expressed his view on independent 
gaming on many occasions. In a recent talk at the game conference IndieCade, 
Pedercini argued that not all self-proclaimed independent designers can consider 
themselves to be properly autonomous. The re-appropriation of independent 
productions operated by some of the major video game publishers (an issue that 
I will soon introduce) undermines, according to Pedercini, the liberation of the 
video game developers. Pedercini further suggests that we need to reconsider 
how best to pursue independence, and how different forms of independence 
could (and in fact do) co-exist and be supported. As he put it himself at the 2012 
IndieCade conference: 
                                                 
48 Molleindustria (2014) www.molleindustria.org [Last accessed 8/11/2014] 
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There are a lot of people these days trying to come up with new definitions of 
independent development that take into account the various degrees of 
autonomy from platform owners and hardware manufacturers; the co-optation 
of styles, keywords and modes that used to be part of the ‘indie’ identity; and 
the mainstream acceptance and structural expansion of the most successful 
independent developers. (Pedercini 2012: online) 
 
He suggests in the same speech that we consider independence as a spectrum 
whose extremes are, at one end, a sort of unreachable utopian autarchy and, at its 
opposite, a completely de-humanised activity where the worker does what he or 
she is told, with no emotional involvement in the final outcome. Pedercini argues 
that the utopian idea of complete independence can never be fully achieved but 
can nonetheless frame the practice of those game designers who aim to reach it. 
 Interestingly, major publishers have attempted to appropriate 
independent productions in recent years, further complicating the debate on 
what should count as independence. In fact, the games presented in Indie Game: 
The Movie, as well as many of the most popular independent games and the 
movie itself, are on sale on the online markets of game publishers Valve and 
Microsoft, which are far from being grassroots companies or at the margins of 
the game industry. These two game publishers have promoted in recent years the 
indie channels of their online platforms for digital distribution (respectively, 
Steam and Xbox Live Arcade). Valve and Microsoft can  offer a wide distribution 
and market visibility to otherwise isolated independent developers, asking in 
exchange for a percentage of the sales generated on their platforms (usually 
estimated at about 30 per cent of the final price of the game). 
 The presence of these distributors has shaped a sort of other video game 
industry, which is parallel to the mainstream one. Individual, or small groups of, 
game developers design and promote video games in the hope of being offered 
the possibility of featuring on the indie channels of Valve or Microsoft, where 
they are sold next to the major productions of the game industry. Conceding part 
of the revenue is considered acceptable by these developers, who are often 
confronted with an increasing number of small-scale competitors and with the 
associated difficulties of competing against them in an open online market. 
Pedercini’s argument appears to be a reasonable description of some of the 
current developments of the independent sector: the emerging practice of 
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substituting the previous employers with new gatekeepers such as Valve and 
Microsoft can be seen to undermine some of the claims of independence. 
Furthermore, the new gatekeepers have a determining power with regard to 
which games will reach a sufficient audience and therefore be able to cover the 
initial investment and hence finance future projects. 
 However, the new conditions of precariousness do not seem to affect 
adversely the enthusiastic claims in favour of independent gaming. The 
documentary Indie Game: The Movie begins by showing the developer Tommy 
Refenes looking desperate in front of the homepage of Microsoft’s XBox Live 
Arcade because it is not displaying his most recent game, as had been agreed 
with the publisher. Despite this mistake by Microsoft being described by the 
designer as a matter of ‘life and death’ for his independent career, it does not 
hinder, in the rest of the documentary, the celebration of independent gaming as 
a form of liberation for video game developers.  
 A more recent example of the conflicting definition of independence has 
been presented by the game designer Jonathan Blow – acclaimed for his game 
Braid, released in 2008 and considered by the independent community to be the 
first independent game to reach mainstream visibility – and also features in Indie 
Game: The Movie. Blow appeared on the stage of Sony’s PlayStation2013 
conference announcing his new game, The Witness, as an exclusive for Sony’s new 
PlayStation4 console. What sort of independence are Blow and Sony referring to 
in this case? What is the difference between Blow’s presentation and those of the 
major producers who also presented their works in progress for the incoming 
new product from Sony Computer Entertainment? 
There is indeed something quite problematic about these claims of 
independence, particularly considering the undefined political connotations of 
this term. Terms such as freedom and emancipation appear in the discourses 
surrounding independent gaming. In the previous chapter, while discussing the 
case of the hacking of PlayStation3, I saw how these terms appeared in the 
statements by hackers or in articles in mainstream news media. In the case of the 
hacking of PlayStation3, the claims of freedom and emancipation were 
contextualised by a specific event in which a group of consumers wanted to claim 
ownership over the product they had bought. However, the process I am now 
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discussing is a much broader phenomenon, which involves thousands of game 
developers and journalists, as well as events and institutions, who all make use 
of, and in the process redefine, the concept of independence. Also, we are first 
and foremost concerned here with the production process of a video game rather 
than the consumption of a video game product. 
More importantly, these more or less apparent ambiguities are frequently 
debated by the practitioners of the independent scene. The question of what 
independence means is frequently asked and receives different answers. The 
polysemy of the term is quite evident to the actors who participate in the so-
called independent community. While for some game developers and critics 
independence means freedom to produce, for others it instead, or also, means 
freedom from the alleged restrictions imposed by the mainstream industry. The 
first kind of freedom resembles the freedom expressed by the California ideology 
(Barbrook and Cameron 1996), introduced in the previous chapter in relation to 
the ethics of the hackers of Sony’s PlayStation3. This kind of freedom often leads 
to forms of individualised work, where the emergence of the individual is both 
the foundation and the result of a neoliberal ideology. Freedom in this context 
stands for individual freedom, and the success of the process of the acquisition of 
such freedom is evaluated on the basis of the success of the individual endeavour. 
Thus, in this view, independence is achieved when one is “truly oneself”, and 
failure is seen as a consequence of a compromise where one’s work does not fully 
respect this true self. The second kind of freedom, which in the case of 
independent gaming does not necessarily conflict with the first but rather might 
also co-exist with it, more often develops in the attempt to construct an 
alternative to the existing relations of power inherent in the production process. 
In this latter sense, freedom mostly means emancipation and autonomy. Freedom 
from also comes to signify that the political or artistic significance of a video 
game is considered to be more important than its economic success or 
popularity. This is the case with Molleindustria and also with other game 
designers I will introduce later, such as Cactus or Anna Anthropy, who want their 
work to be looked at for its political or artistic potential rather than its 
commercial success. 
As I will discuss in what follows, the academic debate on independence 
 157 
with regard to video game culture is equally fragmented. Notably, the question of 
what independence could potentially entail, and therefore what its significance in 
the context of video game culture might be, frequently appears as the leading 
research question for scholars. I want to investigate how different meanings of 
independence co-exist and come to be constituted through discursive 
productions. From this perspective the diverse ideologies of independence will 
not be reduced to their common denominator but instead understood for their 
roles as regulatory frames in the production of different identities. 
The question of what independence amounts to in the context of video 
game culture has also been posed by academics in the last few years. Bart Simon, 
introducing the special issue of the academic journal Loading, addresses the 
problem of defining independent gaming and its practitioners in these terms: 
 
There is the question of who or what is indie? Where do they come from? How 
do they work? But this ‘they’ begs the question. It is a ‘they’ in-the-making who 
appear simultaneously as a legal-economic category (developer controlled IP), 
a social identity for a group or groups of game developers, a set of ideas or an 
ideology about developer freedom, creativity and autonomy (the idea of ‘being 
indie’) and a cultural style or set of styles. (Simon 2013: 3) 
 
Simon further suggests that the term independence is used by many developers 
to describe control over their video games as intellectual property (to be 
understood as game concepts, character and level design, narratives and so on). 
Such games are to be sold on proprietary or external channels, often in a 
serialised form. However, independence is a concept that underpins the 
formation of a community of developers, who often establish networks of 
collaboration, even if working on different intellectual properties, through online 
forms of collaboration, conferences, workshop and meetings. But then there is 
also a political connotation to this term, which does not disappear even in its 
most business-oriented forms, and which instead pervades the emergence of 
new forms of management in video game production. Last but not least, 
independence constitutes a genre of video games which are recognised for their 
tendency to experiment with new forms of game design. Simon proposes we 
could look at independent gaming via different methodologies and through 
posing a variety of questions. The phenomenon could be understood from a 
sociological perspective, by looking at its political implications, at its 
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consequences for the management of a game development company, and finally 
also as a culture or subculture. However, all these approaches proceed from the 
same fundamental question: what is independent gaming? 
 The question is particularly complicated when considering the forms of 
co-optation operated by the mainstream companies of indie as a label to 
advertise low-budget games (Lipkin 2013). Also, websites such as Indie City offer 
visibility to game developers who produce casual games on a low budget. As a 
business model it is similar to what Steam and Xbox Live Arcade already offer. 
However, on Indie City independent comes to signify easy-to-play games 
produced with a low budget, not necessarily showing any particular originality in 
their content and style, and oriented towards a mainstream audience. Ideally, a 
game published on Indie City will reach a large audience of casual gamers, who 
usually play games on their tablets and mobile phones [See Appendix: images 23 
and 24]. 
 The example of Indie City undermines attempts to define independence 
solely on the basis of the content of the games. Producing and releasing video 
games by negotiating agreements with a publisher in a different way to what 
usually happens in the mainstream industry does not necessarily result in new 
forms of game design. Can we then legitimately define these examples as a 
somehow corrupted version of independence, therefore assuming a set of moral 
values that should be associated with this different way of producing and 
releasing a video game? And what then would these values be? 
 Some scholars have been proposing a progressive view of the practices of 
video game production, arguing that independent gaming could be a practice for 
the inclusion of under-represented minorities. Emma Westecott (2013) suggests 
we consider independent game development as a means of involving diverse 
communities usually excluded by the average mainstream companies: 
 
The ongoing fragmentation of the game market holds potential for games that 
represent a diversity of voices, which could work towards more equitable game 
development practices. While the commercially oriented indie industry 
maintains a capitalist status quo, the more DIY expressive productions remain 
outside the commercial imperative and stand as fertile ground for the 
experimentation and learning necessary to engage a broad community of 
makers. (Westecott 2013: 89) 
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On a similar note, writer and game designer Anna Anthropy, a key voice in the 
independent scene, suggests that recent trends are transforming video game 
design into a widespread practice, where design and development tools are 
easily accessible and the development process is facilitated thanks to the 
assistance of the growing communities of independent producers. In her view 
this should eventually lead to more varied forms of digital gaming through which 
minorities and under-represented groups could express themselves. In Rise of the 
Videogame Zinesters (2012) she makes her case by listing which software and 
techniques can be used to produce independent video games and by presenting 
some of her own games as instances of feminist approaches to game design [See 
Appendix: images 25 and 26]. Anthropy and Westecott are explicitly sceptical 
about the abuses of the term independent by the video game industry. They 
advocate instead a more explicitly open access to game development as a way to 
introduce under-represented ideologies to the medium of the video game. From 
their perspective, freedom from the restrictions of the mainstream industry is 
the essential condition for a progressive politics of inclusion. Anthropy in 
particular thinks about the medium of the video game as a tool for self-
expression, and of self-expression as essential to individual freedom. Teaching 
and assisting players how to make a video game thus become, in her view, 
political practices oriented towards inclusion and participation.  
 However, it is difficult to define independence merely on the basis of the 
content of the games, or to decide which approach to game design should have a 
privileged status in the independent scene as an allegedly more complete form of 
liberation from the ideologies of the mainstream industry. The term is used to 
describe a variety of games, often because the content of a game is simply not the 
criterion for its definition as independent. As for the case of the games published 
on Indie City, there are many examples where independence signifies a different 
organisation of the production and distribution processes but not necessarily 
unusual or politically aware game design. 
 
 
Independent gaming and its discontents 
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Even when the defining criteria are focused on the practices of production, this 
still appears to be a very unstable and disputed territory, as many independent 
designers are likely to emulate the working conditions of the major companies. 
In fact many independents, similarly to larger companies in the industry, plan so-
called crunch sessions: intense weeks of work activity scheduled to reach the 
milestones of a project. As Jennifer Whitson (2013) notes, referring to an article 
by Chris Remo,49 reports on the career of an average game developer in the 
mainstream industry mention an average of 55 hours of work in each of about 13 
weeks of intense crunch mode per year (124). As reported by the International 
Game Developers Association (2004), developers on average tend to leave the 
industry after less than ten years, precisely because of these exasperating 
conditions. Becoming independent is seen by many as a potential solution to 
improve the quality of time spent at work and, for some, it probably is. However, 
the activity of an independent developer does not seem to necessarily bring a 
radically different and less burdensome amount of work. Considering the high 
number of competitors in the independent market, the demand for quick and 
intensive production is simply increased. Although numbers and statistics in this 
case are still lacking, even the most celebratory reports agree that the life of an 
average independent is not easier than that of a worker in the mainstream 
industry. 
For example, the documentary Indie Game: The Movie frequently stresses 
how intense the activity of independent developers can be. It could be argued 
further that, while for developers in the mainstream industry crunch periods 
mean sleeping in the office, independent developers, who mostly work from 
home, have already blurred the distinction between free time and work, which 
therefore makes it difficult to calculate the number of their working hours within 
a week. 
 Whitson argues that ‘[...] developers themselves are resistant to change. 
Part of this resistance is rooted in the finely tuned technological skills, aptitudes, 
and specializations they have developed over time’ (2013: 124). Whitson also 
notices that game development is based on a sort of developer culture that works 
                                                 
49 Remo, C. (2 June 2010) ‘Study: Developers Claim 13 Weeks of Crunch Per Year’, Gamasutra.com, 
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/28669/Study_Developers_Claim_13_Weeks_Of_Crunch_
Per_Year.php#.UTc_SxxfZ8E [Last accessed 8/11/2014] 
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as a self-coercive system. There are other examples of similarly self-exploited 
forms of production in the video game industry. Nieborg and van der Graaf 
(2008) note that teams of modders, who design and release modifications of 
existing video game software, tend to replicate the organisation of a video game 
company and transform what could be defined as ‘grassroots cultural production’ 
into ‘plain hard work’ (191). They therefore conclude that ‘through emulating the 
first developers’ risk-averse, capital-intensive mode of production and within a 
proprietary context, total conversion modding has become a “proprietary 
experience”, as modders anticipate the developers’ act of re-appropriation and 
subsequent commodification’ (192). 
 Independent gaming, or at least its most market-oriented version, appears 
to be moving in a similar direction. The possibility of working at a faster pace is 
one of the reasons why some game developers quit their previous jobs and work 
independently. This therefore appears to provide a slightly different definition of 
independence, as a condition of work where more duties, responsibilities, risks 
and effort are taken by one or a few individuals in exchange for potentially higher 
revenues, in an analogous, rather than alternative or even emancipatory, way to 
the profit-oriented industry. 
 It could then be argued, with Dovey and Kennedy’s early account (2006), 
that: 
 
[…] the notion of independence needs to be interrogated somewhat if it is to 
have any purchase. As we have seen in the film and music industries, the ‘indy’ 
tag may not signify much more than ‘wannabe’. In other words, the power of 
already established publishers may in fact be strengthened by the creation of 
an industrial diaspora of hopeful independents looking for commercial 
sustainability by copying game formats that already exist. (Dovey and Kennedy 
2006: 141)  
 
As well as being a form of false subversion, independence might also become, 
according to many authors – including, although less directly, Kucklich (2005) 
and Sotamaa (2009) – the propitious dream that ends up leading to self-
exploitation. 
 From this perspective the rise of the independent sector, at least in this 
specific market-oriented form, could replicate the emergence of forms of self-
employment in other so-called creative industries. This is precisely what Angela 
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McRobbie argued, a decade ago, in ‘Clubs to Companies: Notes on the Decline of 
Political Culture in Speeded up Creative Worlds’ (2002) with regard to the 
creative industries. In the scenario analysed by McRobbie, the new multi-skilled, 
de-specialised workforce had been justified by the actors involved through the 
use of terms such as creativity, authorship and independence in the actual 
process of production. Enthusiastic comments have been made by many 
commentators and practitioners engaged in the creative industries in favour of 
the emergence of the individual auteur, as opposed to the highly structured and 
hierarchic model that allegedly shaped the previous forms of labour. For 
McRobbie, this enthusiasm is misplaced: 
 
For the young woman fashion designer working 18-hour days and doing her 
own sewing to complete an order, ‘loving’ her work but self-exploiting herself, 
she only has herself to blame if things go wrong. After all she opted for this kind 
of unstable career choice. […] Self-blame where social structures are 
increasingly illegible or opaque, serves the interests of the new capitalism well, 
ensuring the absence of social critique. (McRobbie 2002: 521) 
 
Such a process of individualisation and redistribution of responsibilities marks 
the disappearance (‘ironically’, as McRobbie points out) of any form of 
independence and the emergence of ‘creative sub-contractors’ (519). As 
maintained in ‘Everyone Is Creative: Artists as New Economy Pioneers?’, this 
scenario has an immediate effect on the quality of the work produced: ‘where 
there is little or no time for thinking, the art-work itself can hardly be thoughtful’ 
(McRobbie 2001: 3). 
Stephanie J. Fisher and Alison Harvey maintain similar scepticism about 
independent gaming. In ‘Intervention for Inclusivity: Gender Politics and Indie 
Game Development’ they state: 
Being indie in no way translates to being inclusive. Rather, a great deal of the 
values and meanings associated with going indie actually reify the structural 
inequalities of the mainstream industry through the valuation of a supposed 
meritocracy that not only denies persistent systemic exclusion but celebrates in 
its own way the precarious labour conditions of digital games production. 
(Fisher and Harvey 2013: 37) 
 
 Independent developers might be allowed to work at their preferred pace, 
as self-employed workers, but the preferred pace could also be, and often is, a 
 163 
self-exploitative regime. Independence could then also be seen as a discursive 
justification for the introduction of pre-existing forms of work ethics in a new 
guise, in accordance with the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2007). The introduction of a series of changes in the production process of a 
video game is presented by the actors involved as an allegedly less alienating 
process, making possible a ‘perfect fusion of the needs of personal emancipation 
with the system’s needs of capitalism’ (Fisher 2010: 141). 
 Furthermore, video game publisher Valve has recently started to offer an 
online service where users can vote, comment and help the works in progress 
proposed by the independent community. Called Steam Greenlight, the service 
was released in August 2012 and serves as a sort of crowd-sourced filter to select 
which games should be featured, once completed, on the online market Steam. As 
also maintained by Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter (2009) and Kline, Dyer-
Witheford and de Peuter (2003), the video game industry has increasingly 
attempted to assimilate forms of consumer production in the last decade. Steam 
Greenlight could be seen as another example of this trend. Independent 
producers are attracted by online services where their works receive support 
and visibility, while their games come to complement the variety of products 
offered by major publishers, such as Valve and Microsoft. Also, the practices of 
co-operation between developers that emerge in the context of these grassroots 
productions are assimilated in a proprietary system. Steam Greenlight appears to 
confirm Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s take on Hardt and Negri’s Empire 
(2000), which they view as a metaphor for the contemporary video game 
industry, increasingly reliant on incorporating forms of nomadic production in 
order to maintain its position of power. However, what sort of nomadism is really 
suggested by the video game design concepts put forward on platforms such as 
Steam Greenlight? Is there anything particularly ‘independent’ about them? They 
might just as well be viewed as perfectly consistent with the modes of production 
of the mainstream industry, except for their much lower investment levels and 
smaller workforce. 
 In the context of independent gaming, these forms of assimilation and co-
optation blur the boundaries between the independent and the non-independent 
sectors. Self-employment, despite the advantages one might claim in favour of it, 
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does not necessarily entail any forms of freedom, emancipation, self-expression 
and economic success – which are often associated with independent gaming by 
its most enthusiastic supporters. This discrepancy is particularly evident when 
we consider instead the economic safety and freedom to experiment guaranteed 
by some of the major companies. Independence, in the context of video game 
culture, could be said to describe a different organisation of work, which does not 
automatically and necessarily bring any of the positive aspects attributed to it by 
the enthusiasts of this alleged revolution. 
More recent debates within gamer communities have started to argue 
that, maybe, the label independent should be replaced with a more specific 
denomination. Tom McShea, in the video game web magazine Gamespot, has 
argued in a popular article that ‘indie has become a term as nebulous as it is 
ubiquitous. […] It’s time we put these categorisations to rest’.50 Several days later 
on the same website, Alex Newhouse replied with an article claiming instead that 
we should not ‘throw “indie” away just yet’, as it is the only word we have to 
designate games in which the personalities of the authors ‘shine through’.51 In 
any case, the lack of an agreed definition does not slow down the practitioners of 
independent gaming and the emergence of festivals, incubators for new 
companies, articles and awards centred on this phenomenon. Quite the opposite. 
The phenomenon is increasing in size and at the centre is the establishment of 
several institutions based around the production of independent video games. 
I believe it is precisely this undefined condition that stimulates the need 
to produce definitions of the concept of independence. The latter are often self-
definitions, produced by game developers as they try to position themselves in 
relation to the existent independent scene. Furthermore, the re-appropriation of 
the indie label by the mainstream industry highlights the difficulty of 
understanding what a radical outside to the discourses of independence could 
be: to what extent is it possible to talk about such acts as forms of appropriation 
or re-appropriation rather than seeing them as forms of the actual production of 
                                                 
50 McShea T. (10 July 2014) ‘We named the dog indie’, Gamespot, 
http://www.gamespot.com/articles/its-impossible-to-define-indie-so-we-should-stop-u/1100-
6420984/ [Last accessed 23/10/2014] 
51 Newhouse A. (15 July 2014) ‘There is no other word to describe these games’, Gamespot, 
http://www.gamespot.com/articles/dont-throw-indie-away-just-yet-we-still-need-it/1100-6421044/ 
[Last accessed 23/10/2014] 
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independence? The indie channels on Steam and Xbox Live Arcade, Indie City or 
the sponsoring of independent festivals by mainstream companies can be seen as 
producing in their own turn further definitions of what independence is rather 
than being just belated attempts to exploit a pre-existing phenomenon. This 
process of moving and contesting the boundaries of independence is, I suggest, 
what constitutes independent gaming: it produces and incites verbal 
performances; it facilitates the production of games, events, articles and festivals, 
as well as forms of hospitality (inviting gamers to play for free or inviting 
designers to distribute their games through dedicated online channels), which all 
contribute to defining who and what is included in the independent territory. In 
the rest of this chapter I will question what the implications are of this 
abundance of interpretations and how seemingly contradictory definitions can 
co-exist in the practices of independent production. 
 
 
Independence as a discursive un-formation 
 
In this chapter I propose to change the typical question posed in the academic 
context about independent gaming. Instead of asking what independence is, we 
should rather ask how it functions (i.e. how independence is defined while being 
performed by its promoters and practitioners) and where it is discussed and 
defined, in which contexts and on what occasions. I believe that from this 
perspective we could also look at independence as having its own series of 
events, practices, video games, conferences, online services, institutions and so 
on that are based on, or are a direct response to, the emergence of the concept of 
independence (regardless of which definition the term is given). Independence, 
from this perspective, would be seen as the result of a series of discursive 
stimulations that incite producers to respond to, participate in and relate their 
own practice to the concept of independence. 
Independence can therefore be understood, I believe, not as one thing, one 
idea (or ideology), one business model or community. Rather, it is a social and 
historical construct through which a significant number of material and 
discursive productions are channelled. It can be positioned in a similar fashion to 
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the way in which Michel Foucault analysed other historical constructs, such as 
sexuality (1978). In his words: 
 
[Sexuality] is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive 
reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the 
stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to 
discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls 
and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major 
strategies of knowledge and power. (Foucault 1978: 106) 
 
Referring to the above quote by Foucault, I will not focus, particularly in the 
following part of this chapter, on what the ‘major strategies’ of independence are 
or could be. Instead, I will expand and articulate independent gaming in its 
‘surface network’ of multiple occurrences. As I have argued, processes of 
redefinition of the production and marketing of a video game do not seem to 
follow precise guidelines when relating to the concept of independence. These 
processes instead delineate strategies that are often incoherent when confronted 
with each other. In line with Foucault’s project of an ‘archaeology of knowledge’, I 
would like ‘not to overcome differences, but to analyse them, to say what exactly 
they consist of, to differentiate them’ (Foucault 1972: 188). 
 What does this process of differentiation entail? I will attempt, through 
this process, to preserve and analyse the various identities performed in the 
unformed field of independent gaming. I have already presented some examples 
where different actors have attempted to define independence: when the 
designers interviewed in the documentary Indie Game: The Movie propose an 
interpretation of their own work, when Molleindustria’s Paolo Pedercini argues 
what independence should mean in the context of video game production and 
also in the academic context when questions about the nature of the indies are 
posed and articulated. There are no specific authorities or institutions that define 
what independence is, what objects it forms and what the conditions of its 
existence are. This amounts to a large number of voices that categorise and frame 
independent gaming through different kinds of ‘serious speech acts’ (Laclau 
1993b: 434). More importantly, there is no scientific or legal discourse that 
defines independence in the context of video game culture (as much as there has 
been, for example, a legal discourse that has contributed towards the constitution 
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of the roles and limitations of producers and consumers in the case study of the 
hacking of PlayStation3, discussed in the previous chapter). I believe that 
independent gaming is worth studying, at this precise moment, because of this 
discursive instability and because of the resulting variety of subjects that come to 
be constituted through it. 
In this sense I would like to talk about independent gaming as a discursive 
un-formation: a not-yet-formed ‘regularity between objects, types of statements, 
concepts, thematic choices’ (Foucault 1972: 41). In the absence of a legal, 
scientific or theological discourse that could somehow crystallise specific rules of 
formation (and structure a case of study similar to those discussed by Foucault), 
independent gaming works at the same time as a label for very different practices 
and also for redefining existing ones. From this perspective I believe it becomes 
quite significant to notice the proliferation of attempts to provide those missing 
rules, through discourses that have an authoritative role (documentaries, 
academic papers, conferences and so on) and propose to map, classify and list 
what is independent and what is not, and what the consequences of this 
phenomenon are. 
 In reading this discursive un-formation in its making and unmaking, 
through the production of definitions and their continuous contradictions, I turn 
to discourse theory as formulated by Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985; Laclau 1993b; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 24-59). In their perspective, 
the interplay between the hegemonic crystallisations of discourse (a concept 
reinterpreted from the work of Gramsci) and the persistence of ‘floating 
signifiers’ that remain open to different ascriptions of meaning, points towards a 
theory that manages to take into account the both stable and unstable condition 
of the structures of language. In particular, their turn to a post-structuralist 
understanding of discourse allows the instabilities to thrive and multiply rather 
than being resolved. Instabilities of the concept of independence, rather than 
their resolution, are precisely what I intend to look at in this phenomenon, as 
they drive the production of discourses on the multiple meanings of being 
independent.  
 Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe look at how expressions are actively reduced 
by discourse in the moment of their articulation within a structure of signs. The 
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process of articulation of signs operates a double function. On the one hand, it 
replicates previous associations of meanings, or challenges those same 
associations while moving them towards a new, undecidable, terrain. On the 
other, it operates a temporary closure. In this latter sense, discourse is 
hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In their understanding of hegemony, 
Laclau and Mouffe turn to Gramsci, who was mostly interested in theorising the 
relation between power and the economic and ideological structures in a society. 
In the discourses surrounding independent gaming, the temporary closures of 
the meaning of independence cannot be reduced to the control exercised by an 
allegedly ruling class. There is instead a multiplicity of forms of power being 
enacted that define and classify the boundaries of independence. When game 
publishers, such as Microsoft and Valve, and academic scholars, practitioners and 
game journalists provide a temporary closure of the meaning of independence 
through their own words and actions, these can be seen as exercising a 
temporary hegemony. 
However, independence keeps floating, as a signifier. Turning to Laclau 
and Mouffe’s perspective can be useful precisely because it allows us to look at 
how independence can be at the same time open and closed. It defines an 
independent territory, but such closure never really manages to prevail over the 
multitude of similar attempts to exercise further authoritarian definitions. 
Independence is a thought-provoking concept to look at precisely due to its 
floating across multiple temporary grounds. Moreover, discourses of 
independence involve the construction of one’s own identity in relation to other 
independent developers or the non-independent. Because of this necessary 
confrontation with other developers and other forms of independence, the claims 
of autonomy and emancipation are necessarily corrupted: independence can only 
be defined through the presence of the other, of that which is outside one’s own 
territory. 
Independence forces us to look at how the boundaries between oneself 
and others are always necessarily in contact with each other, thus it entails a 
certain degree of contamination. But what are the consequences of 
acknowledging the co-existence of a plurality of contaminated forms of 
independence? How is this inconsistency in the discourses on independent 
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gaming reflected in the subjects who perform these same discourses? What is at 
stake in living in a disputed terrain? What does this unstable condition lead to? In 
the following section I will attempt to answer these questions by drawing on 
Laclau’s work on emancipation, which directly deals with the (im)possibility of 
tracing a line between oneself and others. 
 
 
Independence(s): constituting boundaries between the particular and the 
universal  
 
Laclau’s Emancipation(s) (1996), which deals, among others, with the topic of 
multiculturalism, could offer a helpful rejoinder to the argument presented here. 
He approaches the relation between identification and alterity from a political 
perspective but also as an issue that involves the philosophy of language. Laclau 
argues that individuals, or specific social groups, are constituted through the 
construction of a form of particularity, a certain idea of uniqueness that 
establishes a difference with other groups of individuals. However, 
‘particularism’, claims Laclau, when asserted in its pure form, is a ‘self-defeating 
enterprise’ (1996: 26). Laclau lists two reasons for this. The first is that each 
particular group, while claiming respect for its own particularism within a larger 
social context, has to make an appeal to a universal law, which transcends the 
particularism of any group (48). The second reason is that in asserting one’s own 
particular identity one ‘has to assert the identity of the other’ (49): to propose or 
claim a form of particularism, while constituting a context to be separated from, 
also re-invents this same context. 
Laclau intends particularism to be logically dependent on the universal. 
Particularism, according to Laclau, is entwined with the universal, with that 
larger context that is  re-inscribed by introducing an element of differentiation. 
This does not undermine the possibility of achieving a multicultural society in 
which several ‘particular’ subjects co-exist, but at the cost of a redefinition of the 
universal itself when confronted with social particularities. 
 Understanding this entanglement via Laclau’s work means, I argue, 
identifying areas where the limits of universal and particular contexts are being 
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redefined, and not only looking at them from a logical-philosophical perspective, 
or through the rhetorical construction of what independence is (always in 
relation to what it is not), but also understanding what sorts of discursive 
productions are involved in and solicited by this continuous process of 
temporary and strategic redefinition. The term independence assumes a 
separation between a previously constituted object and a new, detached one. 
When used in a context that is not, strictly speaking, related to the medium of the 
video game, independence usually evokes a separation on a cultural, political or 
economic level. It might also connote geographical divisions, where a visible 
element of the landscape marks the boundary between two territories. 
This geographical separation is also occasionally repurposed in the 
context of video game culture. Some independent game conventions take place in 
buildings that are distant from those of correlated industry meetings. More often, 
independent tracks are based in a separate room or on a different day to the rest 
of the industry convention. The example of the Nordic Game Conference 2010 is 
particularly significant. The event took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, while its 
independent counterpart, the Nordic Game Indie Night, was intentionally 
planned to open the day before in Malmø, Sweden, on the other side of the 
Øresund Bridge. Similar choices mark the distance between the two sides of the 
game industry. The act of separation leads to the constitution of the other side, as 
a previous, hierarchically superior and sometimes opposed actor. 
Although not explicitly related to the notion of independence, the Finnish 
convention Assembly, dedicated to computer hobbyists, can also be seen as 
hosting several conflicting and particular groups. Tyni and Sotamaa (2014) have 
looked at this event and at how, since its first edition in 1992, it has been 
changing due to the introduction of industry sponsors. The participants of 
Assembly have been negotiating, since then, their own independence from the 
institutionalised game industry by redrawing boundaries within the conference 
space. Dedicated events for hobbyists have been preserved within the convention 
but in a conflicted relation with the software and hardware companies that 
occupy the spaces next to them. Moreover, different interests of the event’s 
participants overlap with each other. While some prefer to show their skills with 
demos (demonstrations of programming abilities, sometimes also involving 
 171 
music and 3D modelling), others come to play video games with other 
participants. According to the authors, these two interests are seen as conflictual 
by many attendees (one is about making, the other about consuming game 
products); however, the boundaries between the two fade and open to forms of 
contamination because of the physical proximity of the participants. The relation 
with the game industries also opens to a form of hospitality, where equipment 
and technical solutions are shared between the guests of Assembly during the 
typical three days of full immersion in the spaces of the convention. 
The aforementioned Nordic Game Indie Night proposed in its 2010 edition 
an interesting selection of games representing different kinds of independence, 
some of them in clear contradiction to each other. On closer inspection, it can be 
said that each of the six video games presented at the festival offered a different 
understanding of independence. Jonatan Soderstro m, also known as Cactus,52 
one of the most acclaimed designers in the independent scene, exhibited Tuning, 
a psychedelic game experience where controlling a rotating ball in a geometric 
scenario quickly becomes a very complex activity [See Appendix: images 27 and 
28]. Cactus usually offers his video games on his own website, available for free 
download. Each game is designed in a few days (the number of working days 
required is displayed next to the description of each game) and is allegedly 
produced by Cactus himself, with no collaborators. According to the statements 
accompanying his video games, there is no budget, no market research and no 
business plan. Cactus invites his audience to a sort of anti-mainstream 
experience; he presents himself as not profit-oriented but rather attempts to 
propose original forms of game design. 
In the context of the same edition of the Nordic Game Indie Night, next to 
Cactus’s game, Frecle’s Youropa was instead produced by a team of experienced 
game developers who, after working in the industry for about a decade, decided 
to plan their own productions and sell them online through Steam [See 
Appendix: images 28 and 29]. Youropa received grants and large-scale financing, 
took several years of production and has been conceived as a product to be sold 
                                                 
52 Cactus defines himself on his own website: ‘I'm a game developer living in Gothenburg, 
Sweden. I've been making small freeware games since 2004. My aim is to create interesting 
things, whether it be through visuals or gameplay mechanics. A lot of the games on my site are 
just small experiments dressed up as games. I'm glad that people still seem to enjoy them.’ 
(Cactus 2014, cactusquid.blogspot.co.uk). 
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on the market. These two projects, exhibited one next to the other as 
representatives of the Scandinavian independent scene, draw two different 
boundaries to separate themselves, as independents, from the non-independent 
side. Cactus’s claim for an artistic and economic independence in the production 
process of a video game is interpreted and applied in the opposite way by Frecle. 
 In its own turn, the Nordic Game Indie Night defines both of these games 
as independent by displaying them together in the same event. Despite the 
apparent contradictions between these two games, the presence of both does not 
appear to be a problematic issue for the festival organisers. In the application 
page of the Nordic Game Indie Night website, the organising group Copenhagen 
Games Collective answers the frequently asked question ‘What counts as indie?’ 
in these terms: ‘Honestly, the term is a little meaningless. Everyone seems to have 
a different definition. Our answer is, we’ll know “indie” when we see it. If you’re 
not a AAA company and you’re not working with a major publisher, chances are 
you do indeed qualify as “indie”’ (Copenhagen Game Collective 2013). Despite the 
number of attempts to define independent gaming and question what it really 
means, the indeterminateness of the answers does not stop the use of the term 
and the emergence of contexts where independent video games are exhibited. 
There is a general acceptance of who the game developers represented in these 
festivals are and what can be expected from them. The more famous Independent 
Games Festival, held in San Francisco each year since 1998, also expects 
submissions to be ‘created in the indie spirit by an independent developer’, and 
does not further explain what this entails (Independent Games Festival 2014). 
 These and similar festivals present themselves as the authorities that 
define and allow video game developers to be exhibited as independents. But 
these institutions also work in a negative way, defining what is not independent, 
what is not allowed in the same contexts. In these processes of assigning to a 
video game its place inside or outside the independent territory, I would like to 
propose, drawing on Laclau’s theory of emancipation (1996), that what is 
individuated and discursively enacted is a kind of particularism within a 
universal context. I argue that independence emerges precisely at the interplay 
between the particularism of each developer and its relation with the universal, 
the outside, the preceding and different territory of the mainstream industry. The 
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two sides also constitute each other in the act of denying any relation, 
collaboration or co-optation. This continuous process comes at the cost of 
negotiating one’s own definition and relation to the outside. The result of the 
process, which I would like to discuss in the following section, is the constant 
need to talk about, analyse and describe the game developers as individuals. 
 
 
Strategies of individualisation: the need to talk about the outside of 
independence 
 
Independent game developers often discuss, or are brought to discuss 
during public interviews, about what it is that makes them different from the 
conventional, mainstream industry. Finding this element of difference is one of 
the discursive strategies used in order to construct their own individualisation. 
Cactus, for example, became particularly well known in the independent games 
community for his ability to design and release a video game in no more than a 
couple of days. He is celebrated by the likes of the Independent Games Festival, 
where he was nominated in 2008 (Excellence in Visual Arts and Excellence in 
Audio with the game Clean Asia!) and won in 2010 (Nuovo Award with the game 
Tuning). When he received the Nuovo Award, given in the category of original 
visual design, he remained silent on the stage for some time, sipped some water, 
and finally thanked ‘Jesus [and God] for the inspiration to make this game’.53 With 
this intentionally irreverent presentation, Cactus provided an anticlimactic 
moment of bathos that clashed with the declamatory style of the award 
ceremony as a whole. Cactus marks his distance not only from the so-called 
mainstream but also from other independent designers such as Blow, who 
instead appear as much more conformist in their attitudes to the established 
industry. Cactus marks his own difference through a variety of actions. His refusal 
to work for a stable company or to publish his games anywhere other than on his 
own website led to him being viewed as a representative of the advocates of pure 
indie gaming. 
                                                 
53 The award ceremony and Cactus’s speech can be seen on YouTube, ‘IGF Awards 2010 Part 2/2’, min. 
4’00’’-5’58’’, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDVZg9kZXEY [Last accessed 7/11/2014] 
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 Claiming an irreducible particularism evokes a form of purity, which 
places Cactus in a different territory, not reducible to the rules of the universal 
one. However, the risk, according to Laclau, of claiming an absolute difference 
and particularism, is to relegate oneself to the periphery – a sort of ‘self-
ghettoisation’. Laclau argues, while analysing the concept of apartheid, that ‘if the 
oppressed is defined by its difference from the oppressor, such a difference is an 
essential component of the identity of the oppressed’ (1996: 29). The problem 
with radical separation is not really the act of separation per se. I propose instead 
that the issue to be considered here is what sort of outside is formulated in 
shaping these radically independent identities. Laclau continues: ‘[the 
oppressed] cannot assert its identity without asserting that of the oppressor as 
well’ (29). Oppression is not necessarily a physical coercion but it is, at the same 
time, a limiting power and, in Foucauldian terms, always already and necessarily 
productive. What comes to be produced is not only the independent territory but 
also its outside, which often appears as a uniform coercive force. That is, an 
undifferentiated side, where the economic, social, cultural and political aspects 
involved in the production of a video game are predictable and imposed on the 
workers. 
When Molleindustria’s Paolo Pedercini argues that independence should 
be understood as a spectrum of possibilities, his assumption that ‘the code 
monkey working on slot machines for Zynga’54 would be the ‘least independent 
developer’ (Pedercini 2012) highlights that there is still a structural frame in this 
discourse that assumes the existence of the outside of independence, a 
supposedly non-independent condition, that we should avoid in preference for 
autonomous forms of game production. Even when the number of potential 
conditions of non-independence are multiplied and are acknowledged by 
Pedercini to be of different kinds and degrees, his argument still suggests a 
distinction between what is independent and what is not. 
A further development of this approach, I argue, is to consider instead the 
practices of production of video games as involving a multiplicity of particular 
                                                 
54 Zynga is one of the largest video game companies to become popular thanks to products 
developed for social networks such as Facebook. Zynga’s games are often considered repetitive 
and unimaginative, as they are produced for the largest possible audience and with little care for 
original forms of game design. 
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approaches, none of them single-handedly constituting the universal and non-
independent context. Rather, each is delineating, in its own way, an element of 
difference. This approach, however, comes at the cost of re-analysing not only 
independence as a plurality of forms but also non-independence in its multiple 
variations. In other words, it would entail a redefinition of the very distinction 
between the two sides as a multiplicity of different practices of production, not 
completely consistent or equal to each other but all mutually defining the other 
through a process of self-differentiation. Thus, not only particularism but also 
universalism needs to be looked at again in its apparent unity. 
As Zerilli points out in ‘This Universalism Which Is Not One’, reflecting on 
Laclau’s political theory: ‘[…] universalism is not One: it is not a pre-existing 
something (essence or form) to which individuals accede but, rather, the fragile, 
shifting, and always incomplete achievement of political action; it is not the 
container of a presence but the placeholder of an absence, not a substantive 
content but an empty place’ (2006: 102). Molleindustria’s view does not suggest 
the presence of a further outside in the continuum between independence and 
non-independence. In his view each game developer is potentially involved in 
this continuum, which means that anyone who is involved in the production of a 
video game could be assessed according to his or her degree of independence 
(and non-independence). 
From this perspective independence becomes an enticement to a 
discourse of self-definition, a regulatory frame that produces the need to define 
and locate oneself in relation to this continuum. In Foucauldian terms, 
independence could be seen as a concept around which one organises a practice 
of care of the self. As Foucault argues: ‘the care of oneself is a sort of thorn which 
must be stuck in men’s flesh, driven into their existence, and which is a principle 
of restlessness and movement, of continuous concern throughout life’ (2005: 8). 
From this perspective the discursive articulation of independence and non-
independence can be seen as immediately productive of discourses and 
performances, and the productivity of such binary lies in the latter’s unresolvable 
condition. As there is no solution to the problem of defining what becoming 
independent means, there is no end to the potential productivity of this concept 
and no final resolution to the quest for independence (as much as in the 
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Foucauldian understanding of the care of the self, the epimeleia heautou, there is 
no method to test when complete self-sufficiency is reached, or when sanctity is 
achieved). 
 Is this logic of negotiation between an outside and an inside, universal and 
particular, an essential condition of any claim of independence, and not only in 
video game culture? Is independence necessarily predicated on the constitution 
of these discursive boundaries? What is it that makes the emergence of this 
narrative in video game culture different from the use of the same term not only 
in a political context but also in the other entertainment industries, such as 
cinema or music? I believe these questions cannot be answered exhaustively, but 
I would like to propose that there is an interesting aspect of this narrative that 
seems to belong mostly to the video game context. The construction of 
independent game developers as individualised subjects takes place in 
workshops, meetings, conferences and incubators where game designers are 
instructed on how to become independent. The abundance of these almost 
educational contexts offers occasions to look at how precisely the constitution of 
a boundary between the first person and the others is solicited, curated and 
evaluated, and with what consequences. 
 
 
Independence as regulated practice  
 
Recent years have seen the rise of several contexts where presentations, 
workshops and meetings are organised to provide guidelines and suggestions to 
video game developers who want to be independent. On these occasions an 
expert or consultant usually provides instructional material on how to express 
oneself in a personal and unique form through a video game. This process 
involves advertising, communication with the press, direct contact with the 
audience through social networks, management of intellectual properties, 
relations with online distributors, and more issues focused on the economic 
sustainability of independent companies. These services satisfy the demand, 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, to overcome the increasing 
competition among developers in the independent sector, where introducing a 
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new product is relatively easy in economic terms. However, I believe there is a 
more pressing issue at stake here for the developers, apart from gaining the 
necessary visibility to sell a video game product. This sort of training focuses not 
only on how to market an independent video game but also on how to make sure 
it can belong to the category of independent.  
What comes to be associated with independence is often a series of 
provisions and limitations on which actions are to be performed in order for a 
game designer to become independent. These often take the form of operational 
procedures, a series of dos and don’ts, lists and instructions. This process of 
becoming independent therefore appears to include not only verbal 
performances but also certain practical and operational behaviours. 
Independence comes to stimulate a need or desire (or probably a need to desire 
– the necessity of feeling attracted) to be in control of one’s own production. This 
solicitation also produces specific contexts where the drive to become 
independent is seen as an operation that can be instructed. 
Thus, independent gaming signals the introduction of explicit forms of 
‘care of the self’ (Foucault 2005) in video game culture. Foucault distinguishes 
between the cura sui and epimeleia heautou, of the Roman and Greek cultures, 
and the Californian cult of the self. While the first are procedures to learn and 
practise in order to ‘take care of the self ’ and access truth, the Californian cult of 
the self assumes the presence of a true, inner self to be discovered and then 
expressed and communicated. As I will soon discuss in relation to Execution Labs 
– one of the most important incubators for independents – this and other similar 
institutions provide a technology of the self that is grounded, as in the Californian 
cult, in the idea that game designers have an identity to express in their video 
games. Expressing one’s own self is what a designer should desire, in this 
narrative. However, the desire might need to be instructed in order to be 
successful. 
Also, the individual plays a significant role in these narratives of 
independent gaming, as an actor who brings an element of their own personality 
to the final product. More importantly, in these examples the relation between 
producer and product comes to constitute the object of a form of knowledge. 
Some of the institutionalised practices that are now emerging in independent 
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gaming are operating at both a conceptual and a practical level to create an 
institutionalised path to becoming independent. Such practices therefore come to 
constitute a further articulation of a more general self-regulatory practice, where 
the emergence of a different market and production process of video games 
materialises and is grounded in the constitution of individual identities, and of 
institutions where one can learn how to become this kind of individual. 
 The Execution Labs project, founded in Montreal, Canada, in 2012 and 
begun in January 2013, is one of the latest and major examples. One of the three 
founders of the project is the ‘indie evangelist’ (as defined on Execution Labs’ 
website) Jason Della Rocca. Della Rocca has been involved for several years in the 
video game industry as a consultant and entrepreneurial expert. Before this 
latest activity at Execution Labs he had been presenting to, and consulting for, a 
large number of independent developers. Part of the outcome of his work 
consists of a series of videos of public presentations where Della Rocca suggests 
what developers could do in order to become independent, and why this choice 
is sensible and potentially rewarding. 
 Della Rocca’s Execution Labs works as an incubator for new game projects 
by small teams of developers, and aims to provide the business expertise that 
most independent developers usually do not have. The incubator also provides 
expertise in public relations, infrastructure (working space, computers, 
development tools and Internet connection) and funding (Execution Labs 
2013a). On top of this, selected applicants receive supervision, mainly on three 
aspects, namely ‘business’, ‘creativ[ity]’, and ‘production’ (Execution Labs 2013b). 
The idea behind such an organisation is that through this process applicants will 
become independent game developers and make profit on their games. 
 Execution Labs has an interesting way of interpreting independence. In 
the application process applicants are required to answer two questions, among 
others: ‘Has your team (or team member) made an indie game before?’ and 
‘What is your personal motivation to be an independent developer (if you are not 
already one)?’ (Execution Labs 2013c). Being independent appears, in this 
application form, as a feeling and an expectation about one’s own actions, a form 
of self-judgement and an ambition. 
Execution Labs proposes itself as an institution that knows how to 
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channel ambition and personal motivation in the right direction and towards 
independence. In this narrative, creativity has to be regulated in order to become 
productive and marketable, and once this process is completed independence is 
achieved. The forms of mentoring and consultancy that Execution Labs offers are 
therefore oriented towards the regulation of the self, making a business out of 
the capacity to communicate personal creativity through a video game. The main 
service offered by Execution Labs is assistance in regulating the constitution of a 
particularism, a difference from the universal context, which the game 
development company then has to market to the community of video game 
players. 
On the Execution Labs blog, on 6 February 2013, in a post entitled ‘First 
Mentor at Execution Labs Sets a High Bar’, we can see how this happens in more 
detail: 
 
Yesterday marked our first ‘individual’ mentor day here at Execution Labs. On 
Monday several dozen mentors spent the afternoon helping each team, which 
everyone agreed was super helpful. However, one of the things that sets 
[Execution Labs] apart from other incubators and accelerators is what 
happened yesterday. Adrian Crook, who has been in the biz [sic] for years and is 
a professional mobile/social gaming consultant […], spent the entire day at the 
Badger Lair. In the morning Keith and Adrian sat down for a wide-ranging 
interview-style Q&A session with the entire Lab in attendance asking follow-up 
questions. After lunch, Adrian spent an hour or so with each team deep diving 
into their gameplay, monetization systems, and everything in between. This is 
the kind of guidance that most indies simply can’t get, and here’s the kicker: 
we’re doing this nearly every week. (Execution Labs 2013d) 
 
Furthermore, the guidance often combines practical advice with 
motivational lectures on how to improve one’s personal take on game design, 
thus making a particular independent video game stand out from the rest of the 
offerings on the market. On 4 March 2013, three important guests visited 
Execution Labs. The first was game designer and scholar Eric Zimmerman, who 
‘shared his thoughts on what it means to be a game creator and principles to 
guide yourself ’ (Execution Labs 2013e). Zimmerman introduced his lecture, 
entitled ‘Being a Game Designer: 10 Principles for a Thoughtful Practice’, thus: 
 
Most game design talks focus on how to make a better product – a more 
successful game. This session frames what game designers do in a different 
way. I want to ask the question: What does it mean to be a game designer? 
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Apart from the problems and challenges of designing particular games, what 
are the attitudes and approaches that cut across all kinds of games that can 
connect us more deeply to what we do on a daily basis? […] Could we take a 
similar approach to game design? Is it possible to think about game design as a 
way or mode of being? The talk is structured as a series of ‘principles.’ The 
principles help describe games as a cultural form, and they also describe game 
design as a creative practice. The principles are meant to anchor a set of ideas 
around what being a game designer can mean. Each principle will be presented 
with examples from my own experience as a designer, player, and teacher. 
(Execution Labs, 2013f) 
 
On the same day, before Zimmerman’s talk, Execution Labs hosted 
‘happiness guru’ Scott Crabtree, whose consultancy work deals with how to be 
happier (and therefore more productive) at work. Following Crabtree, 
‘leadership master’ Christopher Avery visited the studios. Avery’s main focus is 
on how to take better decisions at work and how to develop leadership ‘every 
day in yourself, your team and your entire business’ (Avery 2013). 
Execution Labs is representative of a specific part of independent gaming, 
in which the marketability of the final product is crucial (Execution Labs earns 
money back from the sales of the video game products designed in its offices 
during the incubation period). Jason Della Rocca, who has been co-chair of the 
International Game Developers Association (IGDA), also chairs the IndieCamp, a 
yearly workshop focused on ‘funding, marketing, distribution and other 
business-related topics for garage and indie developers’ (IGDA 2012). Similarly, 
the convention IndieCade, held each year in the United States, provides several 
occasions for networking with other independents, and is mostly concerned with 
discussing how to be independent and how to make independence economically 
feasible. The IndieXchange sessions take place before the conference and are 
explicitly organised to share knowledge on practical matters. This is from the 
FAQ section on the official website: 
 
[Question:] What are the topics of IndieXchange sessions? 
[Answer:] All IndieXchange sessions are designed as practical and hands-on 
clinics specifically for Independent developers. Past clinics have included PR, 
pitching, and IP issues. Each of these clinics provides sample contracts, PR 
plans, and other useful elements. (IndieCade 2013a) 
 
In the same context, there is also the Game U – IndieCade’s Gamemaker 101: 
 
Game U is a special program from IndieCade that focuses on pulling back the 
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curtain on the game development process, and the work that game designers 
do. Specially designed [sic] for a diverse audience from entertainment and 
media professionals who want to learn about the game development process to 
amateur game creators who are considering trying to become professional. 
(IndieCade 2013b) 
 
In Europe similar events take place in Scandinavian countries and in the United 
Kingdom. One of the most prominent events for independent game designers is 
the Indie Dev Day, which takes place in Brighton, UK, during the Develop 
conference, addressed to the mainstream industry. On 11 July 2012, during the 
latest Indie Dev Day, independent designer Michael Movel from game company 
Fat Pebble delivered a presentation about what it means to be independent and 
how to manage independence through the production and marketing of a video 
game. Interestingly, his case is particularly complicated because of an agreement 
with game publisher Zynga, one of the biggest publishers for online video games 
addressed to a casual audience. Despite this agreement, Movel explains how and 
why his work should be considered independent. According to Movel, an indie 
developer is someone who creates his or her own game, has creative control and 
cares about the quality of the final product. Movel argues that the absence of a 
marketing department is one of the three most important ‘indie power-ups’, the 
other two being the absence of any restraint (‘you are free to push the 
boundaries, you don’t have to make another First-Person Shooter or strategy 
game’ Movel 2012) and individual passion, which contributes to the 
differentiation of each product. The absence of a marketing department, in 
particular, is also one of the greatest challenges, according to Movel. In his 
specific case, Zynga had stepped in during the production process, when a few 
videos of Movel’s new game had already been released, to help with the 
marketing of the game. Movel points out that, despite the intervention of a 
publisher, he has full creative control and is therefore to be considered 
independent. 
 Movel then explains how, precisely, a video game should be marketed, 
presenting it as the result of a personal, almost intimate process. Part of the 
marketing takes place on social networks such as Twitter, where the independent 
designer is expected to present the game and narrate the production process 
itself, engaging in discussions with the potential players (and buyers) of the 
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game. These comments are supposed to show the developer at work, while 
struggling to reach the final stages of the production process and communicating 
the personal fatigue of taking care of the whole process on one’s own.  
 This process is regulated through a precise technique, where the number 
of tweets to deliver each day, the press releases and the preview videos are 
predetermined. They have to be consistent and engage the audience. The process 
is so precise that it can be put in the hands of a professional company, as 
happened to Movel with Zynga. Such a precise communication, and the 
possibility to outsource it to a separate company, does not undermine, according 
to Movel, the claims of freedom and self-expression often associated in the 
context of video game culture with independence. What is communicated is still a 
very personal and individual perspective, a passionate understanding of game 
design, despite this communication being strongly calculated, almost numbered. 
Independent gaming, in this more recent development that I have 
introduced here, involves the emergence of practical organisational techniques, 
such as application forms, workshops and incubators, of which Execution Labs is 
an example. This way of approaching the notion of independence is not bringing 
us to an explicit understanding of what independence is but it is providing 
explanations of how to be independent, and where independence should be 
negotiated. On these occasions the process of becoming independent is 
transformed into the object of knowledge. Independence here becomes a 
methodology for the creation of difference and particularity. 
 The question I would like to pose, in the conclusions, is how such a 
methodology could be evaluated not just in terms of its effectiveness in 
guaranteeing autonomy to a game developer, so that he or she might also be 
called independent. I would like to question the possibility of introducing some 
new standards of evaluation and different criteria for deciding when 
independence is also what we might term a good independence. How else can the 
practice of taking care of one’s own video game become, in the context of video 
game culture, a good methodology? In the final part of this chapter I will propose 
that independence might also become an ethical practice, precisely because of its 
undetermined condition and of its necessity to include a confrontation with a 
form of alterity, whether the rest of the video game industry or the other 
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independent developers. 
 
 
Conclusion: independence as a form of ethics 
 
We could interrogate the extent to which the production of techniques to 
communicate the individuality of the game developer through their game can be 
understood as an example of a more general production of techniques of the self. 
In a Foucauldian sense, the production of an independent video game, 
particularly in the latest development I have introduced, could be seen as a mode 
of being, to be achieved through specific principles (as those offered by Eric 
Zimmerman and the hosting institution Execution Labs). Thus it might also be 
seen as a different way to approach the hermeneutics of the subject (Foucault 
2005) as based on a practice of production. What is involved in this modus 
operandum as it becomes a general modus vivendum, and as it represents a re-
evaluation of the practice of doing and reflecting at the same time? Can 
independent gaming be redefined as a means to ‘know what you are doing’, and 
therefore a practice that becomes a form of politics, as proposed by Richard 
Sennett in The Craftsman (2008), in relation to Hanna Arendt (1958)? 
Joanna Zylinska, in Bioethics in the Age of New Media (2009), argues about 
similar forms of self-management with regard to the phenomenon of blogging. 
Bloggers can be seen as being part of a larger ‘neoliberal imperative for 
individualized productivity’ (96) but they can also be questioned with regard to 
the forms of hospitality that this individualisation, which ‘necessarily’ becomes a 
form of narcissism, entails. To what extent can we then think in terms of an 
ethical narcissism, ‘one which is more open to the experience of the other as 
other’ (88)? 
Being an independent game designer could become a way of doing games 
through the ethical question of taking care of the other, of the non-independent 
or the diversely independent, the other form of independence which-is-not-mine. 
This other, as we have seen, is always and necessarily there; he, she or it is 
intrinsic in the notion of independence. It can be the other to be separated from 
(the mainstream industry, for instance), or the other who is defining him or 
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herself as independent but differently than someone else (the small company 
that makes clones of mobile games and the solo artist can both call themselves 
independent). What independent gaming is introducing into video game culture 
is more than an alleged revolution in the management of game production, or in 
the broadening of the availability of the means to make and publish a game. The 
original aspect it is introducing rather lies in the need for game designers to 
relate themselves to a form of alterity. 
As Zylinska again argues, through Emmanuel Levinas, the infinite alterity 
of the other, and its undecidability, are at the foundation of discourse (Zylinska 
2005: 14). Discourse needs confirmation in an interlocutor, or in a form of 
otherness that confronts, evaluates and judges it. Independent gaming is showing 
us that even the highest level of narcissism and separation from a more or less 
imaginary mainstream context, precisely because of this act of separation, needs 
to confront itself with a form of alterity. The difficulty that independence poses, 
therefore, is in how this alterity is accounted, taken care of and hosted. 
Producing one’s own identity through the production of a video game, and 
making sense of this practice in relation to other forms of independence and non-
independence, simultaneously generates forms of alterity. How, to what extent 
and with what consequences can the narcissism of certain kinds of independent 
video game design remain open to such alterity and also become an ethical game 
design? 
 The most pressing question I have tried to approach in this chapter is how 
diverse claims of independence come to constitute a practice for the definition of 
the identity of the video game producers. From this perspective, it seems to me 
that independent gaming is a name given to a set of discursive practices related 
to the production of a video game through which the game developer seeks to 
answer the question, ‘Who am I?’ I am here generalising about a phenomenon 
that I have tried, so far, to keep untied in its multiple forms. But if a unifying 
proposition had to be found, for the sake of a summarising and conclusive note, 
then I believe that this quest to define oneself is what characterises independent 
gaming. More than a practice of production, it appears to be mostly a practice of 
self-production. 
 Moreover, the incessant emergence of discourses that attempt to describe 
 185 
what independent gaming is, how to be part of it and also how to succeed and 
make a living out of it, could also be reinterpreted as not only a practice of self-
production from the side of the game developers but also a way to avoid, so to 
speak, self-consumption. The risk of not regulating the self, not emerging as a 
defined first person singular, could come at the cost of disappearing in an 
undefined universalism ‘which is not one’ (Zerilli 2006). Indeed, this also seems 
to be part of the anxiety inherent in the self-exploitative regimes that some 
independent developers prepare for themselves. In the documentary Indie Game: 
The Movie there is a moment where this appears, I believe, quite clearly. It is 
when designer Phil Fish, developer of the game Fez, narrates his own personal 
story. The difficulties he is facing in concluding the video game are not only 
economic but existential: 
 
The game has become a bit of a reflection of me over time. It certainly wasn't 
the intention at first. […] and now we’re here. We don’t have any money. I’m 
over-worked and over-stressed. I’m on the line. Me. My name... my career. If this 
fails, I’m done. I don't think I’ll work in games again. And it’s not just a game, 
I’m so closely attached to it. It’s me. It's my ego, my perception of myself is at 
risk. This is my identity: Fez. I’m guy [sic] making Fez. That’s about it. If that 
doesn't work out then […] I would kill myself. I would kill myself. That’s my 
incentive to finish it. Because then I get to not kill myself. (Indie Game: The 
Movie 2012) 
 
Narcissism can turn into solipsism, and when the only thing that matters for the 
independent developer is the game he or she is making then, at the risk of 
making too big a statement, life itself can be under threat, as there is no form of 
alterity to account for, or to seek confirmation from. Independence forces one to 
look for different others. It appears as a necessity for tracing the boundary of 
one’s own independence but also for looking for contamination and similarity, 
for finding other independents that can attribute value to an otherwise isolated 
work. Independence can be a repressive power that forces one to say what one is 
not, but it is also productive. It produces alterity in the first place, and movement 
towards the other. 
I have offered in this chapter a reading of an ongoing practice, a 
phenomenon that is changing, quite literally, as I am writing about it (many of the 
examples and references in this chapter are very recent events). This, I believe, is 
 186 
one of the challenges and also one of the most interesting aspects of studying the 
phenomenon of gaming. Suicidal notes such as the one mentioned above by Phil 
Fish, claims of anarchy and political critique such as those pronounced by 
Molleindustria, and workshops on how to guide yourself and become successful 
independent designers, all co-exist as part of the process that independent 
gaming is. This broad label can be seen as categorising a series of ongoing 
negotiations over the processes of individualisation of various video game 
producers. 
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Chapter 5 
Narratives of engagement: gamification and the 
performativity of video games 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation I have been debating the emerging narratives that attempt to 
define the allegedly new forms of relation between video gamers and video 
games. Narratives of conflict and independence have been presented and 
critiqued in relation to the discourses they tend to replicate, such as the 
separation between producers and consumers. Reading these same narratives, I 
have started to delineate and propose potential alternative views and forms of 
intervention in the relation between gamers and games – starting precisely from 
questioning how the separation between the two comes to be enacted. I have 
argued in favour of some alternative narratives that would allow us to reinterpret 
the practices of production and consumption of video games while also 
reconsidering the ethical and political issues implicated in these same practices. 
However, I believe that we need to address in more detail the 
performative potential of these different narratives I have been outlining. What is 
at stake in proposing such alternatives? How are these supposed to bring about 
different realities, and what is it that should make them more appealing than the 
existing ones? In this chapter I intend to answer these questions by looking, more 
generally, at how the issue of performativity is currently enacted in the 
discourses surrounding gamers’ games. While the ultimate aim of this chapter 
will be to consider the possibilities opened up by academic contributions with 
regard to the understanding of video games, these considerations will be reached 
through an analysis of how similar questions – although very differently phrased 
– are currently emerging in the debates on the effects of video games and on the 
possibility of channelling these effects for economic and social purposes. 
In this final chapter I will discuss the relatively recent interest, expressed 
in the field of game design, in developing video games that can potentially 
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influence players in their everyday practices, in a more or less controlled way. 
The phenomenon, alternatively known as serious games, games for change or 
games with an agenda, generally refers to the design of video games aimed as a 
form of critique or used for political and activist purposes. The underlying idea of 
these games is that game design can be used for more than mere entertainment, 
and that it could be applied to serious contexts. Players are supposed to learn 
something from these games, or be influenced in more or less explicit ways when 
it comes to their thinking about a serious topic of contemporary significance. 
 In more recent times, specifically since 2011, a similar approach has been 
adopted by the marketing industry. Interestingly, here the topic has also been 
presented through a political lens. In the view of the promoters of this more 
recent variation of the serious games phenomenon, understanding how to 
develop games that can effectively influence human behaviour is beneficial for 
businesses as well as having a social purpose.55 In this chapter I will discuss 
games such as SuperBetter, where the player is encouraged to follow real-life 
goals, such as losing weight or recovering from an injury, through a series of 
steps presented in a game-like scenario. Another popular example is Nike+, by 
the sports company Nike, where sport practitioners are invited to submit the 
scores of their performances in order to have them compared with those of their 
friends and neighbours – consequently motivating people to practise sports. 
These and other similar games have been presented, through a series of TED 
talks and self-help trade books, as part of a narrative of engagement with video 
game players who could collectively gather the energies usually spent on a video 
game to fix the problems of the world – while possibly contributing to the 
business of a company. Gamification is the name most often given to the process 
of transforming an experience into a game-like environment, with the purpose of 
engaging players in the resolution or improvement of a real-life situation. 
 Engagement is the keyword of gamification. One of the best known texts 
about gamification, Gamification by Design (Zichermann and Cunningham 2011) 
starts precisely with a definition of engagement: 
 
                                                 
55 As will be seen in this chapter, references to positive psychology, and particularly to Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow (1990), are often used in this context.  
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The term ‘engagement’, in a business sense, indicates the connection between a 
consumer and a product or service. Unsurprisingly, the term is also used to 
name the period in a romantic couple’s relationship during which they are 
preparing and planning to spend the rest of their lives together. Engagement is 
the period of time at which we have a great deal of connection with a person, 
place, thing or idea. (2011: xvi) 
  
However, for Zichermann and Cunningham this definition is a problem as it is too 
broad. Therefore they propose to create a metric to break down engagement:  
 
We would be better off thinking of engagement as being comprised of a series 
of potentially interrelated metrics that combine to form a whole. These metrics 
are: recency, frequency, duration, virality, ratings. Collectively, they can be 
amalgamated as an ‘E’ (or engagement) score. (2011: xvi) 
 
 The need to count, number and evaluate appears quite often in 
gamification. It is frequently brought forward to record data and compare results. 
In one of the most often mentioned examples of gamification, what comes to be 
quantified is life itself. This is what NikeFuel, a recent development of the Nike+ 
series of sport applications, states in its advertisement: 
 
Our minds, our bodies and our experience all tell us that movement is life and 
that the more we move the more we live. It’s something athletes have 
understood from the beginning. The kind of movement it takes to improve your 
game is the kind of movement it takes to improve your life. But unlike sport, life 
doesn’t come with convenient ways of measuring movement. So we developed 
one. NikeFuel: a single universal unit uniquely designed to measure the 
movement of the entire human body for the entire human race, whatever your 
weight, whatever your gender, whatever your activity. It’s that simple and that 
revolutionary. So get out there, find what fuels you and get moving. (Nike 
2013)56 
 
NikeFuel is a service based on a wearable technology that counts the heartbeats 
of the body during its daily activities. In so doing it provides a number that is 
supposed to quantify movement – and life, which is allegedly the same thing. 
Again, what can be seen here is an attempt to engage sport practitioners, and 
potentially beginners, through a service that quantifies what would otherwise be 
difficult or problematic to quantify. 
 In this chapter I will suggest that this specific idea of engagement, as it is 
                                                 
56 Nike Inc. (2013) ‘What is Fuel’, NikePlus.com, http://nikeplus.nike.com/plus/what_is_fuel/ 
[Last accessed 8/11/2014] 
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presented in the books on gamification and its applications, has a problem with 
the notion of life: participation and involvement of the players should have an 
impact, in the theories of gamification, on their daily lives. However, the ways in 
which this impact is performed brings about a rather limiting concept of life, one 
that remains static rather than being in movement. I will suggest that 
reconsidering life and movement can be crucial in rethinking engagement, 
gamification and more generally the performativity of video games. I will do so 
through the philosophy of Henri Bergson and some more recent contributions in 
anthropology (Tim Ingold) and media studies (Sarah Kember and Joanna 
Zylinska) that have been closely inspired by Bergson’s notions of intuition, 
creativity and vitalism. Bergson’s idea of life as movement, strikingly similar to 
Nike’s slogan, will be seen in its radical difference to what Nike and the 
gamification “gurus” have been proposing so far. 
 I will first start by discussing some of the ways in which gamification has 
been presented and critiqued. In the second part of the chapter I will argue how 
an alternative narrative of engagement can be articulated. 
This alternative narrative of engagement will ultimately lead to a vision of 
gamers’ games that will be more radical, and hopefully more interesting, than the 
one that is usually presented in the mainstream media, game studies and 
industry reports, as a new trend towards the involvement of consumers in the 
production of games and game content. Such a different vision will be articulated 
at the end of the chapter as potentially leading to what I have called a creative 
study of video games: a proposal for game study seen as a form of invention, 
which could bring about new narratives while taking responsibility for 
evaluating its own contribution to the debate. The examples I will bring from the 
field of game art, Gazira Babeli’s Come to Heaven (2006) and Bittanti-IOCOSE’s 
Game Arthritis (2011), will be seen as possible ways of practising game studies 
by other means, and yet reflecting on the possibilities of being engaged within 
the culture of video games by participating in it. They will also be presented as 
examples for inventing new questions and ultimately bringing the notion of life 
into the discourses on the relation between gamers and games. 
 
 
Gamification, or how to do things with games 
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Gamification as a term originated in the digital media industry. The first 
documented use dates back to 2008, but gamification only entered widespread 
adoption in the second half of 2010, when several industry players and 
conferences popularized it. (Deterding et al. 2011: 1) 
 
Gamification is a relatively recent term in the discourses surrounding video game 
culture. Extensive use of the term has been reported from 2010, while its origins 
are probably to be found in a British consultancy company, Conundra, founded in 
2003 by game designer Nick Pelling, who claimed to be specialising in 
‘gamification’ (Deterding et al. 2011; Werbach and Hunter 2012). Conundra, not 
currently in service, focused on helping ‘manufacturers evolve their electronic 
devices into entertainment platforms’ (Pelling 2012). Conundra’s business 
consisted of offering consultancies to companies interested in attracting new 
customers by implementing game features in their offer. Such activity was given 
the name gamification on Conundra’s website. In more recent times, the idea of 
gamifying a business has re-emerged, not necessarily directly with reference to 
Pelling’s first attempt but in a very similar vein. 
Since 2011 the marketing/consultancy sector has been re-evaluating 
gamification as a potential source of revenue. The last few years have also 
witnessed the emergence of several events and publications that have 
contributed to defining gamification. Zichermann and Cunningham’s text 
Gamification by Design: Implementing Game Mechanics in Web and Mobile Apps 
(2011) is the most popular, as are Zichermann’s website Gamification.co and the 
associated annual conference, Gamification Summit, held in San Francisco every 
year since 2011. Jane McGonigal’s work, culminating in her contribution at the 
TEDtalk series in 2010, is also concerned with selling gamification to 
corporations.57 In her book Reality is Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How 
They Can Change the World (2011) she mostly looks at her own work as a 
consultant for McDonald’s, the Olympic Games organising committees, and other 
companies for whom she organised marketing campaigns based on alternate 
                                                 
57 Jane McGonigal’s talk at TED is entitled ‘Gaming can make a better world’. Since its publication 
it has been viewed by more than 3 million people, according to the TED website. Available from 
http://www.ted.com/talks/jane_mcgonigal_gaming_can_make_a_better_world.html [Last 
accessed 24/10/2014] 
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reality games.58 In McGonigal’s view, gamification is not only a new goldmine for 
designers and business makers. It is also a tool for social policy and for changing 
the world. 
From her perspective, gamification is the term that describes a new age 
where gamers can collectively use their problem-solving skills not only in the 
context of a digital game but also for solving social and political issues. 
McGonigal’s idea of fixing the world through video games has generated, quite 
predictably, heated discussions about her over-simplistic proposal of a unified 
world with clear problems to be fixed by means of design.59 In addition, her view 
tends to maintain an unproblematic acceptance and positive evaluation of forms 
of civic engagement, as good per se and as an essential part of progressive 
politics. 
Similarly, although in a different field, the genealogy of such positive re-
evaluation of engagement and participation has been discussed by Claire Bishop 
in the context of contemporary art practice. Bishop argues that, particularly in 
the United Kingdom during the New Labour government, art was redefined, by 
means of government policy, as a socially inclusive tool for creating employment 
and helping local communities. Art as a social tool thus comes to be evaluated not 
on the basis of its ability to pose questions but rather on its capacity to solve 
problems by engaging citizens and involving them in art projects. Redefined as an 
inclusive and democratic practice, in many aspects art comes to substitute 
welfare (Bishop 2012). 
Digital gaming, in Jane McGonigal’s vision, could and should play a similar 
role. Game designers could become the new social entrepreneurs, and citizens 
gamers. The decision as to what comes to be defined as the problem, and a 
solution to it, should be put in the hands of game designers. Gamification thus 
becomes, from this perspective, a technique that allows for such an ambitious 
change. Terms such as engagement and participation, which receive positive 
connotation in other contexts, including art practice, come to be further 
                                                 
58 Alternate Reality Games, or ARGs, are games that take place to a large extent in the real world. 
Players are usually asked to take action in public spaces in order to progress with the video game. 
ARGs usually make use of geolocation and mobile devices to track the activity of the player and 
record his or her movement. 
59 Poole, S. (12 March 2012) ‘Opinion: Devastating Humanism’, Edge-online, http://www.edge-
online.com/features/opinion-devastating-humanism/ [Last accessed 8/11/2014] 
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articulated in the discourses surrounding gamification. 
In fact, gamification is promoted (and, ultimately, sold through 
consultancies) as a technique. Gamification appears to be a process through 
which cultural and social change could be achieved. More importantly, it is not 
just suggested as a generic approach to the design of playful experiences through 
which citizens/gamers should fix the world. It is narrated as a technique with 
some very precise instructions. McGonigal herself includes in her talk at the TED 
series a list of rules for living and playing well. Such rules all appear to have a 
scientific foundation that supports their authenticity; they are based on 
supposed facts and evidence that provide the grounds for making gamification a 
technique with predictable results.60 
As a technique, gamification can be seen, through Foucault, as being 
grounded in, and at the same time bringing about, a specific form of truth 
(Foucault 2005). The techniques of knowledge of the self, analysed by Foucault in 
Greek and Latin times and then in Christian and contemporary culture, construct 
the possibility of arriving at and articulating the truth about oneself. The 
existence of a form of truth is replicated in the discourses surrounding 
gamification. In these discourses, truth is presented as the equivalent of the 
collection of all possible data about one’s body. In McGonigal’s games, self-
improvement is defined through the evidence of statistics and medical research, 
and the standards for a good life are seen as a direct consequence of this data. In 
the textbooks on gamification, such as Gamification by Design (Zichermann and 
Cunningham 2011), gamification is presented as a technique based on the 
collection and analysis of previous experiences in user engagement. Resulting 
from the systematic analysis of previous successful cases, gamification can be 
sold as a reliable, trustworthy technique for engaging audiences. In this view it 
then becomes possible, in other words, to tell the truth about gamification and its 
effects. It also becomes possible to talk about a correct form of gamification as 
opposed to a wrong kind of gamification, which could be imagined as being based 
on misleading or incomplete information, or relying on unquantifiable aspects. 
                                                 
60 Suggestions include ‘Don’t play more than 21 hours a week’, because an average of 3 hours per 
day releases the right amount of dopamine and more than this can cause depression and affect 
‘real-life goals’. Much of McGonigal’s perspective on happiness and satisfaction, and how these 
can be channelled through design and used to solve social issues, is allegedly inspired by theories 
on psychology and, in particular, by the theory of ‘flow’ by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990). 
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It is these aspects of gamification that have made it what it is known as 
today: a series of practical and operational suggestions on how to involve users 
(be they customers, citizens or gamers) and maximise their performance 
towards a specific goal. In the previous chapter, I discussed how independent 
game production is increasingly becoming, in some contexts, a form of 
institutionalised knowledge where the development and marketing of a video 
game product is organised through a series of structured choices that come to be 
associated with the concept of independence. Similarly, gamification tends to 
take the form of a technique, a precise set of design solutions to gamify a certain 
experience. Gamification has been invented and narrated with the purpose, in the 
first place, of being a regulated and regulatory practice. It is born as a topic for 
design consultants, as a pitch for a new category of user-experience gurus and 
advertisement strategists. 
It could then be asked, following Foucault’s perspective, what kind of self 
is created through and by this specific technique. The gamified self is constructed 
through the collection and archiving of data about the user. This data needs to be 
first archived and processed to later become part of a game, and is collected 
according to a principle of transparency: gamification plays with the facts about 
the user, and attempts to assist the user in improving these same facts, these 
truths about him or herself. 
This very notion of the self is evoked by the Quantified Self movement. 
The Quantified Self movement originated in a context similar to that in which 
gamification was first promoted. It was in the TED Talk series, in around 2010, 
that the idea of the Quantified Self received major exposure through the words of 
experts involved, mostly, in the editorial team of Wired magazine.61 The 
movement promotes the introduction of technologies for the measurement of 
daily activities in the lives of individuals. Collection and data processing is 
oriented towards the improvement of life, here intended as the sum of the data 
about a person’s body as it is generated during daily activities. The quantified self 
                                                 
61 Gary Wolf, author and contributing editor at Wired magazine, presented his idea of the 
quantified self at a TED Talk in June 2010 
(http://www.ted.com/talks/gary_wolf_the_quantified_self) and during the ‘Wired Health 
Conference: Living by Numbers’, October 2012 
(http://fora.tv/2012/10/15/Wireds_Gary_Wolf__Kevin_Kelly_Talk_the_Quantified_Self) [Last 
accessed 24/10/2014]  
 195 
is also promoted as a solution to medical problems and for the improvement of 
certain characteristics of the body. Gamification can actually be seen as a further 
step in the process of quantifying the self, in which the improvement of life 
happens through a game-like environment and towards the establishment of 
practices of participation between users. 
However, the principle of truth that underlies the quantified self has been 
critiqued by Gary Hall (2011) for its political implications. Hall argues that the 
idea of the transparency of data, and of the very possibility of acquiring data as a 
transparent process, is compromised by the necessary presence of an agent who 
decides how and why this data should be acquired in the first place. 
Transparency is contextually defined by that same agent who is collecting the 
data, a process that is not necessarily transparent in its methods and purposes. 
Hall argues that metadata, as the key principle that makes data hierarchically 
organised and accessible, is what undermines the notion of transparency as it 
introduces a contingent perspective into the organisation and collection of data. 
Thus, the alleged transparency of data ultimately relies on a rather opaque point 
of origin. Hall points out: 
 
All information and data is ordered, structured, selected and framed in a 
particular way. This is what metadata is for, after all. […] The specific ways in 
which metadata is created, organized and presented helps to produce (rather 
than merely passively reflect) what is classified as data and information – and 
what is not. (Hall 2011: 20) 
 
Hall sees the practices of quantification and data visualisation as emerging 
within the humanities and becoming more and more relevant (in what is often 
termed the digital side of the humanities). However, this emergence appears to 
Hall to be mostly a response to political pressure towards a measurable and 
quantifiable kind of academic research (which makes it possible later to sell the 
outcome of research as published papers identified within a numeric system 
based on referencing, usage and other quantifiable factors). Hall’s answer to this 
would be to move towards a re-evaluation of the creative aspects of the 
humanities: making data accessible is not enough to be able to make a claim 
about that very reality the data is supposed to explain. Gamification appears to 
me to respond to a similar pressure towards quantifiable effects, although one 
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exercised in the field of the design of video games. Gamification provides a 
justification and a proof that video games can make a difference and influence 
their players. In this chapter it is precisely the need for such proof and 
justification that I would like to discuss and, along with Hall, provide a proposal 
for a creative approach to the study of video games, one possibly closer to the 
field of the humanities.  
Moreover, gamification as a technique is what makes it marketable in the 
first place. It is for this reason, I believe, that texts such as Gamification by Design 
by Zichermann and Cunningham (2011) are essentially presented as lists of case 
studies where this technique can be applied in order to inspire designers to 
transform existing businesses into gamified experiences. It is also for this reason, 
I propose, that critiques of gamification (some of which will be introduced 
shortly) have been addressing an obvious point when claiming that gamification 
is not much more than a marketing strategy. In fact gamification, as we know it 
through the words, books and public talks of those who have been promoting this 
concept, has never been presented as much more than a marketing tool. When it 
comes to be associated with a form of social entrepreneurism, it is still listed 
under a business approach. Even when Jane McGonigal claims that games will 
change the world, or when Gabe Zichermann, in his Gamification Summits, 
argues that a new generation is growing up through playful simulations, their 
bottom line is that understanding and orienting such potential for businesses 
require a new kind of expertise. Such expertise can be acquired through training 
at one of the gamification workshops around the world or bought as a 
consultancy, but it always requires an invoice to one of the aforementioned 
authors. If it is a ploy to introduce new forms of consumer exploitation, then it is 
quite explicitly so, and certainly not part of a hidden agenda. What is more 
interesting, I believe, is how a tool for marketing comes to blend with forms of 
social intervention, so that gamification becomes a technique for improving 
businesses as well as society as a whole. Also, as I will argue, what gamification 
gurus are now proposing appears to be consistent, in its theoretical background, 
with the theories of game design that have been taught in recent decades in 
academic programmes about video game development, and in publications on 
this same topic. 
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Examples of gamification occupy a significant proportion of books such as 
Gamification by Design and similar how-to publications. Among the most 
referenced successful cases of gamification is Nike+, a product by the corporation 
Nike.62 Nike+ is a mobile device that helps users track their running activity 
through GPS (Global Positioning System). Recently released as a smartphone 
application, Nike+ keeps a record of the time, weather conditions, pace and route 
of the sporting activity. When the performance is over, Nike+ saves the data and 
provides statistics about the runner’s progress (or lack thereof) in comparison to 
previous performances, to their personal contacts, or to neighbours who run in 
the same area. Nike+ serves to motivate the user by showing their goals and 
achievements while also keeping a detailed record of every workout session. The 
Nike+ website lets users log in and access all personal data, in a graphic style 
largely influenced by contemporary video games and social networks [See 
Appendix: images 31 and 32]. 
Another allegedly successful example is SuperBetter by Jane McGonigal.63 
According to McGonigal, SuperBetter is a game that helps players achieve any 
possible goal in life by offering a systematic self-improvement guide. Losing 
weight, for example, is divided into a long series of daily tasks to be achieved and 
registered on SuperBetter’s website. The website offers a constant flow of 
deadlines and goals to reach while mutating the lexicon and graphic of video 
games: users score points, advance in the rankings and are awarded badges and 
titles, all the while achieving real-life goals [See Appendix: images 33 and 34]. 
SuperBetter assumes that a best possible scenario, for human beings and 
humankind as a whole, could actually exist. It is the scenario in which all the 
goals of the game are achieved and the player has taken care of him or herself in 
a fulfilling way. In SuperBetter, the player is expected to provide data about him 
or herself on a daily basis – data that also necessarily has to be true in order for 
the game to have any effect. Truth is therefore constructed; it is made by the 
game and its players through the act of playing. It is, however, not a theological 
transcendental truth, as in the Christian hermeneutics of the self (Foucault 
2005). This is a much more mundane kind of truth, yet still confined in the realm 
                                                 
62 Available from http://nikeplus.nike.com/plus [Last accessed 24/10/2014] 
63 Available from https://www.superbetter.com/ [Last accessed 24/10/2014] 
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of the obvious and the taken for granted, still undisputable (if not by more 
accurate data), and similarly brought forward for the purpose of serving the 
individual in his or her own self-judgement. 
Gamification is not only confined to the realms of self-improvement and 
physical health. Other examples include Stack OverFlow, an online community of 
programmers, where each user can score points by assisting other members of 
the community.64 Stack OverFlow regulates the social capital of the programmers, 
motivating their personal pride as well as their inclination to help and assist each 
other. Leaders receive an incentive to keep their leadership unchallenged, 
although the entire system rewards only on a social level and not in economic 
terms [See Appendix: image 35]. 
Zichermann and Cunningham, in Gamification by Design, also mention 
early examples such as the loyalty programmes of airlines or the coffee-points 
offered by coffee shops such as Cafe Nero that motivate users to visit the same 
shop and receive a free coffee after reaching a certain number of purchases. 
Popular websites such as Foursquare and LinkedIn also integrate early forms of 
gamification by awarding points and titles to the most active users, and 
quantifying the amount of personal data uploaded on the websites in order to 
encourage prolonged and repeated use of the online services [See Appendix: 
image 36].  
In the last year, gamification has received significant visibility, and its 
promoters have managed to influence policymakers to include it as a keyword of 
one of the key areas for future investment. The Horizon 2020 document by the 
Research and Innovation sector of the European Union, published in early 2014, 
includes ‘advanced digital gaming/gamification technologies’ as one of the key 
areas for research and development. The document states that the European 
Union will invest in this area, for the following purposes: 
 
Digital games and gamification mechanics applied in non-leisure contexts is an 
important but scattered industry that can bring high pay-offs and lead to the 
emergence of a prospering market. Digital games can also make a real change 
in the life of a large number of targeted excluded groups, enhancing their better 
integration in society. This requires, however, the development of new 
methodologies and tools to produce, apply and use digital games and 
                                                 
64 Available from http://stackoverflow.com/ [Last accessed 24/10/2014] 
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gamification techniques in non-leisure contexts, as well as building scientific 
evidence on their benefits – for governments, enterprises and individuals. 
(European Commission Research and Innovation 2014) 
 
Gamification has assimilated the discourses surrounding the use of games for 
social and marketing purposes. It has been accepted as a common term for 
identifying research in game design techniques in a non-game context 
(borrowing the definition of Deterding et al. 2011). However, this assimilation 
has also brought about a simplification, not only of the terminology but also of 
the theoretical understanding of video games, their production and their players. 
I will now discuss what I believe the consequences of this state of events are, 
drawing on the academic contributions to the debates surrounding gamification. 
 
 
Critiques of Gamification 
 
Since Jane McGonigal’s talk at the TED series encouraged a series of articles in 
mainstream newspapers about the alleged positive effects of video games, the 
community of game scholars has felt the need to respond to McGonigal’s 
statement by highlighting some of the limitations of the debate and nuancing 
most of the over-enthusiastic comments. Of particular concern has been the 
deterministic naivete  of McGonigal’s talk and her followers. Statements such as 
“games can save the world” are quite obviously disputable with regard to the 
actual potential of games (digital or not), the limits of the distribution of game 
products and the geographic specificities of the video game market. More 
importantly, McGonigal and her supporters assume games to be one clearly 
identifiable entity that produces specific and controllable effects. From this 
perspective, it has been argued that gamification and other positive re-
evaluations of digital games approach the subject with the same deterministic 
view as the condemnatory attacks on digital games (Carbone and Ruffino 2012). 
Similarly deterministic approaches can be seen in the current trend of producing 
video games for mental and physical health (e.g. the WiiFit and Brain Age series 
by Nintendo) or even marketing them as works of art (e.g. Alan Wake (2010) by 
Remedy Entertainment, Heavy Rain (2010) by Quantic Dream and L.A. Noire 
 200 
(2011) by Rockstar Games, selected for its aesthetic value at the Tribeca Film 
Festival). In the articles and press releases that introduce these games their 
properties are seen as objective qualities, capable of influencing the players or 
achieving undisputed artistic achievements. 
As a response to the emergence of gamification, one of the reactions in the 
academic world interested in digital gaming has been to propose a more 
moderate understanding of this newly emerging phenomenon, possibly 
eliminating the marketing aspects involved. It is from this context that Sebastian 
Deterding and colleagues have proposed a relatively simple definition of 
gamification: ‘gamification is the use of game design elements in non-game 
contexts’ (Deterding et al. 2011: 2). The above quote has been accepted in the 
academic discourse in the last couple of years as a good description of the term 
‘gamification’.65 However, as I will argue in this chapter, it says little of what 
gamification does and what it could do, which is a much more relevant question. 
It is a question that more directly challenges the discourse on the potential 
effects of digital games, which is what the promoters of gamification insist on. 
As reported by Deterding and colleagues, gamification is not the only term 
used to label the practice of adopting game design techniques in a non-game 
experience: 
 
Parallel terms continue being used and new ones are still being introduced, 
such as ‘productivity games’, ‘surveillance entertainment’, ‘funware’, ‘playful 
design’, ‘behavioral games’, ‘game layer’ or ‘applied gaming’. Yet ‘gamification’ 
has arguably managed to institutionalize itself as the common household term. 
(Deterding et al. 2011: 1) 
 
The paper by Deterding and colleagues helps to define gamification beyond the 
enthusiastic talk that usually transpires in the uses of the term since McGonigal 
made it popular in 2010. However, gamification has received a relatively large 
number of more or less consistent definitions and studies of the origin of the 
term and its political implications (Nelson 2012b; Fuchs 2012 and 2014; Jacobs 
2012; Mosca 2012). This is partly due to the concept’s background. Gamification 
                                                 
65 This has been accepted by the ‘Rethinking Gamification workshop’ at Leuphana University 
(May 2013) as the most popular definition of gamification. Outside the academic context, the one-
line definition provided by Deterding et al. can also be seen, rephrased, in Zichermann and 
Cunningham’s guide to gamification (2011).  
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is mostly a marketing concept, developed and promoted by designers and 
business consultants. In this context a clear and simple definition soon became a 
necessity in order to sell gamification to existing businesses (and sometimes also 
to public institutions). What appears to be clear about gamification, after a brief 
analysis, is precisely the relatively fast narrowing down of what this expression 
means. In less than a couple of years since it reached popularity it had already 
received a number of definitions, sometimes in published texts, other times 
through the development of gamified systems that were introduced and 
advertised as examples of gamification, thus indirectly contributing to a general 
acceptance of what this term implies. The term has also been further defined in 
the academic context, simply replicating the how-to approach of many 
publications (e.g. the Gamification module at Pennsylvania University, held by 
Professor Kevin Werbach) or, occasionally, articulating what else could be 
involved in the phenomenon (Fuchs et al. 2014).  
There have not been many attempts to further elaborate what could be at 
stake with gamification, and the present chapter aims precisely to address this 
point. New definitions of gamification, in fact, would not yet tell us why we 
should be interested in it and what we could make of it. 
Ian Bogost has attempted to address a more nuanced question about 
gamification, first by saying that, from what we have seen so far, the technique 
should be renamed ‘exploitationware’ (2011a) – elsewhere, simply ‘bullshit’ 
(2011b) – and second by exploring the potential uses of video games in his text 
How to do Things with Videogames (2011c). His first argument can be 
summarised as follows. Gamification has little to do with the design of games, as 
it tends to reduce them to a predictable series of mechanisms to attract 
players/customers. Such mechanisms include the use of leaderboards, rankings 
and badges to reward the best players, as well as quick and unchallenging tasks 
to encourage players and make them feel gratified. However, Bogost argues, game 
design (or at least good game design) has been trying to complicate such 
techniques by introducing more varied tasks, demanding a variety of skills from 
players and possibly questioning the experience of playing through complex 
narratives. Gamification does not attempt to achieve any of these goals, as it is 
uniquely interested in maximising the activity of the users, and potentially 
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turning them into better customers, or unpaid contributors to their business. 
Therefore, according to Bogost, it should not be embellished by the word game, 
and should be more correctly called ‘exploitationware’. 
Bogost also adds that serious games – games with a political or activist 
agenda, supported by Bogost on several occasions (for instance, in his work on 
‘persuasive’ games, 2007) – is instead a much fairer name than gamification. 
Serious games combine two apparently contradictory words to describe a 
challenge to the design of games, through which players are supposed to 
question their own knowledge and beliefs. The serious aspect serves to 
distinguish these emerging kinds of video games from more facetious forms of 
entertainment (2011a, 2011b). Bogost expands his view on serious games in 
How to do Things with Videogames (2011c). Here the reference to Austin’s How to 
do Things with Words (1962) is explicit, and so is the attempt to introduce a 
debate on the potential of video games from a perspective that is possibly more 
nuanced than the one seen in the context of gamification. This means, according 
to Bogost, that a better understanding of the potential of digital games entails an 
expansion of the number of things attainable from them: to be used not only as 
entertainment tools or as part of marketing campaigns and self-help 
applications, as proposed in gamification, but also as objects with an artistic 
value or as elements of social and political campaigns, and much more. 
In How to do Things with Videogames, Bogost lists and analyses some of 
the possible uses of digital games as they have emerged in recent times, including 
games with political content, promotional games displaying in-game 
advertisements, games used for propaganda or activism, and those with artistic 
purposes. He also discusses, through several short chapters, how games could 
provoke ‘empathy’, ‘reverence’, ‘relaxation’, ‘disinterest’ and ‘drill’, among many 
other effects. Bogost argues that we can understand the relevance of a medium 
by looking at the variety of things it does: ‘we can think of a medium’s explored 
uses as a spectrum, a possibility space that extends from purely artistic uses at 
one end […] to purely instrumental uses at the other […]’ (2011c: 3).  
Bogost’s answer to the debates on the potential of the medium of the 
video game is to avoid binaries and oppositions between serious and superficial 
technologies. He proposes instead what he calls an ecological understanding of 
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the medium, inspired by McLuhan and Postman’s theory of media. In this view, 
according to Bogost, media affect the environment in which they are introduced 
at a variety of levels, not necessarily to be evaluated in positive or negative terms. 
Bogost’s response to gamification, and more broadly to the idea that video 
games can be used for achieving specific effects, contests the institutionalisation 
and appropriation from the side of the marketing context of the alleged 
transformations of the medium currently happening through the emergence of 
gamification. However, it does little to debate where such views originate. Also, 
and more importantly, it does not yet tell us anything that could help complicate 
and possibly surpass the binaries he evokes, and therefore does not propose a 
way of thinking about video games that could be seen as different from what 
McGonigal, Zichermann and colleagues evangelise about. 
The question of what we can do with video games receives a more varied 
response from Bogost than any of the gamification gurus. However, what persists 
is the idea that the medium of the video game has a certain impact on its users – 
an impact that could be more or less predicted and channelled through design. In 
doing so, it evokes a question of the performativity of games and their agency. 
However, I would like to point out in the following section that such focus on the 
agency of games needs to be rethought, as it tends to replicate, as much as 
gamification does, the instrumentalism underpinning the contemporary 
techniques of game design. It is evident in the idea that specific elements in the 
design of a game will help to have a specific effect on the player’s behaviour, and 
that these same elements could be replicated in different contexts by preserving 
the same effects. This background has proven, I believe, to be rather limiting 
when trying to address the question of “what can we do with games?” from the 
perspective of both theoretical analysis and design. 
Gamification is in fact consistent with the behaviourist background that 
underlies the studies on game design. As acknowledged by Jon Radoff, author of 
Game On: Energize your Business with Social Media Games (2011a), game design 
often builds on the heritage of behaviourism and design concepts such as the 
‘theory of flow’ by Csikszentmihalyi (1990). Radoff also argues that this heritage 
is visible not only in gamification but in game design more generally: 
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Gamification is generally caught-up in one of the game industry’s overarching 
myths – the idea that games are nothing more than Skinner boxes (‘push-
button, get cookie’), a part of behaviorist psychology which has largely been 
passed by advances in cognitive and evolutionary psychology over the past 50 
years. (Radoff 2011b) 
 
In this chapter I would like to discuss how we could rethink gamification, 
alongside the discourses originating from the marketing context and not 
necessarily in opposition to that same context, but also not attempting to offer 
better solutions for the ‘exploitation’, as Bogost would put it, of video game 
players. Mostly, I am concerned here about how the concept of the performativity 
of video games emerges in the discourses surrounding gamification. 
I will be addressing this issue through the contribution provided by Tim 
Ingold, whose work, though not explicitly related to games or video games, 
questions the concept of performativity from an anthropological perspective. In 
the discourses about gamification the focus is on the agency of games: games can 
‘do something’ to their players, they have a certain power to affect players in a 
more or less predictable way. As Ingold would put it, agency is a term often 
brought into a debate in order to resuscitate the concept of materiality. In this 
view, objects have a certain material presence that does something to us; they 
have a certain agency with regard to the surrounding environment. However, 
Ingold suggests, while thinking in this way we tend to be suffocated by ‘the dead 
hand of materiality’ (Ingold 2011: 28): all that is material stands still, engages 
with the surrounding environment and is put in motion by a sort of ‘magical 
mind-dust’ (Ingold 2010: 2) that is agency. Agency and materiality are not only 
forms of abstraction that overshadow the nuanced relations between human 
beings and the surrounding environment, but, as concepts, they also actively 
produce this distinction. Through Ingold, I will question how this distinction is 
also replicated in the discourses on gamification, and I will attempt to articulate a 
different reading of gamification by reimagining the relation between human 
beings (players and game scholars) and video games. 
In the following section, I will take seriously the question of gamification 
as proposed by both its gurus and detractors, and as rephrased by Bogost, with 
reference to Austin, as “how to do things with video games”. I will discuss how 
Ingold’s anthropological perspective can teach us how to rethink gamification, 
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and not necessarily against the current proposals originating from the non-
academic contexts. I will also argue that a process of rethinking gamification, 
while maybe not urgently needed in the marketing sector, is instead quite 
pressing in the debates about the medium of the video game. Rethinking 
gamification means, after all, interrogating the possibility to intervene with and 
through digital games, possibly by producing and consuming games through 
political, ideological and ethical questions.  
 
 
How to do things with gamification 
 
Performativity has been at the centre of the work of authors such as Michel 
Foucault and Judith Butler, already introduced in this dissertation. Their 
perspective introduces a crucial aspect of the theories of performativity: 
language is considered to be taking part and joining in that very same reality it is 
constructing. In the ways in which I have described gamification so far, such 
consideration has not yet been debated. Gamification as a technique is narrated 
instead as an abstract process that regulates the design of video games in order 
to affect the players in a predetermined way. 
 I would like to pose the question, in this part of the chapter, of “how to do 
things with gamification”, borrowing both the phrasing and the theory of Austin 
and Bogost. The question I want to propose focuses on the performativity of 
gamification itself rather than of games. What sort of reality does gamification 
bring about? Also, what is involved in an analysis of gamification that considers it 
to be part of that same reality that gamification can allegedly affect? I believe this 
question also brings to light a different understanding of gamification through its 
unfolding in a specific time and space.  
 Through Ingold, it could be said that focusing on the performativity and 
materiality of gamification entails thinking less about games and gamified 
applications as objects, and more as things. Ingold proposes that the distinction 
between objects and things can be crucial when evaluating what is at stake in the 
debates around performativity. He draws on Martin Heidegger’s essay ‘The 
Thing’ (1971a) and comments: 
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The object stands before us as a fait accompli, presenting its congealed, outer 
surfaces to our inspection. It is defined by its very ‘overagainstness’ in relation 
to the setting in which it is placed (Heidegger 1971a: 167). The thing, by 
contrast, is a ‘going on’, or better, a place where several goings on become 
entwined. To observe a thing is not to be locked out but to be invited in to the 
gathering. (Ingold 2010: 4) 
 
Ingold follows from this that things are in constant flow, constantly mutating and 
in contact with each other through their surfaces. Such a process of continuous 
mutation is intended as a contrast with the notion of agency. According to Ingold, 
agency acts as a solution to resuscitate the otherwise ‘dead’ objects by giving 
them a sort of ‘sprinkle’ of life. While imagining the environment to be populated 
by objects suggests the image of an excavated world, similar to a piece of Swiss 
cheese (2011: 24), Ingold argues, things instead fill the environment and are 
entangled with one another, in ‘a meshwork of interwoven lines of growth and 
movement’ (2010: 4). 
 The perspective offered by Ingold is more than an attempt to avoid a sort 
of horror vacui of an environment where objects are cut and surrounded by an 
empty space. There is still, for Ingold, the need to make sense of our own 
participations, as things ourselves, participating in the world. For this reason, 
Ingold brings focus to the life of things. He writes: ‘In effect, to render the life of 
things as the agency of objects is to effect a double reduction, of things to objects 
and of life to agency’ (2010: 7). 
 Life is a crucial concept here for Ingold, and he explicitly mentions 
Bergson and his Creative Evolution as one of the major influences on his work 
(Ingold 2010: 13). From Bergson, Ingold develops the notion of life as movement 
and duration. Bergson argues that we, as humans, tend to capture the things 
around us intellectually, interrupting the flow of life to freeze, control and 
transform things into forms. However, this process loses sight of movement. The 
intellectual faculty of our mind is accompanied by the intuitive faculty, which we 
rarely exercise but which persists and occasionally comes through. Intuition 
originates from the ‘vital impulse’ shared by all living species. While intelligence 
is analytical, in that it divides and recomposes things in order to give us the 
knowledge we need to satisfy our needs, intuition instead gives us the knowledge 
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of how things are in constant movement and always in the process of becoming 
other (Bergson 1914).  
 Creativity is that which accounts for the continuity of life, the movement 
of things, and at the same time for the discontinuity of such things, the diversity 
of matter that we tend to intellectually fixate in time and space. Our task, for 
Bergson, is to reconnect with the intuitive faculty and participate in the life of 
things in order to reach absolute knowledge.  
 What does it mean, then, for us to creatively participate in such a flow of 
life? It means, first of all, that the very idea of the agency of objects of any sort 
(words, technologies, human beings, etc.) has to be rethought as being less a 
transitive action (doing something to someone else) and more a dynamic state of 
being, a property that allows things to be alive in the world. Ingold critiques the 
transitivity of agency as an inheritance from the hylomorphic model, as first 
conceived by Aristotle and then crystallised in Western culture. In this model, 
Form and Matter are separated from each other, and while Form is in the mind of 
the agent, Matter is a passive receiver of the action of the agent. Ingold further 
argues that this model is still clearly traceable in the modern theories of 
production, such as those of Marx and Engels: in the series of volumes that 
compose Capital: Critique of Political Economy (1990), human labour is defined 
by Marx as the materialisation of an ideal form previously existing only in the 
mind of the creator. Such a process of production is, according to Marx, what 
makes human beings alive, that is, actively participating in the world. Agency is 
therefore conceived as what makes possible an essentially transitive process, 
from the human being towards the external world, from Form to Matter. 
 Why is this model problematic for Ingold, and how can his contribution 
help us to say something different about gamification? Ingold believes that the 
hylomorphic model leads to quite a static view of life. It suggests in fact that life is 
equal to the productive capacity of an individual, but such productive capacity 
exists separately from the environment, as excavated from an empty space. 
Similarly, gamification, presented as a design technique, proposes a way to 
produce games so that they can affect the users, somehow influencing their 
behaviour, preserving more or less the same effects in mutating contexts. Games 
are seen in the theories of gamification as objects, in Ingold’s terms, that can be 
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reiterated in a different environment and act on the users, producing a certain 
effect, transforming a specific Form into Matter. 
 The possibility of reiterating the same transformations is particularly 
relevant, I believe, because it is first of all what makes gamification a technique 
and a procedure that can be applied in different contexts. But it is also what 
makes it an abstract and fossilised technique: the design of leaderboards, 
rankings, rewards, tasks and so on appears in the texts about gamification as a 
process that can be cut and pasted, to borrow an expression from digital culture. 
 I propose that the abstraction and fossilisation of gamification 
performatively produces a rather conservative vision of life, as well as of the 
possibilities of play. The way in which the question of how to do things with 
games is answered by the experts of gamification tends to operate a reduction in 
the ways in which we could potentially engage with digital games. The relation 
between gamers and games, which is placed at the centre of my dissertation, is 
too easily dismissed by gamification through the quantification of this very 
relation and through the application of allegedly effective solutions for the 
engagement of players. 
 For instance, Nike+, one of the best known and most often mentioned 
examples of gamification, connects to a mobile device and records through GPS 
the path and pace of a runner. Nike+ is a system that is designed to receive and 
record already predicted signals; it rewards precise events that are already 
expected by the simulation. It works as a system for recording and reviewing 
runners’ performances, and compares them with each other on a local or global 
scale. The runner/player of Nike+ is encouraged to comply with a frame of rules 
that works as a regulatory frame, where only specific events are expected, saved, 
calculated and evaluated. Through this practice of compliance, the runner/player 
of Nike+ is normalised, and regulates him or herself in order to maintain and 
progress in a process of constant self-normalisation. As Foucault notes (1977), 
disciplinary practices tend to optimise the body and stimulate its 
submissiveness. A mobile application such as Nike+ produces docile bodies while 
disciplining their sport activity and punishing their eventual failure. Failure here 
comes to be defined not only as failure to improve the body’s performance, but 
more subtly as failure to produce the expected data, to update the system as 
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frequently as possible and to provide information about the body. In other words, 
failure means not telling the truth about oneself. However, doing so in a context 
where all that can be said is data, which is seen as necessarily true and 
transparent, failure means not saying anything or not following up on the request 
to produce information. Nike+ is not a game to play but mostly to update. 
The game SuperBetter, designed by Jane McGonigal, works in a similar 
fashion, while attempting to regulate physical and mental health. The goals to 
achieve (losing weight, running a marathon, connecting with friends and 
relatives, and so on) and the tasks offered to reach such goals prescribe a limited 
set of possibilities for improving one’s life. Games such as Nike+ and SuperBetter 
tend to limit the possibilities of play and can also be seen as conservative images 
of a way of living. Both games offer a unique path to the achievement of well-
being, where what is defined as good for the body is catalogued and presented as 
necessarily positive. 
 Gamified applications can be seen as conservative tools, where 
unexpected and original ways of thinking about a specific practice are ruled out. 
But also, possibly, they are inevitably so. The struggle to eliminate uncertainty 
appears in the very origin of cybernetics and digital simulations. This is what 
Patrick Crogan argues in his text Gameplay Mode: War, Simulation and 
Technoculture (2011), through an analysis of the historical and ideological 
relations between the video game industry and military developments. 
Crogan points out that the study of video games has tended towards an 
uncritical acceptance of the ideology of cybernetics, as exemplified by Gonzalo 
Frasca’s statement, inspired by Espen Aarseth’s Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic 
Literature (1997), that digital games should be studied through a cybernetic 
approach (Crogan 2011: 145). In Aarseth’s original proposal this meant the 
dismissal of a semiotic approach in the study of computer games in favour of a 
study of the interpretation of ‘cybernetic signs’, arbitrarily determined by the 
relation between a coded, invisible level and an expressive, visible level (Aarseth 
1997: 24-41). From Aarseth’s approach, computer programming determines not 
only the ways in which cybertexts, including computer games, are structured but 
also their interpretation: ‘the concept of cybertext focuses on the mechanical 
organization of the text, by positing the intricacies of the medium as an integral 
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part of the literary exchange’ (Aarseth 1997: 1). 
However, Crogan argues that the ‘intricacies of the medium’, as Aarseth 
puts it, derive from a specific ideology. It is the same ideology that has been 
framing military research and the study of simulations as systems for the pre-
emption of possible future events. I will now introduce Crogan’s theory, and look 
at how it could be useful in the project of rethinking gamification and the study of 
games I am outlining here. 
 
 
Gamification and the war on contingency 
 
Crogan analyses the historical relation between the video game industry and 
military developments, but his reading of this relation goes beyond 
acknowledging the mutual influence that the two sectors have had on each other 
since the Cold War. Examples of this influence could be seen in the often-
occurring perpetuation of a warmongering ideology, or the use of similar 
technologies such as military simulations both for training purposes and as 
commercial products (see the example of America's Army, a video game 
developed by the United States army and also released as a game product). 
Several authors have discussed these aspects of the medium of the video game 
but mostly by acknowledging a historical relation or metaphorically suggesting 
that the game industry participates in the same capitalistic ‘empire’ from which 
the war industry originates (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009; Kline, Dyer-
Witheford and de Peuter 2003; Halter 2006). Crogan argues that there is 
something more involved in this legacy. It is, first of all, not simply a historical 
background that video games inherit but in fact an ongoing legacy, which he 
defines as ‘military technoscientific’ and which casts a shadow on contemporary 
forms of digital play (2011: xii-xiii). One of the consequences of this legacy is that 
video games participate in what Crogan calls the ‘war on contingency’: ‘computer 
games play with the playing out of the war on contingency that has been an 
animating force throughout the course of the development of computers as 
simulation platforms capable of modelling the future as virtually accessible to 
pre-emption’ (2011: 36). 
 211 
Crogan argues that the main purpose of military simulations is to prepare 
a model of the possible outcomes of a war-scenario, quantifying as much data as 
possible in order to predict a future intervention. This element of prediction is 
crucial, according to Crogan. War simulations work as predictive systems and 
computers, as well as the ‘technoculture’ that derives from the use of digital 
machines, are grounded in the obsession for controlling possible future events: 
 
The predictive, hypothetical force of computer simulation is in no small way a 
legacy of the military technoscientific merger with the modern rational 
industrialization of planning, control, and regulation in the military and 
military-entertainment complexes. (2011: 155) 
 
From this perspective Nike+ and SuperBetter can be seen to be conceived to 
record signals that are inevitably already predicted, and this makes them 
necessarily conservative in their regulative power as they cannot open up to 
unpredicted inputs and unexpected forms of play. However, the same could be 
said of all forms of digital gaming, as they all take part in replicating the same 
logic of pre-emption of military simulations. 
 Alexander Galloway has similarly stated that digital games take part in 
what he calls the ‘algorithmic culture’. In his reading of the game series 
Civilization (1991-2014) by game designer Sid Meier, he argues that the 
simulation is an excellent example of how digital games can embody ‘the total 
logic of informatics itself ’ (2006: 101). Video games more generally are, 
according to Galloway, ‘allegories of our contemporary life under the 
protocological network of continuous informatic control’ (106). As such, they 
bring about social transformations, where ideology itself comes to be reshaped 
by informatics. The allegorical move of the critic, Galloway states, should 
therefore take the form of a playact, an enacted text. From this standpoint he 
argues that forms of subversion and critiques of the ideology of video games, 
which he names ‘countergaming’, have rarely if ever taken the form of a critique 
of gameplay, which is instead needed as a form of intervention in digital culture 
in order to potentially reveal the logic of ‘algorithmic’ culture. He calls for ‘radical 
action’ as opposed to conventional gaming, and for a political, intellectual and 
artistic gesture that could emulate what the avant-garde of cinema directors such 
as Jean-Luc Godard brought into the critique of cinema (2006: 107-126).  
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 If we accept Crogan and Galloway’s analyses of the historical and 
ideological background of digital games, then gamification appears to fit in 
perfectly with what we could name, combining Crogan and Galloway’s terms, the 
ongoing war on contingency under the protocological network of continuous 
informatic control. From this perspective, we can look at gamification as 
consistently relying on a logic of pre-emption and control, while also introducing 
a more explicit question about the performativity of games, that is, about the 
possibility of directly influencing players’ behaviour through the modelling of 
specifically designed simulations. What I believe is interesting is the emergence 
of the demand, from contexts that are not strictly speaking involved in the video 
game industry, for designing game-like scenarios for affecting citizens and 
customers in (more or less) predictable ways, influencing practices of everyday 
life such as habits of consumption, physical health and also political behaviour 
(as in the case of games for change and games with an agenda). 
 While such emergence could be ascribed to the algorithmic culture and 
explained as part of it, it is still unexplained how we, as gamers and game 
scholars, could make sense of such culture without replicating that same 
ideology – and whether there is a need to do so. Both Galloway and Crogan have 
answers to such questions, and their proposals involve forms of artistic 
investigation. Galloway and Crogan both agree that critique is needed, although 
not necessarily in oppositional terms. Crogan argues that we should instead 
think of digital gaming through the ‘material and sociotechnical dynamics that 
make it possible, and in a way inevitable, in the context of the tenacious 
forgetting of war’s co-constitutive relation to technoculture’ (2011: 145). 
 Crogan offers to re-evaluate the concept of theatricality, as formulated by 
Samuel Weber and defined as ‘the problematic process of placing, framing, 
situating rather than as a process of representation’ (quoted in Crogan 2011: 
141). He looks at the example of PainStation, an artistic installation by collective 
//////////fur//// art entertainment interfaces, and Tekken Torture Tournament 
by Eddo Stern and the C-Level art group [See Appendix: images 37 and 38]. In 
these two examples, the video games Pong and Tekken are modified to cause real 
physical pain to the players. In PainStation, the player who wins the game has the 
option of causing pain to their opponent (in the form of a whip that beats the 
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player’s hand, an electric shock and other similar painful options, which were 
increased in number in the second edition of the installation, PainStation2). The 
game ends when one of the two sides releases his or her hand from the 
PainStation. Similarly, Tekken Torture Tournament converts the virtual pain of the 
fighters in the video game Tekken to real electric shocks for the human players, 
who are wired to the game hardware. Crogan argues that similar interventions 
‘incite participants to think about gameplay and game consoles and their 
historical relation to warfare and the history of computing’ (2011: 141). The 
theatricality of such performances makes them ‘projective, rather than reflective, 
aesthetic, or representational’, and ‘it works toward achieving a certain effect 
rather than taking that effect as given’ (141). More importantly, theatricality is 
oriented towards the future, towards possible and not yet materialised forms of 
engagement with technologies. 
 Crogan’s attempt is potentially highly relevant in imagining alternative 
questions to the ‘war on contingency’. His proposal is to counter, from an 
academic and artistic perspective, the: 
 
overarching tendency of the program industries to standardize and 
predetermine the nature of access and utilization of their products. 
Nevertheless one can play, and design and co-create […] or becoming the bugs, 
artifacts, mods, critical and creative readings and appropriation, and other 
accidental becomings that alter what we can do with games, what games do 
with us, and what they give us to think about what we are doing with them now 
and tomorrow. (Crogan 2011: 174-175)  
 
 Crogan’s contribution to the recurring question of how to do things with 
games, and of what they do to us, which I have argued is also the basis of the 
discourses surrounding gamification, is useful and relevant for a variety of 
reasons. First, Crogan highlights how the logic of the ‘war on contingency’ 
subsumed by the military-industrial complex is not only important in the 
development of forms of digital entertainment but is also present in the ways we 
(gamers and scholars) tend to make sense of these entertainment forms.
 Second, he proposes that one possible way to think outside such 
weltanschauung is to rethink the physical presence of the players and the 
materiality of games and game technologies. He does this by presenting examples 
from the artistic context where the concept of theatricality, as formulated by 
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Samuel Weber, manifests itself. 
 I would like to expand on these suggestions and connect Crogan’s analysis 
of the medium of the video game with Ingold’s proposal for an anthropological 
rethinking of the concept of agency. I believe that these two perspectives, distant 
from each other in the objectives they aim to achieve, can contribute by saying 
something different about gamification.  
 
 
Towards a different narrative of engagement 
 
The issue of participation is, I believe, crucial. As I have argued, one key point of 
gamification, and of the behaviourist approach to the design of games, is the 
iterability of the techniques for the production of games that are supposed to be 
effective (or ‘felicitious’, if we want to borrow Austin’s terminology) in their 
influence on the player’s behaviour. The possibility of “cutting and pasting” 
specific design solutions, while preserving the same effects in mutating contexts, 
assumes a detachment of the techniques, and the games that are made from 
them, from the environment in which they enact. Thus, video games are 
supposed to work as objects, as Ingold would put it, excavated from the 
environment. 
 Bogost’s critique of gamification is still explicitly grounded in the idea that 
games are objects. In How to do Things with Videogames, Bogost proposes an 
ecological understanding of media, but media are here still understood as objects 
with a sparkle of agency, so that they can have varied effects on us. We as users 
and observers, however, remain essentially separated from these agential 
objects. We do not participate, nor do we engage (to borrow a verb from the 
discourses surrounding gamification) in the presence of such objects, apart from 
the merely intellectual process of observation and analysis. In Alien 
Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (2012b), Bogost proposes an 
analysis of how objects, or things (the two terms indiscriminately used, and 
rather un-problematically), experience the world surrounding them. In his 
attempt to reflect on what experience could be like outside an anthropocentric 
view and how this could lead to different morals and ethics, Bogost does not 
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eliminate the essential alien quality of the objects/things he uses as examples. To 
interrogate ourselves on the ‘ethics of the spark plug, the piston, the fuel injector, 
or the gasoline’ (Bogost 2012b: 75) when looking at the engine of a car can 
indeed be a different question than seeing how a car engine is entangled with 
human activities. However, it is not yet telling us much about how the plug, 
piston, injector and gasoline happen to us, how come they have been divided as 
such, as separate and abstracted objects, and how such a process of cutting the 
environment makes sense to us, what is at stake in it, and how it could be 
otherwise. In other words, we do not yet know from such an analysis of aliens 
how we are participating in the analysis itself, how we are in contact – physically, 
intellectually or intuitively – with the engine of a car, or any other system. 
 Ingold, instead, focuses on the essentially anthropological (but not 
anthropocentric) question of being alive as participating in an environment of 
things. In Ingold’s view, it could be said that Bogost argues mostly about objects: 
even if multiplied in number, the instances Bogost describes – including video 
games – are cut from an environment, abstracted and interrogated for their 
inevitably alien nature. The reason I draw on Ingold rather than Bogost in 
rethinking gamification and the study of video games is because Ingold’s 
perspective can be seen as proposing a different narrative of engagement, one 
where the alien condition of the surrounding environment is seen as only one of 
the many possible forms of making sense of the world around us (and definitely 
as the less challenging for our faculties). I will now discuss how such a narrative 
develops from a reflection on materiality and agency. 
 
 
Living and playing in a world of materials 
 
What I have so far addressed as a problem of rethinking our engagement with 
games is formulated by Ingold in different terms, as a problem of understanding 
life. The meanings of being alive, and ways of bringing things to life, are the main 
concerns of Ingold’s anthropological endeavour. He argues that the question of 
life is inherently connected to the physical presence of things in the environment, 
and that this question is hindered by the theories of materiality.  
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 Ingold argues that materiality, a concept derived from a sort of ‘academic 
perversion’ (2011: 20), is based on a virtualisation of the occurrence. 
Occurrences have no materiality, as much as they do not have a boundary that 
separates them from an empty environment, if not given by a process of 
abstraction. Ingold draws on Gibson’s theory of perception to suggest that it is in 
the problem of the boundary that materiality demonstrates its inconsistency. If 
we consider objects to be in contact, physically, with the external environment, to 
be immersed in different materials, then the boundary appears to be artificial. 
However, the problem for Ingold is not really in the artificiality of the boundary, 
but rather in how such a boundary influences our understanding of the world 
and our presence in it, and what it overshadows. 
In fact, according to Ingold, to talk about the materiality of things amounts 
to strangling things with a dead hand, and losing sight of the narrative side of 
their properties. To explain this concept, Ingold argues that materials, rather 
than materiality, should be at the centre of our attention: ‘materials do not 
present themselves as tokens of some common essence – materiality – that 
endows every worldly entity with its inherent “objectness” rather they partake in 
the very processes of the world's ongoing generation and regeneration [...]’ 
(2011: 26). 
Shifting the focus to materials, rather than materiality, is what allows 
Ingold to re-evaluate the human presence in the environment, an aspect he finds 
to be articulated, in the theories of agency, in a distinction of human vs matter. He 
takes the example of a stone, which can become wet by being dropped in water. 
After a certain amount of time, water will evaporate and the stone will be dry. 
The appearance of the stone has indeed changed, and so have its properties. The 
wet stone will feel and sound different to the dry one. What can we say then of 
the materiality of the stone? Has the dry stone more ‘stoniness’ than the wet 
stone? Ingold argues: 
 
There is no way in which its stoniness can be understood apart from the ways it 
is caught up in the interchanges across its surface, between medium and 
substance. [...T]he stone has actually changed as it dried out. Stoniness, then, is 
not the stone’s ‘nature’, in its materiality, nor is it merely in the mind of the 
observer or practitioner. Rather, it merges through the stone’s involvement in 
its total surroundings – including you, the observer – and from the manifold 
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ways in which it is engaged in the currents of the lifeworld. (Ingold 2011: 32) 
 
 If the observer is also considered to be part of that same ‘lifeworld’ of the 
things around him or her, then the distinction in quality and hierarchy between 
subject and object comes to be disputed. Also, materiality appears through this 
example in its artificiality: it is a concept that replaces, by oversimplification, 
discourses on materials and our approaches and contact with them. Ingold 
ultimately proposes a different narrative of engagement, one that does not have 
much to share with the narrative that has been emerging in contemporary video 
game culture so far but that could tell us something about how we engage, also, 
with digital games. What he offers is a different way of thinking about our own 
immersion in the world, as thinkers and doers, scholars, producers and 
consumers. These practices, however, are thought of less as transitive actions and 
more as what results from a co-presence of live materials. 
The agency of objects and the essentially transitive acts of causing, 
affecting, doing things to human beings that populate the environment are 
substituted by the Heideggerian concept of ‘dwelling’ in ‘Building Dwelling 
Thinking’ (1971b). Dwelling, an intransitive verb, is not directed towards an 
object and should not be taken as the direct consequence, or as the opposite, of 
the act of building (as, for instance, consumption could be seen in relation to 
production). Dwelling is rather a way of being, which is understood as becoming 
rather than as something permanent. It helps us understand ways in which we 
make sense of the surrounding environment not as static points, standing in one 
place, but as wayfarers. Wayfaring and movement are the dynamic metaphors 
that Ingold suggests as models of the ways in which we inhabit the environment 
and as alternatives to observation and perception (2011: 9-14). 
 What does it mean to think about digital games through the ways in which 
we move along them, rather than what they do to us (or us to them)? Also, how 
can this perspective help us to add something new to the existing, but rather 
conservative, narrative of engagement with games and game technologies that 
we have been fed by both marketing consultants and game scholars? 
 Following Ingold, I propose some questions for moving in an alternative 
direction in the study of gamification and video games in general. What if we 
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consider gamified systems and video games to be part of that same world it is 
claimed they are affecting? What are the implications of letting them join in the 
environment at the same level as human beings? What are the consequences of 
thinking of video games as materials rather than looking at their materiality? 
What does it mean to dwell in an environment where video games co-exist with 
us? Finally, how could that offer an alternative perspective not only to 
gamification but also to the war on contingency and the logic of pre-emption? 
 I formulate these questions as open precisely because I do not intend to 
propose an answer to gamification, or to the issue of the performativity of games. 
I do not think this view is intended to replace, or surpass, what gamification 
gurus are currently asking themselves in relation to the use of game design for 
marketing and social change. It is instead a separate perspective, largely inspired 
by the questions emerging around gamification, although definitely not 
consistent with those same questions. As an alternative, it will not work as a 
further technique to think and make video games but it will propose references 
and parallel modes of thinking. 
 I think that what calls for some alternative modes of thinking is the rather 
unproductive dead-end into which gamification and its critique have confined 
themselves. Drawing on the introduction to this chapter, the statement 
‘movement is life’, presented by Nike in its advertisement for NikeFuel, is 
interpreted by the sport company as if being alive could somehow be a problem: 
‘life doesn’t come with convenient ways of measuring movement’, says Nike’s 
advertisement. NikeFuel’s response to this problem is that each singular activity 
of the body should come to be quantified and counted by the application. By 
doing so NikeFuel disregards movement as a process of knowledge, as wayfaring 
(in Ingold’s terms), and applies instead a notion of movement as homogenous 
and divisible into homogenous unities. In this sense, movement is here 
spatialised, as the notion of scientific time introduced by Bergson in his Time and 
Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (2001). Bergson 
proposed that to account for duration we cannot limit ourselves to the scientific 
time but must also allow an intuitive understanding of time and space. Scientific 
time, the kind of time we measure and quantify, is expressed through numbers. 
As such, it is based on the idea of a homogenous space as it implies the presence 
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of a unit of measure that is juxtaposed to the next unit, as if temporal units were 
linearly disposed. Spatialised time also brings the notions of determinism and 
causation, as individual moments are seen as one being the effect of the other, 
following one from another in a cause-effect relation.  
The production of a ‘single universal way to measure all kinds of activities 
[… to track] your active life’ (Nike 2013)66 is another way of regulating 
movement, and also performatively produce, in a Foucaldian sense, a notion of 
life as measurable and traceable through data. By tracing, measuring and 
quantifying, NikeFuel and gamification in general freeze movement and life 
through the separation and invention of fixities, through what Bergson would 
define as an intellectual approach, and replicating the notion of time that 
Bergson identifies as belonging to ancient Greek philosophy (and Zeno’s 
conception of time and space in particular). Bergson’s contribution is highly 
relevant in the context of this chapter because it is ultimately concerned with the 
possibility of freedom within such a notion of time. Bergson’s philosophy can 
therefore provide an essential contribution to the understanding of how to 
rethink gamification, and also of what is at stake in this process of rethinking. 
For Bergson, a different notion of time entails a different notion of free 
will (as the title of his text suggests). Time as duration means reconsidering our 
involvement in time. While Zeno and Kant’s philosophies place the human 
outside time, in a position where time can be measured and quantified, to 
relocate ourselves within the duration of time, as Bergson proposes, means 
rethinking our engagement with time and the possibility of moving within time. 
Because of this, duration involves the possibility of mobility, and mobility means 
freedom: free will is possible in Bergson’s philosophy as long as it comes to be 
equivalent with movement. 
 Through Ingold and Bergson (who is in fact one of the main sources of 
Ingold’s thought), I have so far tried to trace possible reasons to rethink the 
narrative of engagement as it is replicated in the discourses surrounding 
gamification, and also possible ways for doing so. Engagement might have to do 
with time and duration, with movement and materials, and ultimately with life 
                                                 
66 Nike (2013) ‘What is Fuel?’ NikePlus.com, http://nikeplus.nike.com/plus/what_is_fuel/ [Last 
accessed 8/11/2014] 
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and freedom. I believe most of these aspects have tended not to be considered, so 
far, by either gamification gurus nor game scholars. But what would it mean to 
intervene in and within video games, and the narratives about them, while 
considering these aspects? 
 In the final part of this chapter I will attempt to map some possible ways 
for such forms of intervention. I will do so through the work of Sarah Kember and 
Joanna Zylinska, as delineated in their text Life After New Media: Mediation as a 
Vital Process (2012). I believe this text provides a valuable contribution to the 
questions I am posing for at least two reasons: first, through the notion of the cut 
within processes of mediation, and second, by foregrounding the ethical 
necessity of cutting well as part of the process of doing media studies as a form of 
invention and critique. Kember and Zylinska propose to focus our attention on 
the study of mediation, rather than media, precisely by drawing on Bergson’s 
concepts of duration and intuition. Mediation is concerned with becoming with 
and being in the technological world, and is intended to contrast a study of media 
as a study of fixities within the processes of mediation. Moreover, Bergson’s 
notion of duration is combined with Derrida’s idea of ‘diffe rance’ (1976), which 
takes account of the cuts and interruptions within processes. It is through cuts 
that duration comes to be temporarily fixed, and Kember and Zylinska argue that 
the intrusion of an element of difference within mediation could and should be 
‘creative’ in order to take account of the vitalism of media (2012: xv-xvii). 
I will discuss further at the end of this chapter how creativity could be a 
central issue in the redefinition of game studies. I now intend to offer some 
possible forms of interventions that exemplify what a different way of doing 
things with games could be like. In these examples, taken mostly from the art 
context, our engagement with video games is understood through a different 
configuration, which queries, rather than merely replicates, the dualities and 
separations that tend to frame the processes of understanding of digital games. 
These proposals investigate the materials that video games are made of, and the 
significance of dwelling and playing in a world of materials. Yet they also 
delineate temporary fixities, cuts in an ongoing process of mediating our 
presence in such a world.  
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Gazira Babeli and Game Arthritis: game studies by different means 
 
The works I would like to introduce are a piece by the artist Gazira Babeli (an 
avatar in the game Second Life) and a piece made by Matteo Bittanti and the 
collective IOCOSE. In these investigations, conceived and presented mostly within 
the context of art galleries and festivals, I believe there can be found a suggestion 
of what else game studies could be, and of the implications of finding an 
alternative. 
The work of the artist Gazira Babeli that I would like to introduce is a 
piece she made in 2006, entitled Come to Heaven [See Appendix: images 39 and 
40]. I will propose to look at this performance as a potentially different 
perspective on the relationship between digital games and their materiality, the 
ways in which games are played and how they can be understood to reach 
unexpected results. I suggest that thinking about video games in the terms used 
by Gazira Babeli entails, possibly, looking less at the performativity of games and 
more at games as performers. In the example I will now introduce I believe this 
happens in quite a remarkable way. I will propose that this artistic investigation 
explores the materials of which video games are made, and our co-existence with 
these materials, in a way that is radically alternative (although not intentionally, 
considering its date of publication) to the ways in which the question of 
performativity is currently debated with regard to gamification. I will also draw 
some conclusions about how this and the project Game Arthritis could be seen as 
examples of a creative study of video games. 
 Gazira was a code performer and avatar in Second Life – her artistic career 
was intentionally stopped a few years ago so it is appropriate to talk about her in 
the past tense, as a dead artist. Her work investigated the possibility of 
performing in a digital online environment such as Second Life. In Come to 
Heaven (2006), one of the pieces I find to be most relevant to her career, Gazira 
lets her avatar (her body in the digital simulation) fall from a very high point in 
the sky of Second Life. While falling, the 3D model of the avatar tends to lose its 
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integrity and generates a series of unpredictable glitches.67 
 Gazira’s work centres on one essential property of digital simulations. 
That is, digital simulations, by participating in the ‘war on contingency’ (as 
proposed by Crogan), will replicate the same script with identical results 
regardless of the spatial and temporal context where the script is performed. 
Gazira’s intervention consists of allowing her avatar to automatically repeat the 
same script, which forces the avatar to fly up to the highest point in the digital 
simulation and then freely fall down to the ground. She repeated the same script 
on different computers, with different hardware and at different moments in the 
day (therefore with different Internet connection speeds and traffic). 
 The outcome of her work is a series of still images of the falls. The 
performance stresses the graphic engine of the game and the graphic capabilities 
of the computers where the same code is performed (or, rather, performs). Gazira 
highlights the unpredictability of the engine itself, which mixes the textures of 
the 3D model in different ways each time it is run. At stake here is not only a way 
of playing with the logic of the script. Gazira, more significantly, questions the 
iterability of the code, which makes it reliable and worthwhile, through the 
material from which the computers are made.  
 Gazira’s crucial move is that she does not play the video game Second Life 
but rather sets it up to perform itself. She is not producing or consuming the 
game. Gazira’s intervention is not, simply, a form of re-appropriation of the game 
product or a form of active consumerism. Indeed, she had to program the script 
beforehand, take the screenshots and so on, but the noteworthy part of the work 
is when the hardware performs such a script, when the game plays itself and 
makes itself visible for the materials from which it is made. It becomes crucial, in 
Gazira’s concept, to document and report not only the screenshots of the 
performance but also the exact hardware that has been performing in each 
instance. Graphic cards, CPUs and RAMs are the performers, communicating with 
the servers of Second Life in California, and unpredictably generating graphic 
deformations while overheating and crashing. As Gazira comments: '... millions of 
meters away, at a very high speed. The effect obtained on the graphic card of the 
                                                 
67 Documentation of Gazira’s Come to Heaven is available online from 
http://www.gazirababeli.com/cometoheaven.php [Last accessed 24/10/2014] 
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computer is hard to anticipate and it depends on the creativity process of the 
card itself. Yes, cards go bananas...’ (Gazira Babeli 2006: online). 
 Letting cards go bananas is, potentially, one of the many ways to 
investigate how the narrative of pre-emption, which underlies the computer 
script, can be narrated otherwise. Gazira Babeli’s work does not offer an answer, 
it does not crystallise into a technique for doing things with games, rather it 
offers a temporary perspective on what else scripts, and video games, are, what 
they are made of, and how our ideas about them can be challenged by inquiring 
into such material presence. Gazira offers what Crogan, through Weber, would 
define as a ‘theatrical’ gesture, which questions our participation in the video 
game Second Life and looks at what this participation is made of and how it 
happens rather than, too simply, framing the answer on a producer-consumer 
binary. 
 Another example, which similarly queries the ways in which we dwell and 
co-exist with video games, is Game Arthritis. Game Arthritis is an art project 
presented at the Venice Biennale in 2011 by Matteo Bittanti, adjunct professor at 
the California College of the Arts, and the collective IOCOSE, of which I have 
myself been a member since its inception in 2006. Game Arthritis (2011) is a 
photographic documentation of a ‘systemic study of video game induced 
diseases’ (Bittanti and IOCOSE 2011) [See Appendix: images 41 and 42]. It 
investigates the topic of the alleged effects of video games, particularly from the 
angle of medical and scientific discourse. The project is inspired by, and directly 
references, a series of published papers which, until the early 2000s, claimed that 
video games would affect an entire generation of teenagers by altering their 
bodies due to prolonged use of video game interfaces. From a Foucauldian 
perspective, game arthritis and other differently named disorders (‘3D optical 
disorder’, ‘PlayStation thumb’, ‘Wii shoulder dislocation’, and so on) could be 
seen to have been brought about by authoritarian statements, such as articles in 
medical journals on the evidence of their emergence, and reinforced by 
mainstream newspapers and video game magazines. However, game arthritis 
and other disabilities are also symptomatic of a deterministic narrative that 
permeates both the scientific and mainstream discourse. According to this view, 
video games can harm people – a narrative not necessarily dissimilar in its logic 
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when reverted through a positive connotation (as in Jane McGonigal’s “video 
games will save the world” slogan). Game Arthritis, the art project, displayed, in 
2011, what should have been the scientific evidence of the studies published in 
the early 2000s. No evidence has ever been found, despite the diseases being 
analysed in peer-reviewed scientific journals. The photographic documentation 
shocks the viewer with its disturbing images, which should appear familiar, as 
this is what we have been told video games can do to our bodies, and yet 
unfamiliar at the same time, as an actual image to prove the alleged effects of 
digital games has never been provided. Also, the images of Game Arthritis do not 
match the current trend of describing video games through positive and 
celebratory narratives as an art form, or as good for health and effective in 
preparing the professional class of the next generation (as enthusiastically 
argued in 2004 by Beck and Wade in the first consistent study). It proposes what 
appears to be a sort of conspiracy narrative, according to which the game 
industry has been hiding evidence that would have proved the concerns of the 
scientific community.  
 Game Arthritis summarises, through a series of images, a potential 
narrative of our physical relation with the hardware of the medium. At the same 
time, however, it disputes our tendency to abstract such a relation, allowing 
deterministic discourses to become institutionalised interpretations. Game 
Arthritis’ move is to ridicule such abstraction by proposing examples of players 
actually affected by their continuous contact with the materials of which video 
games are made. Yet it is precisely by switching the focus from an abstract 
discourse to the contingent embodiments of which the various game arthritides 
are made that game arthritis, the disease that officially existed until about a 
decade ago, is revealed to be a rather uncanny and probably biased narrative. 
 Game Arthritis is not just about the properties of the materials from which 
video games are made; it is mostly about the narratives that we (again, both 
scholars and gamers) tend to formulate to make sense of our engagement with 
such materials. The focus is on the human, on the ways in which we participate in 
an environment populated by things, and how we tend to abstract them as 
objects and then resuscitate them by giving them agency, or ‘a sparkle of life’ 
(Ingold 2011). In Game Arthritis the question is about (and the joke is on) us. 
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 When we start thinking about the properties of the materials of video 
games as narratives, we can also imagine stories that are intentionally false. 
However, their fakeness sheds light on what video games are for us and what else 
they could be. I believe a similar approach could also be adopted more 
extensively in the study of games rather than being exclusively undertaken in the 
artistic context. This is what I would like to call creative game studies. I will now 
explain what the creativeness of such a form of scholarship entails and what its 
implications are. 
 
 
Conclusion: creative game studies (or how to do things with gamers' games) 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the emerging narratives of engagement of video 
game players, as exemplified in the current trend of gamification. While also 
present in the debates around the design of games for change, for political 
activism and propaganda, the notion of performativity takes the shape of a 
regulated practice in the discourses around gamification. Gamification is 
proposed as a technique for doing things with games. My analysis has brought 
me to argue that the notion of performativity usually proposed in the discourses 
surrounding gamification tends to oversimplify the issues of agency and 
materiality. However, alternative interpretations of such notions have been 
presented in the academic context. Borrowing a more nuanced understanding of 
performativity could possibly provide the foundation for rethinking gamification. 
Moreover, as gamification tends to replicate existing models in the design of 
games, also often replicated in the academic study of the medium, rethinking 
gamification can also be seen as potentially involving an alternative notion of 
game studies. 
 The alternative I would like to outline here starts from reconsidering our 
own engagement with video games, as both gamers and scholars. Through Ingold 
and Heidegger, I have argued that a first point in the process of rethinking 
gamification and game studies is to counter the theories of agency with the 
concept of dwelling: in this view the observer participates in the same 
environment that is populated by the observed things. However, the transitive 
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acts of observing, as well as producing or consuming, come to be disputed in this 
theory. They are instead substituted by an intransitive process of living within 
and ‘wayfaring’, as Ingold suggests. Participation and co-existence of gamers and 
games in the same environment have been presented as alternative modes of 
thinking about the narratives of engagement that pervade the discourses 
surrounding gamification. I have discussed some examples, mostly from the art 
context, where these alternative modes of thinking about video games have been 
articulated through visual projects. In these works, as I have argued, the 
narratives of participation propose to reinterpret the notions of instrumentalism 
that underpin the leading theories in the design of games, including gamification: 
video games are, in these examples, no longer used for a specific purpose but 
understood as things that have a life of their own and that live with us. 
 At this point, I believe that some conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
study of video games. The field of game studies has often been concerned with 
the boundary between theory and practice, and the analysis of games as opposed 
to the design of games. Experiments in game art, such as the works by Gazira 
Babeli or the ensemble Bittanti-IOCOSE, show us that this separation is difficult 
to maintain. Working with games and thinking about their properties can take 
different forms: game art is, often, game studies by other means. It is from here 
that I would like to plan a form of creative game studies. 
 I use the adjective creative to highlight the productive and performative 
potential of the scholarly interventions that could compose such an approach to 
the study of video games. Creativity is here intended, as Kember and Zylinska 
have proposed, drawing on Bergson and Deleuze, as the ‘condition under which 
something new is produced’, as formulated by Deleuze in his dialogues with 
Claire Parnet (quoted in Kember and Zylinska 2012: 180). 
 Kember and Zylinska discuss creativity in the context of their analysis of 
the concept of performativity in media studies. They are particularly interested 
in how Foucault, Butler and Derrida think about performativity, after Austin, as a 
process of invention. Performativity is seen by these authors not simply as the 
possibility of language to affect reality but as a process that involves and frames 
the speaker as well as bringing about certain realities. Kember and Zylinska 
propose from this to consider a form of ‘socially engaged, critical creativity’, 
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borrowing an expression used by Angela McRobbie (in Kember and Zylinska 
2012: 177). The performative aspect of such engaged creativity would bring 
about ‘creative media’; it would aim at becoming a paradigm for inventing new 
media (189) and creating the conditions for their emergence (188) rather than 
aiming at a distant analysis. 
 The inventive property of critical analysis has been acknowledged by 
other authors, but Kember and Zylinska nuance their proposal for cultural 
engagement by looking at its ethical dimension. The authors explain how Brian 
Massumi, particularly in his text Parables for the Virtual (2002), has also 
proposed to embrace inventiveness in the humanities, intended as the possibility 
of bringing about realities through critical thinking. However, Kember and 
Zylinska notice how invention requires a process of making sense, on the part of 
its author, unless we intend to appreciate invention for its own sake (2012: 180-
182). This is where critique is required. 
 Critique is understood by Kember and Zylinska through Foucault and 
Butler. In a post-Kantian move, critique is seen by Foucault not only as the ability 
to evaluate and judge but also as a method for questioning authority. Critique is 
therefore an ethical activity, not only because it is based on the relation with a 
form of otherness but also because it requires, as Butler argues, a decision. Such 
a decision can take the form of a recomposition of states of being, ultimately 
elevating critique to the status of a normative practice. Critique is therefore seen 
by Kember and Zylinska as a creative and ethical process that should result in a 
‘good’ invention, an invention that is not simply complacent about its own 
existence but also adds in a meaningful, anti-authoritarian way (2012: 183-184). 
 Creative game studies (CGS) should embrace the ethical and normative 
dimension of criticality, as illustrated by Kember and Zylinska. CGS will be 
critically performative, in the sense that it will participate in the process of the 
invention and production of something new while evaluating such invention. CGS 
will also inquire, as I have been attempting to do throughout this dissertation, 
into the intricacies of the narratives that game magazines, the game industry and 
gamers themselves tend to replicate and reinforce. It will propose its own 
narratives, temporary (and sometimes even explicitly false) but always revealing 
of a different way of engaging with video games. 
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 CGS will be anti-authoritarian in at least two ways. First, in that it will 
question the ways in which we are presented with fossilised interpretations of 
the dynamics of the practices that compose video game culture. In the previous 
chapters I looked at how crystallised narratives emerge not only from the game 
industry but from gamers themselves. I analysed how emerging practices of 
engaging with video games and their technologies, such as console hacking or 
independent game development, tend to reinforce the discursive formations of 
video game culture and neglect, relatively quickly, the ethical demands that 
would be otherwise required by putting into question those same discourses. 
Rather than replicating distinctions such as producer and consumer, 
independent and mainstream, or terms such as ownership, democratisation and 
freedom, CGS will inquire into how such expressions have been framed, how they 
came into being and how else they could be. 
 Second, CGS will be anti-authoritarian because it will question and 
confront the war on contingency. It will avoid assimilating its language and 
ideology (as Crogan suggested in his critique of Frasca) and also merely opposing 
it, in a naï ve and self-rewarding war against the ‘games of Empire’ (Dyer-
Witheford and de Peuter 2009). It will instead critique and create narratives for 
engaging with digital simulations in general, and digital games in particular. 
 This second reason also expands on Caroline Bassett’s argument about 
the origins of human-computer interaction and how social and cultural studies 
did not take part in its original development. The use of computer science and 
cognitive psychology to ‘explain the user’ has been bringing about models for the 
organisation of information that have been replicated from cybernetics to the 
development of new media (2007: 56-63). It is only with Haraway’s A Cyborg 
Manifesto and Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (both written between the end 
of the 70s and early 80s), Bassett argues, that computers begin to be understood 
within the humanities and social sciences, that is, outside the models of first-
wave cybernetics. According to Bassett, in Lyotard and Haraway ‘particular forms 
of cybernetics are vilified but are also understood to produce grounds for play’ 
(2007: 72). 
 It is unfortunate that this kind of play has so far been overlooked by the 
theories on the design of video games. In the seminal Rules of Play: Game Design 
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Fundamentals by Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, a textbook adopted in 
academies by the majority of video game development programmes, the 
definition of game is taken a-problematically from communication and system 
theory (2003: 71-83). After providing an overview of various definitions of 
games and play, taken from very different theoretical backgrounds, the two 
authors decide to define ‘game’ as a ‘system in which players engage in an 
artificial conflict, defined by rules, that results in a quantifiable outcome’ (80). 
When the authors discuss the keyword ‘system’, they find it problematic to 
understand what sort of relation a system has with the outside. They therefore 
conclude that: 
 
there are two types of systems, open and closed. […] What makes a system 
open or closed is the relationship between the system and the context, or 
environment, that surrounds it. The ‘matter and energy’ that passes 
between a system and its environment can take a number of forms, from 
pure data [….] to human interaction. (Salen and Zimmerman 2003: 53) 
 
The difficulty of defining how such systems should exist and take place in an 
environment and be opened, or closed, to their exteriority can also be seen in the 
leading theory of the ‘magic circle’. According to this theory, games operate 
within an environment that is separated from the spaces occupied by the 
practices of everyday life. The magic circle is a concept often attributed to Salen 
and Zimmerman’s textbook, as a reference to Johan Huizinga’s seminal Homo 
Ludens (1955). In fact, as an expression ‘magic circle’ appears in both works; 
however, as a concept it is not fully embraced by their authors. Eric Zimmerman 
explained in a recent article how the magic circle should not be intended as much 
more than a design tool for thinking about how games ‘generate meaning’ 
(Zimmerman 2012). The notion is used only sporadically by Huizinga – whose 
contribution, on the contrary, inquires into the numerous intricate ways in which 
play and culture appear to be inseparable, and are thought by the Dutch author 
to be one and the same thing. Zimmerman explains in the same article how, in the 
study of games, scholars have rarely, if ever, fully embraced an obviously limited 
concept such as the magic circle. However, I argue, it is also true that, in the study 
of digital games, it has rarely been investigated what it really means to study 
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games as taking part in that same environment in which they are played.68 
I have proposed in this chapter that embracing this perspective could lead 
to a more radical reconsideration of concepts that tend to underlie both the study 
and the design of games. These concepts include the very separation between 
study and design, production and consumption, more or less magical circles and 
their surroundings, as well as the concepts of the performativity, materiality and 
agency of games. Through Crogan, Ingold, Kember and Zylinska, I have also 
argued here that a creative approach to game studies would be a way to bring 
video games back to life – an endeavour that is probably required with a certain 
urgency, given how rapidly the strangling propositions of gamification 
evangelists have been spreading throughout and beyond video game culture. 
  
                                                 
68 There are, indeed, notable exceptions. Giddings and Kennedy (2008) explore similar directions 
in an ethnographic study of their own performance while playing the video game Lego Star Wars. 
The authors look at their own performance as an event in which both players and game 
continuously negotiate their agency, in a cybernetic loop in which no one is ever completely in 
control. They conclude that players are often trained and ‘acted upon’ by the game (28). The 
authors argue that ‘in studying the event of gameplay we are assuming that the videogame “text”, 
the videogame technologies, and the players are all in play, all objects of study, as are circuits 
within and between them’ (18). 
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Conclusions 
Why we need creativity now - the end of gamers, the end 
of games 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation I have studied the relation between gamers and games, and 
analysed how this is narrated through different discourses. I have argued how we 
can intervene, as scholars and gamers, by rethinking existing narratives. At the 
beginning I have asked myself what is at stake with gamers’ games. Ultimately, I 
argue that there is a re-evaluation of the humanities in the study of video game 
culture. A study of gamers’ games requires a critical intervention that is at the 
same time theoretical and practical, thus deconstructing the distinction between 
the two. The project of creative game studies, as outlined in the last chapter, is 
concerned neither with gamers nor with games or any other term that is 
supposed to label things within a structure of relations, but with the relation 
itself, as unstable, mutating and problematic as it may be. In the conclusions of 
this work I will outline the main theoretical contributions that I have so far 
brought into the discussion and present some further arguments and examples.  
In chapter one I explored how a study of gamers’ games can be carried 
out. In light of the current debates on game studies, too often concerned with the 
foundation of new definitions and explanations of what video games are and can 
do, I have instead argued that we need to find ways to understand digital games 
through a study of relations. I looked at deconstruction (in the formulation of 
Derrida) and post-structuralism as theoretical projects that question what keeps 
opposite categories comparable to each other and similar groupings distant. By 
looking at the ways in which gamers and games are put in contact with each 
other through discursive performances, I argued that the boundary between the 
two becomes problematic to identify. From this theoretical problem, one more 
follows: the very process of identification of the boundary that should separate 
gamers and games becomes constitutive of that same boundary. I argued that the 
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scholar is implicated in a study of gamers’ games as author, at each new reading, 
of a temporary configuration that identifies both gamers and games in their 
difference. For this reason I turned to the concept of the ‘parasite’ by Michel 
Serres (1982), and to the notion of the performativity of discourse (mostly 
drawing on the work of Foucault and Butler). I referred to these authors while 
trying to look at the instability of structural organisations of discourse and at 
how these constantly decentre through the production of new discourses. 
In the theoretical framework outlined at the beginning of my dissertation 
scholarly interventions appear to be always already material: effectively bringing 
about distinctions, separations, definitions and, at the same time, their own 
undoing. Thus, the stories on the history of the medium can be read again for the 
implications they have in the present: the framing of the historical changes of the 
medium do reinforce the current processes of boxing of technologies and their 
consumers. Through a genealogical reading of specific moments of the history of 
video games (the supposed invention of the first video game ever, Spacewar, and 
the excavation of the cartridges of E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial) I have re-evaluated 
the role played by narratives in the invention of facts about the medium and their 
users. Chapter two has served to ultimately ask, in a Foucauldian fashion, what 
the conditions are for saying the truth about video games. Also, I argued that 
those same conditions can be re-fashioned for the formulation of alternative 
narratives that re-interpret our ongoing relationships with the medium. 
Chapters three, four and five offered precisely those alternative narratives. 
In chapter three I looked at the series of hacking of PlayStation3 and PlayStation 
Network and explored different modes of understanding and evaluating the role 
of the hacker. My argument was that these products and services do not even 
need to be opened and unboxed to be modified: these are in fact porous 
technologies, leaking networks that are continuously re-framed through the 
production of discourses about what they are. The series of hacking of Sony’s 
products was a particularly clear case in which several official voices, with 
authoritarian roles, were called to define and establish the boundaries of 
PlayStation3 and its online portal. The hackers are hybrid mediators in a network 
of material-discursive nodes (Latour 2005, Michael 2000, Suchman 2007) and 
can act as parasites (Serres 1982) of the allegedly closed boxes of video game and 
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technological products. In chapter three I argued that the invention of 
reconfigurations of video game technologies can happen from a variety of 
sources, and not only from those which are in a position of power (as, in this 
case, Sony Computer Entertainment, some of the most influential hackers and, 
indeed, the scholarly accounts of the events). Those who have been playing with 
PlayStation3 and its porous boundaries could continue doing so imagining new 
ways of relating to the console and to each other, welcoming practices of sharing 
and mutual assistance in the production and consumption of video games. What 
is left to be questioned is the value of those practices, and the implications of the 
claims of freedom often used to support forms of hacking. 
Chapter four further looked at the politics around practices of production 
and consumption, while making a case for the role that ethics play in the 
evaluation of those practices. The emergence of the notion of independence in 
video game culture brings to question how individuals define themselves within 
the territory of independent game production in relation to other independent or 
non-independent developers. Independence soon appears as a ‘floating signifier’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985), or a blanket too short to cover all the different 
modalities of independence. Thus, game developers ask themselves questions 
about who they are and what they do, and the answers they provide can make 
the difference. The individualisation of game developers can turn into narcissism, 
or even into solipsism, feelings of depression and desperation (as seen in some 
scenes of Indie Game: The Movie). However, through confrontation with the other 
differently independent developers and designers, independence works as an 
inconsumable force that raises the ethical question of how to take care of the 
alterity which it necessarily evokes, of the other self-proclaimed independent or 
those outside the independent territory. Ethics can be the driving force of the 
narratives of independence that circulate within video game culture, thus 
eliminating the individualisation of the developers in favour of a practice of 
making games in relation to others. 
The narratives of independence in video game culture participate in a 
broader series of stories in which gamers and games relate to each other in 
complex ways, possibly influencing and engaging with each other. In chapter five 
I ultimately argued that a new narrative of engagement is the purpose of a study 
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of gamers’ games. In this chapter, through the work of Ingold (2010, 2011), 
Heidegger (1971a, 1971b) and Bergson (1914, 2001), I explained how the study 
of games is another way of doing things with games, but I also argued that such a 
scholarly project needs to be creative if it intends to be critical and anti-
authoritarian. I defined these two qualities of creative game studies as the 
capacity to bring about realities through its own interventions and questioning 
the fossilisations in dualities and oppositions of the discourses on game culture. 
Creativity is, in the final analysis, the concept I offer to the study of gamers’ 
games and which can bring to a re-evaluation of the humanities in this field. In 
the rest of the conclusions I want to further stress how and why creativity is 
needed now, and how a creative study of games can provide paths for future 
research. 
 
 
Why we need creativity now 
 
The stories surrounding the medium of the video game are often about changes. 
Reconnecting to the cases discussed in the introduction, and to the numerous 
others outlined in this dissertation, the medium is often presented by industry 
experts and game journalists as undergoing a series of revolutions. The 
production of games is allegedly becoming easier and more accessible to many, 
games might soon become part of the education programs in schools and are 
now used to discuss social problems and to solve health issues. Other stories that 
have been mentioned in the present work include the now accepted adoption of 
video games by artists and in art institutions, the use of video games to deliver 
political messages, the involvement of gamers in the production of content of 
games and, when this possibility is denied, the organisation of gamers into 
groups who decide to modify and manipulate the games they buy. All these 
trends are often described as changes towards a new age of gaming, one where 
the categories and labels of the past are going to be replaced by new ones. The 
history and contemporary condition of the medium is often seen by industry 
experts as in a constant process of evolution through major revolutionary 
moments. 
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 Radical changes are thus the norm in the medium of the video game. The 
introduction of a new game console, for example, is often described as belonging 
to a new generation of products. In the jargon of console manufacturers, the 
release of consoles can be divided in historical ages, often associated with the 
kind of processor used: from the 8-bit and 16-bit era of Nintendo historical 
consoles we have processed to Sony’s PlayStation, the most famous 32-bit 
console, and then to Nintendo64 (named after its 64-bit processor) and so on 
until the contemporary generation of PlayStation4 and Xbox One, usually 
referred to as the eight generation or cycle of consoles (the amount of bits is now 
considered less relevant and generations are conventionally numbered in a 
progressive order). 
 In this history of evolutions and revolutions, I decide to turn to creativity 
in the study of video games and their players. The reason for this is the dead end 
to which the categorisations operated by (r)evolutionary discourses tend to 
relegate the medium. As a succession of consoles, trends, ages and models of 
production and consumption, the narratives on the history and prospected future 
of the medium offer a discontinuous and yet repetitive analysis. In these views, 
one event, invention or product follows the other in an orderly fashion (and will 
be followed by a new one rather soon). The presentations of such orderly 
successions rarely take into account the ideologies of progress associated with it. 
More importantly, these stories often take the timely progression of technology 
as granted and as narrated by neutral voices. 
 In this dissertation I have tried to question where these stories originate, 
how and by whom they are narrated. The apparent linearity of the narratives of 
conflict, independence and engagement that I have looked at in this work lose 
their integrity when confronted with the multiplicity of voices that overlap with 
each other in defining, explaining and describing the phenomena behind them. 
The order that results from these descriptions has been understood as always in 
relation to a temporary and located form of intellectual approach to media, one 
that separates and differentiates through spatial and temporal categorisations: in 
these views, producers are separated from consumers as much as one video 
game product will follow another, and gamers and games are seen to influence, 
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affect and manipulate each other from separate positions in an imagined and 
abstract spatiality. 
 Why is creativity an appropriate destination in this research project, and 
how can it take account of the tendency to understand the medium of the video 
game through discontinuous successions? In Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1914), 
creativity is defined as that which can take account for both the discontinuity of 
evolution and its products and the continuity of life. While intelligence allows an 
analytical and spatialised approach to the world around us, keeping us external 
to the same world, intuition lets us reconnect with the vital impulse and place 
ourselves within evolution, as part of it. Intuition has been seen in this 
dissertation as a strategy for countering categorisations and dualities (such as 
gamers and games) whenever these are presented as given. Through intuition I 
argue instead that we (scholars and gamers) can question the origins of these 
separations and offer new narratives of them, new temporary categorisations. 
 Creativity is also a good concept for evaluating scholarly interventions. It 
brings us to consider the production of narratives as always necessarily being 
part of the stories on and of media. The creative interventions in the study of 
games that I encourage in this conclusion need to reconnect with the duration 
and temporality of the narratives of media. This means understanding that 
interventions happen in a specific time and place and that these can be separated 
from the temporality of their happening only by giving them the aura of 
neutrality of the essentialist and ontological analyses. 
 Creative interventions are needed now, in at least two senses. First, we 
need creativity in this specific period in which the academic study of video games 
is allegedly becoming less useful, or maybe entirely irrelevant, in the preparation 
of students to get a job in the industry. Creativity is the concept that makes the 
study of the humanities relevant in the academic curricula for those who want to 
invent new video games. The attacks to the humanities that have been 
perpetuated in the last years from several political actors in Western 
democracies and, more recently, as I will soon discuss, by the proponents of the 
GamerGate controversy, are representative of a widespread feeling of hate for 
anything that is not seen as being immediately useful and spendable. Creativity is 
thus needed precisely as a mode for questioning where the assumptions on 
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usefulness originate, from which political and ideological background and as part 
of which general plan for the precarisation of labour. Precarisation which 
involves both lecturers and students, with the former often evaluated as not 
necessary to make the game industry work, and the latter being precarised by 
the high fees required to get access to university in the hope of becoming part, 
one day, of the category of the useful ones. Re-evaluating the humanities in the 
study of digital games through the notion of creativity is a needed intervention, 
given the current political context. Higher education might easily prepare 
students to work immediately after graduation in the game industry, but this will 
be useful only in the short term. In fact, it is not a great achievement if those 
same students are not challenged by the continuous question of how to be good 
game makers – thus, knowing not only how to do their job but also, possibly, how 
to reinvent it. 
Second, creativity is needed now in the sense that the creative study of 
games must take responsibility for the moment in which it happens and for the 
events it originates. Being inserted in time and having its own duration, it cannot 
expect to understand what games are, how they work and with what 
consequences (as in the ludological and procedural approaches) but needs to 
acknowledge its being part of the medium. Exceptions and inconsistent 
discourses will always occur and ruin the theorisations of ontologies of games. 
This does not mean we should stop trying to understand games, but welcome the 
ruptures and events that decentre the structures of theoretical discourse. In the 
end, studying video games creatively also means asking ourselves how to be good 
hosts and guests (hôte), in the Serres parlance, of the diverse modes in which 
play happens. As discussed in the introduction, this will indeed lead to a certain 
‘anxiety’, of the kind Derrida proposed to be necessarily emerging when being 
‘implicated in the game, [and] from the very beginning at stake in the game’ 
(1980: 248). But this is a problem that should not be escaped, and that will 
certainly make all of us, gamers and scholars, feel more alive. 
 
 
The end of gamers, the end of games 
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There are more good reasons for staying alive within a creative study of gamers’ 
games. In fact, recent stories disseminated from the game industry have been 
suggesting that both terms, gamers and games, and the categories they designate, 
might be about to die. The death of gamers and games has been narrated by 
several authors and mostly presented as a consequence of the now wide 
distribution of video game products. The diversification of game products (from 
big-budget developments to mobile applications made by a single developer in a 
day), the multiplication of devices and formats (home consoles, PCs, 
smartphones, social networks and so on) and the varied audience sectors 
(families, women, children and over-60s) have allegedly abolished video games 
and their consumers as an identifiable category. This is what we are told, for 
instance, by Ian Bogost (2011c), who concludes his book saying that:  
 
If videogame playership is indeed broadening, then videogames will no longer 
fall under the sole purview of the games industry. There’ll no longer be a single 
court in which the legitimacy of games will be tried. There’ll no longer be an 
oligarchy of videogame industrialists – gods to whom all creators and players 
pay homage. Instead, there’ll be many smaller groups, communities, and 
individuals with a wide variety of interests, some of them occasionally 
intersecting with particular videogame titles. […A]s videogames broaden in 
appeal, being a ‘gamer’ will actually become less common, if being a gamer 
means consuming games as one’s primary media diet or identifying with 
videogames as part of one’s identity. […] Soon gamers will be the anomaly. If we 
are fortunate, they’ll disappear altogether. (Bogost 2011c: 153-154) 
 
Before Bogost, Jesper Juul (2009) advocated that the demographics of video 
games are changing to include different sectors previously not considered. This is 
leading to the rise of the casual gamer, who is not an avid consumer but only 
occasionally engages with digital games. 
 This change is also bringing about the end of games as we know them. In 
some contexts, video games appear to be increasingly substituted by apps; for 
instance, in the field of gamification app often replaces, as a term, video game, 
probably as a more friendly expression for those who might not be familiar with 
the world of PC and console gaming but use smartphones in their daily lives. In 
the HSBC advertisement, discussed in the introduction, the imaginary game 
Sticky Weasel is never called a video game but always an app. Furthermore, social 
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networks and Facebook in particular have incorporated games in their offering, 
blurring the experience of socialising with that of playing. 
Moreover, when in May 2013 Microsoft presented the new Xbox One 
console, the stress placed by the presenters on stage on how the console will be 
just like television or bring home a TV-like experience attracted the criticism of 
many traditional customers and fan communities of Microsoft products.69 
Microsoft representatives seemed hesitant to pronounce the words gamers and 
games, as if this could restrict their target audience. The merging of television 
and online services into home consoles (including Sony’s PlayStation4) can be 
seen as part of a trend where the previously essential hard-core market is now 
becoming less important, in favour of mixed categories of consumers interested 
in different forms of digital entertainment. Sony itself, when promoting its 
PlayStation4 console, attempted to contrast its competitor Microsoft by 
addressing its marketing to a more conventional audience, adopting the slogan 
‘This is for the players’, thus avoiding the word gamers and choosing a broader 
term for whoever might be interested in an entertaining experience.70 
The disappearance of the words is significant of the fact that gamers and 
games now have a negative connotation. Both are seen as being associated with a 
male teenager, no longer appealing to the contemporary audience. In recent 
months gamer culture has been considered to be definitely dead, and for good, 
because of the GamerGate controversy. GamerGate originated when game 
designer Zoe Quinn was accused by online detractors of having a conflict of 
interest with Nathan Grayson, a journalist for the game magazine Kotaku. The 
controversy escalated in a series of personal attacks against Quinn, who was in 
her turn supported by several scholars and journalists who defended her 
position. One in particular, Anita Sarkeesian, who released in the same period a 
series of videos accusing the game industry of objectifying women in games and 
in work placements, took a stand in favour of Quinn. GamerGate soon became an 
attack against women and feminists, seen as threatening the male-dominated 
culture of video games. GamerGate culminated in death threats against both 
Quinn and Sarkeesian and the publication of their private addresses and contact 
                                                 
69 Kelion, L,. (22nd May 2013) ‘Xbox One: Web Reacts to Microsoft’s Multimedia Console’, BBC 
News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22620039 [Last accessed 8/11/2014] 
70 The campaign was commissioned in 2013 to the agency 180Amsterdam. 
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details. As part of the controversy, the work of academic scholars who supported 
Quinn and Sarkeesian, particularly within the Digital Games Research 
Association (DiGRA), has been analysed by GamerGate supporters in order to 
create lists of enemies to denigrate within academia. The movement of self-
professed “social justice warriors” against the alleged overabundance of women 
in gaming culture has been active for several months, mostly in online 
communities such as 4chan and on Twitter. 
As GamerGate reached its lowest point in the denigration of women, the 
hypothesis that gamers might be about to disappear seemed to receive further 
confirmation. Leigh Alexander on Gamasutra (28 August 2014) titled an article 
‘Gamers Don’t Have to Be Your Audience. Gamers Are Over’.71 Dan Golding, 
academic and blogger, wrote a post on the same day about the end of gamers. As 
Golding puts it: ‘[gamers] have astutely, and correctly identified what is going on 
here. Their toys are being taken away […]. Videogames now live in the world and 
there is no going back. I am convinced that this marks the end. We are finished 
here. From now on, there are no more gamers – only players’ (Golding 2014). 
Both articles, influential in the following days on social networks, depicted a sad 
representation of gamers: a minority that seeks confirmation for its aggressive 
and oppressive behaviour against a new emerging and wide audience of players, 
which is apparently making gamers disappear to the point that they are no 
longer relevant. 
The GamerGate controversy has brought to light something that was 
generally well known about video game culture, that is, the overarching 
masculinity that dominates in the industry and among many consumers. This 
and other similar stories regarding the inclusion and representation of women in 
game industry have not been properly discussed in this dissertation. However, I 
argue that a creative approach to game studies can also intervene on these 
occasions – an endeavour that could be carried forward into future research. A 
creative study of games takes into account how categories such as gamers and 
games, men and women and even the boxing of media into identifiable 
                                                 
71 Alexander, L. (28 August 2014) ‘Gamers Don’t Have to Be Your Audience. Gamers Are Over’, 
Gamasutra.com, 
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/224400/Gamers_dont_have_to_be_your_audience_Gam
ers_are_over.php [Last accessed 8/11/2014] 
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technologies (video games, television, smartphones and so on) are brought about 
through discourse, and how the production of these discourses entails an ethical 
demand for hospitality. Creative game studies incessantly asks itself how to be 
good hosts and guests of the actors invented through the narratives that make 
sense of video game culture. 
Within this perspective, I also argue that ethics becomes a crucial element 
while attempting to be hospitable. Paraphrasing a slogan used to ridicule the 
supporters of GamerGate, it can be said that actually, it’s about ethics in game 
studies.72 Ethics offers an unresolved question about the understanding of 
ongoing and conflicted relations. Through ethics we can assess and evaluate the 
temporary fixities that will inevitably be created through our scholarly 
interventions, while relating ourselves to a series of unresolved relations. 
Academics are in fact parasites, as many denigrators of the ivory tower of 
academia might say, but of the good kind: I argue that our duty is to become the 
third destabilising actor in relations of dualities, letting structures implode while 
opening them in order to welcome further hôte, as Serres would put it. 
GamerGate, and other examples of the possible end of gamers and games, 
should not be used to simplify the issues at stake. If gamers and games belong to 
the past, then we might as well be concerned about what else they are becoming, 
or what is replacing them. It is possible that new denominations are now 
becoming widespread (players instead of gamers, and maybe apps instead of 
games) but who is deciding about the new words to be used? Who is affirming 
that gamers and games are dead, and who was dissatisfied with the previous 
condition? 
Claiming that gamers are over can hardly represent an inclusive approach 
towards those who, for example, currently identify with the hard-core 
community but equally disagree with the aggressive stance of the “social justice 
warriors”. The GamerGate controversy ends up denouncing an aggressive 
                                                 
72 The statement “actually, it’s about ethics in game journalism” has become a meme while 
GamerGate has been circulating online. It worked as an ironic comment on those who attempted 
to defend the attackers of Quinn, Sarkeesian and the feminist movement. In fact, those supporting 
the attacks claimed that the scandal was about game journalism and its oft-debated relations 
with game designers, particularly the independent ones, and had nothing to do with the presence 
of women in game culture. The claim was seen as an absurd pretence to defend an unjustifiable 
behaviour that was blatantly offending and threatening women (and only women). 
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behaviour that might equally be re-appropriated by the new audiences (or 
whoever speaks for them), particularly if it is seen as a winner-takes-all scenario 
where a new majority is supplanting the previous one. Not coincidentally, I 
believe, many of the claims of the end of gamers have been supported by market 
research statistics from various organisations and institutions, all equally 
showing that female gamers are now the majority, or close to becoming so. 
Moreover, Microsoft and Sony are attempting to move in a similar direction to 
that taken by Nintendo with its Wii console in 2006, that is, appealing to a 
diverse market that will guarantee a more solid base of consumers with varied 
tastes. For the main publishers, GamerGate also represents an excellent occasion 
to finally appeal to a wider and more profitable market while denigrating the 
criticism received from hard-core gamers. Moreover, the defence of the rights of 
women to be represented in video games in a respectful way, and to take part in 
the industry with fair salaries and the same rights as men, cannot be justified by 
the emergence of a market sector: it should be achieved regardless of the number 
of women involved, and not because of them supposedly becoming a majority. 
In this and other similar situations a creative study of video game culture 
is crucial and can help us understand what makes the difference between 
oppression and inclusion, aggression and hospitality. A creative study of 
GamerGate introduces critical intervention as a form of hospitality towards the 
actors involved in the controversy, letting them speak and unfold their narratives 
before making a cut, in such a multitude of voices, through the invention of a new 
story. This act of invention will avoid becoming itself an aggressive attack in 
which old categories are replaced with new ones. Looking at the multiple ways in 
which gamers define themselves and others entails taking into account a 
multiplicity of different voices, rather than their fossilisation in categories or 
even in market sectors. Listening to gamers’ games also means dismissing 
neither. 
As argued by Gilbert (2008): ‘every group identity is a provisional and 
partial fiction. What is more problematic is the assumption that it is only through 
such group identities, rather than through complex processes of mutual 
interaction, that collectivities can come into being at all’ (159). I maintain 
Gilbert’s proposition that reflecting on the complexities of these processes of 
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interaction is one of the main objectives of cultural study. Of course, decisions 
will need to be made. The angry masculine gamer claiming to be oppressed and 
marginalised is not the same as the woman who is harassed while playing online 
or working in a video game company. But what matters is explaining why it is not 
the same (and being a growing market sector cannot be, I believe, the main 
reason).  
In this context I argue that narratives constitute a crucial tool. Narratives 
have been theorised in this dissertation as performative discourses that are 
capable of describing and bringing about realities. Formulating narratives is a 
way of making choices, of ‘cutting’ (Kember and Zylinska 2012) one or a few 
configurations out of the many possible. In the debate over the end of gamers and 
games we need to operate choices in between the major narratives that are 
pronounced by institutionalised voices, and look at how categories have been 
made, who or what is instead marginalised and how else these same categories 
could be reconfigured. Similar questions have been posed in the work of Michel 
Foucault, particularly in regard to how relations of power operate with and are 
replicated through discourse, and at the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
for its struggle to understand the differences within discursive formations 
without reducing them to political categories.  
While gamers and games might be dead according to many commentators, 
gamers’ games instead, seen as processes of mutual relations, are alive and well. 
Looking at gamers’ games (rather than the two separately) is a fruitful 
perspective when trying to understand the many mutations and contaminations 
operating within video game culture. In this dissertation I have been taking the 
first steps towards a methodology for the study of gamers’ games, one that aims 
at re-evaluating the role of the humanities in the study of the medium of the 
video game and the importance of theory for understanding, making and living 
with games. In other words, these are the guidelines for a new game, a game 
which can and will be improved in the future, but which I find to be already much 
more entertaining than those we have been playing with so far. 
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Appendix: images 
 
 
[Image 1] Sony Computer Entertainment, Little Big Planet (source: Sony 
Computer Entertainment) 
 
 
[Image 2] Sony Computer Entertainment, Little Big Planet (source: Sony 
Computer Entertainment) 
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[Image 3] Sony's Net Yaroze (source: Sony Computer Entertainment) 
 
[Image 4] Sony's Net Yaroze: development kit and manuals 
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[Image 5] Valve, Half Life (source: Valve) 
[Image 6] Counter-Strike, modification of Half Life 
 247 
 
 
[Image 7] Linden Lab, Second Life (source: Linden Lab) 
 
 
[Image 8] Mojang, Minecraft (source: Mojang) 
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[Image 9] HSBC, In the Future campaign – Sticky Weasel (source: JWT Dubai) 
 
 
 
[Image 10] HSBC, In the Future campaign – Sticky Weasel (source: JWT Dubai) 
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[Image 11] JODI, SOD (source: Jodi.org) 
[Image 12] JODI, Jet Set Willy @ 1984 (source: Jodi.org) 
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[Image 13] Miltos Manetas, Super Mario Sleeping (still from video) (source: 
miltosmanetas.com) 
 
[Image 14] Miltos Manetas, Super Mario Sleeping (still from video) (source: 
miltosmanetas.com) 
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[Image 15] Alan Kotok, Stephen Russell and Shag Graetz playing Spacewar, 1962 
(source: Computer History Museum, Mountain View, CA) 
[Image 16] Dan Edwards and Peter Samson playing Spacewar, 
1962 (source: Computer History Museum, Mountain View, CA) 
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[Image 17] Atari’s E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial excavation (source: ArsTechnica.com) 
 
 
 
[Image 18] Atari’s E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial excavation (source: ArsTechnica.com) 
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[Image19] Molleindustria, McDonald’s Videogame (source: molleindustria.org) 
 
[Image 20] Molleindustria, Oiligarchy (source: molleindustria.org) 
 
[Image 21] Molleindustria, Operation Pedopriest (source: molleindustria.org) 
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[Image 22] Molleindustria, Unmanned (source: molleindustria.org) 
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[Image 23] Steam indie channel (source: store.steampowered.com) 
 
 
[Image 24] IndieCity homepage (source: store.indiecity.com) 
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[Image 25] Anna Anthropy, dys4ia (source: auntiepixelante.com) 
 
[Image 26] Anna Anthropy, Triad (source: auntiepixelante.com)  
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[Image 27] Cactus, Tuning (source: cactus-soft.co.nr) 
 
 
[Image 28] Cactus, Tuning (source: cactus-soft.co.nr) 
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[Image 29] Frecle, Youropa (source: Frecle) 
 
 
 
[Image 30] Frecle, Youropa (source: Frecle) 
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[Image 31] Nike, Nike FuelBand (source: Nike, Inc.) 
 
 
[Image 32] Nike, Nike+ running app (source: Nike, Inc.) 
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[Image 33] Jane McGonigal, SuperBetter (source: Superbetter Labs, Inc.) 
 
 
[Image 34] Jane McGonigal, SuperBetter (source: Superbetter Labs, Inc.) 
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[Image 35] StackOverFlow, website homepage (source: stackoverflow.com) 
 
[Image 36] FourSquare, website (source: foursquare.com)  
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[Image 37] //////////fur//// art entertainment interfaces, PainStation (source: 
fursr.com) 
 
[Image 38] Eddo Stern and C-Level, Tekken Torture Tournament (source: 
eddostern.com)  
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[Image 39] Gazira Babeli, Come To Heaven, painted on NVIDIA GeForce 7600 GT 
at sunrise, lambda prints (source: gazirababeli.com) 
 
[Image 40] Gazira Babeli, Come To Heaven, painted on NVIDIA GeForce 7600 GT 
at noon, lambda prints (source: gazirababeli.com)  
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[Image 41] Matteo Bittanti and IOCOSE, Game Arthritis - Nintendo Arthritis, C-
print (source: gamearthritis.org)s 
 
[Image 42] Matteo Bittanti and IOCOSE, Game Arthritis - 3D Optical Disorder, C-
print (source: gamearthritis.org) 
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